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Abstract 
The threat of extremism is profound and the number of individuals being radicalised within local 
communities in the UK continues to grow. The Prevent Strategy was developed to identify, support and 
ultimately stop people being drawn into extremism. It relies heavily on community policing principles and 
engagement between local police and local people. This research looks at the relationship between 
Neighbourhood Police and Counter Terrorism at ground level. It questions whether community 
engagement is as crucial to countering terrorism as the Prevent Strategy suggests, asks how this 
currently works in practice, and crucially whether this could be improved.  
 
The research uses West Yorkshire Police as a basis and identifies four Neighbourhood Policing Teams 
as case studies, keeping the focus on frontline practices. A mixed methodological approach including 
interviews with NPT and counter terrorism personnel, focus groups with community participants, analysis 
of police activity reports, and observations of on duty police officers and PCSOs was employed. This 
provides a comprehensive assessment of how West Yorkshire Police delivers Prevent in our communities 
and a wealth of data to suggest how these practices may be improved.  
 
This research concluded that positive community engagement is a significant factor to the successful 
delivery of the Prevent Strategy and as such community policing principles should be at the forefront of 
preventing extremism, however the current role of NPTs within the delivery of the Prevent Strategy was 
found to be well below the intended level. NPTs have limited capacity to carry out engagement within 
communities for general policing purposes, and generally lack the confidence, knowledge and information 
to proactively engage within vulnerable communities on topics relating to extremism. Whilst these 
challenges could be overcome with increased focus on training, information sharing and re-prioritisation, 
it is clear that the reducing resources and increasing demands placed on policing nationally will also need 
to be addressed if local police are going to be able to play a more significant role in the delivery of Prevent. 
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Introduction  
 
“Community policing is the cornerstone of counter terrorism,” (Choudhary et.al., 2011, p.16) this is a 
phrase often used by advocates of neighbourhood policing and security experts alike, and points to an 
intrinsic link between a police service which works with communities, and its ability to protect them from 
great harms. In England and Wales the Prevent Strategy makes up one quarter of the Government’s 
counter terrorism strategy CONTEST, and is fundamentally based on the principle that to prevent 
extremism thriving within communities, the authorities must work within and with communities to build 
resilience. Put simply, the strategy draws heavily on the concept of community policing as a tactic to 
counter terrorism. Whilst many agree with the theory that the police must work with communities to 
counter extremist influences within them, the integration of two very different policing purposes 
(community policing and national security) is much more complex in practice. This research has explored 
the principles and practices of both community policing and counter terrorism within West Yorkshire 
Police as a case study, to ascertain whether neighbourhood policing should be utilised differently within 
the delivery of the Prevent Strategy, and if so how.  
 
Research Area 
The overarching aim of this research is to understand whether neighbourhood policing could and should 
be used differently to prevent violent extremism. To appreciate the motivations for this research, it is 
important to first understand how the Prevent Strategy currently fits into counter terrorism policing in 
England and Wales, and in turn how it links to community policing. The Prevent Strategy is one of the 
four strands1 of CONTEST which is the overarching counter terrorism Strategy of the British Government. 
CONTEST fundamentally comes under the control of the Home Office department of the OSCT2 but is 
                                                          
1 The strategy uses the ‘four Ps’ structure of Prevent, Prepare, Protect, and Pursue.  
2 Office for Security and Counter Terrorism 
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directed at operational level by the National Police Chief’s Council (NPCC, formerly ACPO).3 The NPCC 
subsequently deliver this through their internal Police Counter Terrorism Structure (PCTS) which is also 
referred to as the Counter Terrorism Network. This network sits alongside local police force structures 
but is distinct in many ways; the clearest difference being that the Counter Terrorism Network is broken 
down in a number of regional Counter Terrorism Units, whilst police forces are generally aligned to historic 
constabulary boundaries. The North East Counter Terrorism Unit (NECTU) actually covers the 
geographical area of seven police forces; whilst it is staffed predominantly by police officers and staff 
from these police forces, it is for governance purposes, directed by the OSCT. This essentially means 
that whilst the Prevent Strategy is often referred to as a police led multi-agency approach, local police 
forces have little to do with the governance and implementation of it, and instead regional Counter 
Terrorism Units take the lead, involving their local police forces to varying levels across the country.  
 
The overarching aim of the Prevent Strategy is to intervene at the earliest opportunity to stop people 
being radicalised and drawn into extremism, it intends to do so by building communities that are resilient 
to extremist influences and supporting those who are vulnerable using many of the same tactics found in 
community policing. The strategy was drafted with a heavy focus on partnership working, community 
engagement and local policing, however in practice the policing element of Prevent sits predominantly 
within the wider CTUs and not the local police resulting in a disparity between how Prevent looks in the 
strategy and on the frontline. Whilst Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs) are also involved in its 
delivery, the extent to which they are responsible for it, is unspecified by the Home Office, and as such 
varying levels and localised practices have developed across police forces. This research opted to focus 
on West Yorkshire Police as a case study to inform how Prevent can be delivered in policing. 
Understanding the level of involvement that NPTs currently have in the delivery practices of Prevent 
within West Yorkshire Police, whether there is a disparity between theory and practice, and the reasons 
                                                          
3 ACPO TAM (Association of Chief Police Officers – Terrorism and Allied Matters) changed to the NPCC in 2015 (National 
Police Chiefs’ Council). 
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for this, were integral to the ultimate aim of this research, which was to establish whether NPTs could or 
should be used differently within the delivery of Prevent.  
 
Research Aims 
As mentioned above the overarching focus of this research was to establish whether or not NPTs could 
and should be utilised differently within the delivery of the Prevent Strategy. To ascertain this, the 
research began with an assessment of the importance of community engagement within Prevent, to 
determine whether NPTs should be considered a suitable ‘delivery provider’. The second research aim 
was to better understand the current function of NPTs within the delivery of Prevent; as mentioned above 
there was a great deal of speculation regarding how this differed in practice from the initial intentions of 
the strategy, the final research objective focused on the logistical, operational, ethical and legal issues 
around whether the current function of NPTs within the delivery of Prevent could be altered. The three 
key research aims and how they were met are briefly outlined below.  
 
Research Aim One: To investigate the significance of community engagement within the Prevent 
Strategy. 
Since its conception in 2003, the Prevent Strategy has been concentrated heavily on defeating extremism 
through regular and constructive engagement with communities that have been identified as potentially 
vulnerable to becoming supporters of terrorism or engaging in extremist activity themselves. The policy 
wording of the first Prevent Strategy identified community engagement as the integral aspect of Prevent 
and the most visible evidence of this is the repeated promotion of the Neighbourhood Policing Model in 
the literature (covered in chapter one). There was also a clear emphasis placed on community policing 
tactics such as increasing police presence in certain areas, making conscious efforts to interact with 
previously isolated communities, regular engagement between the local communities and partners, and 
monitoring confidence and satisfaction in the local police (Huq et al., 2011). This research investigated 
whether the significance of community engagement within the Prevent Strategy was justifiable, 
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predominantly through a literature review which focused on the theories behind cohesion and community 
policing. The literature review also concentrated on the early policy development of the Prevent Strategy 
and its precursor the Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund (PVEPF) which was widely criticised 
within the communities that it was implemented. Assessing the aims of these policies; (to improve 
community cohesion) against their outcomes (the impact they had on communities and counter terrorism 
policing), helped to firstly determine whether a strong focus on community engagement within the Prevent 
Strategy was justified, therefore leading to a further discussion around the suitability of the 
Neighbourhood Policing Model for the purposes of preventing extremism.   
 
Research Aim Two: To understand the current function of NPTs within the Prevent Strategy 
The second research question focused upon the analysis of the function of the NPTs within the delivery 
of Prevent to date. This was crucial to the research as it would be futile to try and achieve an 
understanding of what the role of NPTs could or should be within the delivery of the Prevent Strategy 
without first understanding their current function. As noted above, anecdotal evidence suggested a 
disparity between the intended function of NPTs within the Prevent Strategy and their role in practice. 
This was (and remains) a very contentious issue in that despite suggestions both in the policies and 
research surrounding Prevent which claim that Neighbourhood Policing should be at the forefront of 
community engagement and Prevent Policing (Bettison, 2009), in reality NPTs appeared to play a very 
minor role. Instead the task of dealing with Prevent Policing was designated solely to a few specialist 
Prevent Teams and Prevent Engagement Officers (PEOs), these positions were brought in with 
CONTEST specifically with the intention of being overt links between vulnerable communities and the 
Police with specialist knowledge of localised extremism issues. The establishment of specialist Prevent 
Teams, led to speculation around the function of NPTs in Prevent; the strategy stressed the importance 
of community policing but then appeared not to utilise the well-established Neighbourhood Policing Model 
(and NPTs) to full effect. Later guidance advised that Prevent Teams should be positioned alongside 
local NPTs and the two should work together and share information in order to broaden the effect of 
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‘Prevent Policing’ in the local communities. This approach could be seen as an attempt to balance the 
specialisms needed for counter terrorism with the broad principles and practices of community policing, 
however, initial conversations showed that this suggestion had little impact on practice and the two teams 
continued to have very little interaction with each other; many NPT Officers were unaware of the Prevent 
Strategy, their local Prevent Officers or its implementation within their area. In order to establish whether 
this was an accurate reflection of the current relationship between the two policing purposes, this 
research investigated what the actual function of the NPTs was, through literature review, interviews, 
activity reports, focus groups and observations within West Yorkshire Police case studies.  
 
Research Aim 3: Should and could NPTs be utilised differently within the delivery of the Prevent Strategy.  
Achieving research aims one and two, provided much of the context needed to determine whether NPTs 
could or should be used differently within the delivery of Prevent. There were many different aspects to 
this research question; whether NPTs could be utilised differently was perhaps less complex; it required 
an understanding of the capacity and capability of NPTs in comparison with the needs of the strategy. 
This could be assessed relatively clearly through a review of NPTs practices, culminating in suggestions 
regarding the boundaries of NPT roles and responsibilities and whether these could be changed to 
include more or less involvement within Prevent policing.  
 
Whether NPTs should be utilised differently within the delivery of the Prevent Strategy was perhaps the 
more complicated aspect. It required judgements to be made about the suitability of NPT involvement in 
an already contentious area of policing based on ethical and legal boundaries as well as the logistical 
impact of increased or decreased involvement. The issue of ‘mainstreaming’ Prevent across police forces 
through increased use of NPTs was already highly debated; on one side concerns had been raised over 
placing additional duties which require specialist care, a high level of understanding and time, onto police 
officers who are already at capacity dealing with a broad range of core-policing duties. Similarly critics of 
Prevent claimed that it was already a mis-handled strategy which isolated vulnerable communities and 
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that this would only worsen if NPT officers were involved. Alternatively it had also been said that NPTs 
as community focused police officers who know their communities, provide the best platform to initiate a 
broad community engagement strategy such as Prevent, and if given the correct training and level of 
responsibility (i.e. in support of PEOs, not instead of them) increasing the use of NPTs could broaden the 
impact that Prevent would have on communities in a positive way.  
 
This thesis provides an in depth understanding of these issues through a mixed methodology approach, 
focused on the day to day delivery of the Prevent Strategy within West Yorkshire Police along with the 
perspectives of those involved. It has produced evidence to substantiate and negate the various claims 
made by advocates and critics of the strategy alike and provide suggestions about the most suitable way 
to include NPTs in the delivery of the Prevent Strategy, based not just on any theoretical ideals of 
countering extremism, but also the practical challenges facing the police in keeping communities safe.  
 
The research 
The research used West Yorkshire Police as a basis and identified four suitable NPTs to be used as case 
studies (the reasons for this decision are outlined in chapter two). It utilised a mixed methodological 
approach to explore the same subject in different ways which included a literature review, interviews with 
NPT and Prevent staff, focus groups with representatives from communities vulnerable to extremism, 
activity reports outlining the day to day duties of NPT and Prevent staff, and observations of the same. A 
full overview of the research methodology is covered in chapter two of this thesis, however it is important 
to acknowledge the boundaries and timelines of this research for contextual purposes.  
 
There are three key aims of this research which were met through the use of four key methodologies, 
interviews, focus groups, activity reports and non-participant observations. This is covered in more detail 
in chapter two which provides and overview of the methodologies, but it is useful to note that as each 
methodology contributed to more than one research aim, this thesis is structured in chapters of 
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methodologies. Each chapter sets out the method used, implementation, analysis of results and findings 
pertinent to each of the research aims. This is then brought together in chapter seven – discussions.  
 
The Prevent Strategy was initially developed as a multi-agency strategy, and further revisions and 
supporting legislation such as the Prevent Duty 2015 sought to further entrench the responsibility of 
Prevent on a wide range of statutory organisations. However, whether intended or not, the police do play 
a leading role in delivering the strategy (some of the reasons for this are covered in chapter one). Whilst 
this research is cognisant of the partnership arena in which Prevent sits, it is focused predominantly on 
the police efforts to deliver the strategy and not the efforts of partner organisations.  
 
The fieldwork period for this research commenced in April 2014 and lasted for a 12 month period, with 
preparation dating back to 2012. Much has changed within policing and counter terrorism during this time, 
the threat of terrorism has continued to grow and the tactics used by terrorists across the world have 
evolved. 2017 alone saw more terrorist attacks in the UK than the previous ten years combined, with the 
majority of these perpetrators being considered ‘home-grown’. Whilst the national budget for counter 
terrorism had been protected during this time, there have been significant cuts to local policing, with 
community policing being hit hard. Many police forces, West Yorkshire Police included, have seen a 
significant reduction in police officer numbers from 5,687 in 2006 compared to 4,624 in 2016 (Burns-
Williamson, 2017) and have consequently had to make changes to their neighbourhood policing 
structures. Whilst the research was adapted to suit the changing landscape it is necessary to note that 
some of the findings from the fieldwork will be less relevant in 2018, whilst some will be more significant 
than ever.     
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Chapter One 
Literature Review 
 
To fully understand the role of neighbourhood policing within the Prevent Strategy a consideration must 
be given to the existing literature and debates in relation to radicalisation, counter terrorism policy, 
policing practices, and community engagement within policing. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon and 
the term is commonly used throughout all elements of modern society whether in social media, in the 
press or within classrooms. The term terrorism and extremism have also become interchangeable by 
those in practice, whilst terrorism was traditionally used in attempts to describe actions and extremism to 
denote a mind set or ideology, the changing nature of the threat has resulted in them becoming seen as 
one and the same. In a recent public survey undertaken by Cambridge University and YouGov terrorism 
was perceived to be the primary threat facing British way of life by the public (Rogers, 2014) yet there is 
still no precise definition or criteria as to what constitutes a terrorist act. Historically attempts have been 
made by international bodies such as the United Nations to agree an all-encompassing, legally binding 
definition but due to disagreements around boundaries of inclusion this has not been possible (Hoffman, 
1998). As an alternative, the international community has relied on defining and criminalising various 
types of terrorist activities to be used in conjunction with existing criminal law. It is generally accepted 
that any definition must include three elements; that the act is unlawful, uses fear of violence (terror), and 
is intended to bring about political or religious change. In England and Wales the Terrorism Act (2000) 
was the first of the current anti-terrorism laws to be passed by Parliament which aimed to prohibit actions 
which cause harm, intending to influence the government, intimidate the public or to advance a political, 
religious or ideological cause. Under this legislation there were 542 convictions for terrorism related 
offences in Great Britain between September 2001 and December 2015 (House of Commons, 2016). 
The nature and severity of these crimes often results in a great deal of attention from the media, law 
enforcement agencies and academics alike who ultimately want to know the same thing; why do these 
individuals choose to commit acts of terrorism and how can they be stopped?  
15 
 
 
The legislation created to tackle terrorism has been accompanied by the United Kingdom’s strategy for 
countering terrorism more broadly known as the CONTEST strategy, and specifically the Prevent strand 
of this ‘4 Ps’ strategy which aims to stop people being drawn into terrorism. The CONTEST strategy as 
a whole is very much directed at the police, criminal justice system and intelligence services, however 
the Prevent arm of the strategy was always intended to be delivered in partnership by those in education, 
health, local authorities and other statutory organisations with the police playing a less prominent role. 
Despite this initial intention, the Prevent Strategy soon became police-led, and although it has developed 
and evolved over the past decade, with attempts to redress the partnership balance, the police are very 
much a key stakeholder in the delivery of the Prevent Strategy (for wider overview see Stuart, 2015). For 
this reason, this research is focused on the role that the police play within Prevent - in particular the role 
of neighbourhood policing, and the impact that this has on the strategy as a whole, and the prevention of 
terrorism within England and Wales. Prevent and the wider contest strategy will be discussed in more 
detail later in this chapter.  
 
Radicalisation: a disputed concept 
Another term commonly used but interpreted differently in discussions around terrorism is ‘radicalisation’. 
Many academics have sought to define radicalisation, generally identifying it as a process by which 
somebody comes to develop extremist beliefs and consequently radicalisation is often cited as a 
precursor to terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981; Young et.al, 2015; Gill, 2007), there is however some dispute of 
this process by others such as Kundnani (2015), Sedgwick (2010) and Porta (2009). That said, policy 
makers around the western world of the early 2000s seem to have accepted without question that a 
causal link between radicalisation and terrorism exists and have subsequently built entire counter 
terrorism strategies based upon it; the Prevent Strategy being the most notable.  
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The British government defines radicalisation within the Prevent Strategy as “the process by which a 
person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism” (HM Government, 2011).  
While the concept of radicalisation has been accepted by those in government for many years, reinforcing 
the official narrative that terrorism is caused by extremist ideology, there is a growing consensus amongst 
some academics that the theory of radicalisation is actually based on little empirical evidence, and as 
such, does not stand up to scrutiny. Kundnani (2015) states that “radical religious ideology does not 
correlate well with incidents of terrorist violence” (Kundnani, 2015, p.7), whilst Emmerson (the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering 
terrorism) goes on to criticise policies such as the Prevent Strategy. Emmerson claims that such policies 
are “based on a simplistic understanding of the process [of radicalisation] as a fixed trajectory to violent 
extremism with identifiable markers” (Emmerson, 2016, p.7) despite there being “no authoritative 
statistical data on the pathways towards individual radicalisation.” (Emmerson, 2016, p.8). Kundnani’s 
claim that there is no substantive link between radical religious ideology and the occurrence of terrorist 
incidents, combined with Emmerson’s assertion that despite volumes of research into the topic there is 
no empirical evidence or statistical data to support radicalisation as an identifiable process towards 
extremism, suggests that any policy based on the existence of radicalisation, such as the Prevent 
Strategy, is inherently flawed. Whilst this is an interesting emerging dynamic and one which has been 
added to by Elshimi (2017), Aly, (2015) and Schmid (2016), with each terrorist plot (failed or successful) 
comes the opportunity to analyse and assess the background, mind-set, and motives of the terrorist(s). 
As a result, theories around radicalisation and the causes of terrorism have been developed over decades 
as individual cases have been studied and compared in an attempt to identify any common factors. The 
study of radicalisation incorporates theories from various disciplines including psychology, sociology, 
politics and criminology and consequently there are a number of different ‘models’ of radicalisation 
(Hudson, 1999; Nesser, 2004; Bjorgo, 2005; and Victoroff, 2005), this literature review will not attempt to 
cover all of the varying theories but will provide an overview of the key principles by pointing to key 
fundamental models.  
17 
 
 
Of those who agree on a concept of radicalisation, there is a general consensus that it is a process with 
identifiable stages where people gradually become more motivated to the point that they may be willing 
to commit an act of terrorism: “In order to metamorphose from an ordinary citizen into a fully-fledged 
terrorist, the individual must progress through psychological and practical process” (Young et. al. 2013, 
p.10). Christmann (2012) describes radicalisation as: “a process of change, a personal and political 
transformation from one condition to another” (p.10). Academic interest in this area generally has one 
key objective; to learn from those who have developed a ‘radicalised mentality/psychology’ so that 
common factors can be identified and appropriate interventions developed, to reduce the likelihood of 
radicalisation occurring in the future. One of the more widely accepted theories of radicalisations is 
Moghaddam’s (2005) Staircase Model which draws on five metaphorical stairways starting with the 
ground floor where an individual becomes aware of certain material conditions such as a social situation 
or political cause, and ends with reaching floor five – considered to be the act of terrorism itself. This 
model is heavily reliant on the changing psychological perception of the individual which marks the next 
step in the stairway. The move from the first floor of awareness to the second floor requires a change in 
the individual’s perception towards acknowledging unfairness and the consideration of option to fight. 
Unlike many other radicalisation theories which place higher emphasis on external triggers, 
Moghaddam’s Staircase Theory focuses almost entirely on the psychological change in the individual. 
Whilst there are criticisms of this model (Schmid, 2016; Aly, 2015), the theory behind it is replicated to 
varying degrees across academic study. However, Lygre et al. (2011) point out that whilst there is 
empirical evidence available to support the concept of the five floors, there exists little empirical research 
to support the transition from one floor to the next.  
 
Other theories of radicalisation that place a higher emphasis on the psychology of the individual include 
Gill’s (2007) pathway model, McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2008) 12 mechanism model, Sageman’s 
(2004) four stage process, and the Prevent pyramid. Whilst these each have differences they do all 
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broadly follow the same tiered-process principle. Perhaps the most unique of these examples is Gill’s 
pathway model which still comprises of four ‘stages’ but states that these do not necessarily follow a 
chronological order. Gill (2007) explains that whilst a catalyst in the personal circumstance of the 
individual is still necessary at some point for radicalisation the crucial aspect is the psychological 
interpretation of this event and not the event itself. This means that the catalyst or event can happen at 
any time during the individual’s life (before or after the other ‘stages’ such as exposure to propaganda) 
but could still have the same impact. Whilst there is perhaps even less empirical evidence available to 
support this theory, it is still a very useful perspective to consider when looking at the theories of 
radicalisation objectively. One theory which has been developed following extensive research, case 
studies and detailed review is McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2008) 12 mechanism model which details 
three separate levels of radicalisation and 12 accompanying mechanisms. The levels of radicalisation 
refer to the domains in which radicalisation can take place; the individual, the group and the mass, whilst 
the 12 mechanisms can essentially be described as triggers which relate to a stage in the process for 
example personal victimisation, joining a radical group, and ultimately martyrdom. Whilst this is somewhat 
more complex than many of the other models it does rely on a similar process but brings in more external 
elements than those proposed by Moghaddam and Gill.  
 
Theories of radicalisation generally make reference to wider psychological and social factors which play 
a part in the ‘process’ with many referring to the psychological factors as vulnerabilities and external 
factors as triggers, for an overview of these discussions see,  Crenshaw (1981) Corner et.al. (2016) and 
Pickering et.al. (2008). External factors are much more widely discussed, and are broader in their origins; 
these include cultural influences, political motivations, social dynamics or economic circumstances. 
Literature surrounding these external factors with regards to radicalisation generally seeks to inform 
counter-extremism policy by identifying the potential socio-economic and political causes of terrorism 
which can be influenced by central government at a state-wide level. These can include socio-economic 
deprivation (King & Taylor, 2011), high levels of trigger/signal crimes in the local area (Innes, 2014), poor 
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community cohesion (Pickering et. al. 2008), and a local historic mistrust of authorities (Veldhuis & Staun, 
2009). Internal factors are much more closely tied to psychological characteristics for example a 
propensity to violence or aggression (Borum, 2014), anti-social tendencies (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003), 
susceptibility to charismatic influences (Horgan, 2008) or perhaps a heightened sensitivity to humiliation 
or perceived oppression (Sherman, et.al. 2013). Of course much of the commentary around internal or 
psychological factors in relation to radicalisation can be linked to an ambition to ‘profile’ radicalised 
individuals as well as identify vulnerable communities so that those who are vulnerable to radicalisation 
can be identified before it takes place (Leader-Maynard & Benesch, 2016). However, it is important to 
note that despite a wealth of academic study into these causes or triggers of radicalisation, there is also 
literature which suggests that there is no psychological profile that sets apart radicalised individuals to 
anybody else (Post, 1998; Reich, 1998; Silke, 1998).  
 
Whilst most theories of radicalisation refer to and rely on the impact of both external and internal factors, 
Crenshaw (1981) was one of the first to formally link these factors to the process of radicalisation in a 
way that went beyond the simple trigger notion and her interpretation of these factors within radicalisation 
provides a clear overview of how both social and psychological factors can contribute to radicalisation. 
In her 1981 article ‘the causes of terrorism’, Crenshaw sets out four categories of ‘potential causes’ of 
radicalisation which emanate from the external and internal influences on the individual. Firstly there are 
situational factors which can be broken down further into ‘preconditions’ and ‘precipitant factors’; 
preconditions refer to the existing situation of the individual and are in turn subcategorised into ‘enabling’ 
and ‘motivational’. Enabling factors are essentially the means to which an individual could be radicalised 
for example the internet or access to radical groups or propaganda. Motivational factors can include 
social exclusion, racial discrimination or an inequality of some sort which could at some point be a basis 
for a change in mentality. Precipitant factors are slightly different in that they relate more to a change in 
circumstance such as a war or government policy rather than an existing situation. This first category of 
situational factors is very much focused on the external influences on the individual and so relates more 
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to the social factors as oppose to the psychological factors. The next three of the key categories have a 
higher emphasis on the individual and thus the psychological element of radicalisation. The second 
category detailed by Crenshaw is the ‘strategic factor,’ this is again broken down into two subgroups; 
long term and short term strategic aims. Examples of a long term strategic aim would be to change or 
stop a government policy or to achieve equality across demographic groups, whilst a short term strategic 
aim may be to gain attention, funding or support for the cause. An interesting dynamic in this theory which 
is rarely assimilated in other interpretations of radicalisation is that these strategic aims do not have to 
be those of the individual in the first instance as Crenshaw’s theory is less reliant on a chronological 
process. The strategic aims could actually be that of a wider terrorist organisation to which the individual 
does not yet relate, or likewise they could be personal aims which in time develop into malicious goals. 
The final two categories, whilst still reliant on external influence, link much more naturally to the internal 
psychology of the person; ideological factors are the third category and quite simply refer to the necessity 
for the individual to have or develop an ideology which supports taking action to achieve the strategic 
aims. Using the example of ‘achieving equality’ as a strategic aim; many people will feel that this is an 
important and valid strategic aim, however for this to be linked to a theory of radicalisation there must 
also be a supporting ideology which encourages and allows the individual to take action (both positive 
and negative) to achieve this aim. Individual factors are the fourth category and are much less specific. 
Generally speaking, the term ‘individual factors’ is used by Crenshaw to describe the mentality that an 
individual must have to view all of the external factors in a way that actually leads to radicalisation. Critics 
may argue that this fourth category is simply a safety net or catch-all for Crenshaw which is based on 
very little empirical evidence. Not all people who have access to the internet use it for malicious purposes, 
and not all people who are socially excluded would view themselves as such, furthermore not all people 
would consider a disagreeable foreign policy as reason to act against it. Crenshaw states that although 
many people subjected to the same external factors do not succumb to radicalisation, others do and 
these people do so because of individual factors. More recent theories on external and internal factors 
link the two in a similar way; “external factors like political, economic and cultural conditions indeed shape 
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and constrain the individual’s environment but they do not have a direct effect on individual behaviour. At 
the social and individual level, dynamics in which the individual is directly involved need to be started in 
order for external factors to lead to radicalisation” (European Commission, 2008). Simply put the two 
factors in isolation are generally not a concern, however the combination of certain external factors and 
certain individual factors can lead to radicalisation. 
  
Interestingly a much simpler interpretation of the radicalisation process is the Prevent Pyramid which was 
developed through the research supporting the Preventing Violent Extremism work by the Audit 
Commission in 2008 and is actively used within the Prevent Strategy today. As with many other theories 
of radicalisation, the term pyramid is used to illustrate a number of tiers - four in this case. The lower tier 
represents the wider community, the second represents the most vulnerable members of the community, 
the third is the vulnerable members who have begun to move towards terrorism, and the top consists of 
those who are actively involved. This model concerns itself less with the social or psychological factors 
at play or the transition from tier to tier, but rather provides direction for those trying to identify and prevent 
radicalisation within communities and acts more of a strategic tool for a targeted intervention approach. 
The Prevent Pyramid, whilst not the most complex model does go some way to linking the theories of 
radicalisation (in particular the processes and factors involved), with options and responses to it, and 
whilst it is important to understand the debate regarding the terminology and process of radicalisation, it 
is perhaps more important for this research to acknowledge the intrinsic link between radicalisation and 
counter terrorism. Without fully understanding what causes people to turn to terrorism, authorities cannot 
expect to prevent the resulting terrorist acts. It is this rationale which is at the root of the Prevent Strategy 
which ultimately aims to “intervene to prevent vulnerable people being drawn into terrorist-related activity” 
(HM Government, 2011, p.8). 
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Forms of extremism 
Another key debate within the literature around radicalisation relates to the different forms and types of 
extremism and whether they evolve from different forms of radicalisation. The Prevent Pyramid like most 
theories of radicalisation does not acknowledge any difference in how individuals are radicalised towards 
different forms of extremism for example Islamic extremism or extreme right wing. Of those who agree 
that radicalisation exists and is causally linked to terrorism, the majority claim that whilst the external and 
ideological motivation may differ, the process remains the same (Backes, 2007). Although valid 
comparative studies are difficult to execute, those such as the Safire Project (2013) which compared 
groups of individuals from an Islamic background to those with a right-wing ideology have noted that 
despite the same process taking place, there was a variance in the emphasis placed on certain factors 
or triggers. The study showed that with the right wing group individual factors played a greater part 
including low self-esteem, the desire to be part of a group, and the perception of inequality. There is also 
a wealth of discussion noting the interconnections between right wing-extremism and ultra-criminality 
which is often distinguishable as an identifiable movement in a way that is not seen with other forms of 
extremism. Blee (2010), Durham (2007) and Eatwell (2004) have all contributed to this discussion noting 
that differences in how we define extreme right-wing organisations impacts on our options to respond to 
it. For an overview and further reading see; Blee and Creasap, 2010. A separate but similar debate within 
the literature relates to the potential differences associated with lone-actors. Some such as Pantucci 
(2011) and Ramakrishna (2014) have argued that the process of radicalisation is different for those who 
self-radicalise than for those who are recruited. It is argued that removing the external influence of 
recruiter or a group also removes a number of the social factors which can induce radicalisation. Boros 
(2008) and Harris et al. (2014) draw on theories of group psychology to explain the differences between 
these two pathways to radicalisation; within a group it is easier to build an extremist mentality than in 
isolation, a more submissive character may feel a higher level of diminished responsibility for actions that 
the group has taken as oppose to actions they would have taken themselves, similarly group polarisation 
means that often personal behaviours or beliefs in a group become more drastic in a way of showing 
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commitment to others, similarly the desire to be part of a group can manifest into an ‘us and them’ 
mentality. Pantucci and Ramakrishna point to potential differences in the events which ‘trigger’ the 
radicalisation process for ‘lone actors’ and the term ‘self-radicalisation’ suggests that there is no external 
influence that these dynamics are lacking however much of the literature suggests that the process for 
self-radicalisation does not differ too significantly. Those such as Behr et.al (2013) and Saddiq (2010) 
would in fact argue that despite outward appearance, those who self-radicalise are not actually acting in 
isolation. Today, self-radicalisation often takes place online (Rand, 2013), although those who radicalise 
in this way are alone in the physical sense, they are still connected to a wider network of extremist 
individuals through the internet; “radicalisation on the internet is not necessarily any different to what 
would happen with other more private and less visible sources” (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p.30). Again this 
may not be in the traditional recruiter-recruit relationship, it could in fact be built up from a number of 
loose and anonymous connections between like-minded individuals who post varying degrees of 
ideological or motivational information linked to the same cause, without any personal engagement. It 
could be argued that people who radicalise in this way are still just as influenced by external factors as 
those who are radicalised within a physical social group but just in a more indirect way (Bouhana & 
Wikström, 2011). When an individual self-radicalises there is still a link with a wider group whether 
intentional or not, even if the individual goes on to commit an attack alone, the ideology driving the attack, 
the social factors and the motivational triggers will all originate from an external influence (Gill & Horgan, 
2014). This argument supports the idea that the same overarching process of radicalisation applies 
regardless of the resulting type of extremism and is perhaps one of the reasons why the Prevent Pyramid, 
in its vagueness, is utilised by those who are seeking to prevent all types of extremism. 
 
Community policing and the Prevent Strategy  
The overarching aim of the Prevent Strategy is to prevent people being radicalised and drawn into 
extremism, it aims to do so via three key objectives; challenging the ideology of terrorism, supporting 
those who are vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism, and working with sectors and institutions where 
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there are risks of radicalisation. In short these tactics can be categorised as working with communities to 
challenge and support, and working with partners to reduce the risk. This section will summarise the two 
angles of the Prevent Strategy and explain how public engagement and partnership working have shaped 
the way that the police deliver the strategy.  
 
Public engagement within the police has been a key element since Peel established the Metropolitan 
Police Force in 1829 with some of Peel’s nine principles of policing being recognised as underpinning the 
modern concept of community policing.4 One of the more evident principles is that “the police are the 
public, and the public are the police”, (Peel, 1829, p.1) which refers to the responsibility that communities 
and police have to act as one in the interest of public welfare. Although the prominence of community 
policing within modern police practice has fluctuated through the decades as demands and priorities have 
shifted, it has become more noticeable since the 1990s as the benefits of community involvement have 
been noted (Willard, 2001). With the increased use of the police car, less officers were seen on foot 
patrol, and the hard-line enforcement policies of the 1980s resulted in the need for renewed community 
policing in response to the alienation of communities (particularly minority ethnic communities). This was 
recognised in the Scarman report into the Brixton Riots (Scarman, 1981) and by many others since; Vito 
(2005) and Tilley (2003). In addition to this The Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) has carried 
out in depth research into the effectiveness of community policing for the benefit of police-public relations 
and community cohesion, and the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) have published 
numerous papers on ‘what works’ to be used as examples of good practice and learning for police forces. 
One such report, released in 2012 defined community engagement as “the process of enabling the 
participation of citizens and communities in policing at their chosen level, ranging from providing 
information and reassurance, to empowering them to identify and implement solutions to local problems 
                                                          
4 It is pertinent to note that the authenticity of “Peel’s principles” have been questioned in recent years, however they have 
been referred to in this research to demonstrate the traditional community policing concept. For further reading on this 
discussion please see Lentz and Chaires, 2007.  
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and influence strategic priorities and decisions” (NPIA, 2012, p.1). This along with other literature goes 
on to state that there is a strong theoretical case for community engagement in policing and that there is 
evidence to support the theory (Khan, 1998; Larsen, 2004; Forrest et al. 2005). Evaluation of community 
engagement in practice across policing in the UK since the 1980s shows that whilst there is only “weak 
evidence of community engagement reducing crime…there is fairly strong positive evidence for reducing 
disorder and anti-social behaviour, increasing feelings of safety and improving police-community relations 
and perceptions” (NPIA, 2012. p.3). This has played directly into the policy formation of the Home Office 
over the past two decades, the then Home Secretary, David Blunkett announced in a lecture in 2003 that 
“we must aim to build strong, empowered and active communities...” (Blunkett, 2003, p.43). This was 
followed months later by the Home Office Green Paper on police reform; ‘Policing: Building Safer 
Communities Together’ which focused on neighbourhood policing and localised engagement strategies. 
As a result of this guidance and direction, using neighbourhood policing as the bedrock for police and 
community engagement has re-emerged as a leading principle of policing in the past decade.  
 
The main ambition of using community policing principles is to improve the relationships between the 
police and communities and build stronger, more cohesive communities, this in turn will help to build 
resilience to negative influences (including crime). Whilst there is a wealth of debate regarding community 
engagement practices and their effectiveness in achieving community cohesion (see Thomas, 2011), the 
synergy between community engagement and community cohesion as concepts is one that is generally 
accepted amongst many academics and police practitioners alike (Smikle, 2010; Sheider et.al., 2006; 
and Loader, 2006). The term community cohesion found prominence in the United Kingdom following the 
riots of 2001 and the subsequent government commissioned enquiries. The 2002 ‘Guidance on 
community cohesion paper’ which followed the Cantle Report defined a cohesive community as one 
where: “There is common vision and a sense of belonging for all communities; The diversity of people’s 
different backgrounds and circumstances are appreciated and positively valued; Those from different 
backgrounds have similar life opportunities; and strong and positive relationships are being developed 
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between people from different backgrounds in the workplace, in schools and within neighbourhoods." 
(Local Government Association et al, 2002). Whilst this definition is intentionally broad in order to relate 
to all agencies, when applied to policing the need for the police and communities to have a shared vision 
as one community links directly back to the Peel Principles. Government guidance and literature alike 
also point to the need for the police to be seen as treating different communities equally and building 
positive relationships with those in all communities, if strong cohesion is to be achieved “there would be 
a significant risk to Community Cohesion if the police service were to choose which sections of the 
community to protect or behaved in an inappropriate manner, in that it acted in a discriminatory, unfair or 
partial manner.” (Smikle, 2010, p.35). The end goal for policing with regards to achieving community 
cohesion, is not just to have happier communities, between the police and communities so that people 
feel confident to share information and report crime is a fundamental aim, ‘the more an area pulls 
together, the greater the capacity to combat crime’ (Hirschfield & Bowers, 1997, p.1,292). It is the stance 
of the UK Government and academics including (Stuart, 2015; Out, 2013; and Flannagan, 2008) that this 
concept can relate to all manner of threats facing communities from anti-social behaviour, to drug dealing, 
and even to radicalisation. 
 
Much of the official literature over the years has discussed community engagement in reference to 
general policing practice, however it is important to also acknowledge the influence that this has 
consequently had on counter terrorism policies throughout the same period, which essentially prefaced 
and evolved into the Prevent Strategy that is in place today. The Prevent Strategy is not the first 
government policy intended to get upstream of terrorist acts nor is it the first to utilise community policing 
techniques with a counter terrorism objective. As noted previously, many of the theories of radicalisation 
rely on external or social factors including poor community cohesion, mistrust of authorities and social 
isolation (Crenshaw, 1981; Gill, 2008; and Sageman 2004); as a result, the ambition to improve cohesion 
in order to build resilience to radicalisation, is one that counter terrorism policing has built on throughout 
history. The British government has tried on multiple occasions throughout modern history to ‘win the 
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hearts and minds’ of communities vulnerable to extremism in the same way that it would try to police 
communities vulnerable to high crime levels through neighbourhood policing.  
 
Evidence of this includes literature from the last century which shows that these efforts have been varied 
and range from bids to gain support from local populations as seen during the Malayan Emergency 1948-
1960 to desperate attempts to win back the support of Catholic communities in Northern Ireland towards 
to the end of the Troubles in the 1980s and 1990s. Although there are significant differences in the 
circumstances leading up to the implementation of these policies, not least the geography, era, and 
nature of the threats facing the government, there are also a number of similarities. In both of the cases 
mentioned, public engagement was central to the strategy and was intended to be enforced by those on 
the frontline; primarily the British Military. Another similarity is that the engagement element of these 
strategies was also used in conjunction with wider counter-terrorism/insurgency measures such as 
intelligence gathering; incidentally this combination of methods has also been criticised for contributing 
to the lack of trust and confidence in communities to engage with the authorities historically (discussed 
later).  
 
From a review of government guidance, policing strategies and literature, the link between effective 
community policing and stronger community cohesion is clear. Similarly the theory that poor community 
cohesion can be a contributing factor towards radicalisation is also one which receives little challenge. 
The Prevent Strategy has been built around these two concepts; by using community policing principles, 
the UK Government hope to build communities resilient to extremist influences, and therefore prevent 
radicalisation.   
 
The role of the police and partners in Prevent 
The Prevent Strategy in its current guise was first introduced as part of the wider CONTEST counter 
terrorism policy in 2003 alongside the three other strands of Pursue, Prepare and Protect. Although the 
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government’s response to violent extremism had been based around improving community cohesion 
since 2001, Prevent remained the least developed strand until the Preventing Violent Extremism 
programme was announced in 2006 (Thomas, 2010). It only really became prominent in the public arena 
from 2007 onwards, once the newly developed Department for Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG) were tasked with taking a more prominent role in its delivery (Stuart, 2015). Many have 
commented that the introduction of the Prevent Strategy brought with it a clear shift towards using police 
engagement primarily within Muslim communities that had not been as apparent in previous strategies, 
(Kundnani, 2014) as previously work had been centred on Local Authorities working generically across 
different ethnic groups for the wider purpose of improving cohesion (Thomas, 2008). The strategy placed 
a great deal of importance on reducing a community’s vulnerability to radicalisation by improving 
community cohesion, based on theories which suggest that a more cohesive community will have more 
resilience to radical influences as those within the community will feel more empowered to collectively 
challenge negative ideologies or divisive forces  (Innes & Jones, 2006). It was widely accepted that the 
police or any other authority (alone) could not instil strong cohesion within a group or community, but 
instead must provide the opportunities for good cohesion to thrive and support people within communities 
to come together for their own benefit. For this reason the level of police involvement in Prevent has been 
a contentious issue. Prior to the implementation of the Prevent Strategy community cohesion policies 
were overseen predominately by the DCLG and implemented by Local Authorities as the leading 
agencies. However subsequent reviews into these policies showed a lack of consistency across the 
country with the work that was taking place and a disconnect between central and local government 
departments (Thomas, 2010; English 2009; Birt, 2009). The Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder 
Fund had aimed to rectify this by identifying where the need was greatest, examples of good practice and 
ultimately establishing more uniformed engagement plans across the country.  
 
The introduction of National Indicators for Local Authorities, specifically National Indicator 35 “building 
resilience to violent extremism” (DCLG, 2008, p.35), was one way of formalising the requirements placed 
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on Local Authorities who were required to report back to central government on their progress. However, 
this was not a popular development with some Local Authorities initially refusing to adopt it on a matter 
of principle and/or capacity (Thomas, 2010).  However, as the focus on extremism grew, so did the 
pressure on Local Authorities and in time all those communities with a significant Muslim population were 
involved with the Prevent Strategy. This ultimately meant that despite the initial intention for Prevent to 
be ‘owned’ by Local Authorities and led by the local communities themselves, more and more pressure 
was placed on all agencies operating within these ‘vulnerable areas’ to work together (including police 
forces).  
 
In order to meet this demand, increasing emphasis was put on gathering and utilising intelligence to 
identify individuals vulnerable to extremism in order to ‘get upstream’ and implement the Prevent Strategy 
in targeted areas. As police forces were the agencies which held the majority of this intelligence and had 
the reporting systems in place to manage this, they naturally took a more prominent role in coordinating 
the Prevent Strategy at local level and as a result many would say (rightly or wrongly) that the police have 
become the lead agency within Prevent (Skoczylis, 2015). Advocates of the neighbourhood policing 
model would suggest that this is not necessarily a bad thing; this form of community policing involves, 
empowers and supports communities to work together and therefore improves cohesion; if good cohesion 
helps to prevent extremism within communities, then a community policing approach which helps to 
improve cohesion, consequently also helps to reduce extremism “community-oriented policing could be 
their most effective strategy in dealing with terrorism” (Docobo, 2005, p.1).  
 
Discussions around the suitability of the police as the lead agency within Prevent are covered later in this 
literature review, however, it is important to understand this in the context of partnership working. The 
opening pages of the strategy specifically states that “Prevent is not a police programme,” however, it 
also acknowledges that the “role of policing has been important in the development of Prevent to date,” 
(HM Government, 2011, p.12) and it is widely accepted that whether intentional or not the Prevent 
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Strategy has been largely delivered and led by the police through community policing principles and 
structures with the support of partner agencies. As the strategy has evolved, attempts have been made 
to redress the partnership balance and place a greater onus on statutory partners aside from the police. 
Perhaps the most significant step in this direction was the Prevent Duty which was implemented under 
the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 and placed statutory obligations on a range of ‘specified 
partners’ to deliver Prevent. This duty aims to make use of existing multiagency forums such as 
Community Safety Partnerships formalised through The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and requires that 
all staff in the 35+ agencies “have due regard to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism” (HM 
Government, 2015). The duty guidance explains that there is no additional responsibility on the police to 
lead on the delivery of Prevent, but acknowledges that they will need to play a very specific advisory role 
and have a key part to play when it comes to the sharing of information regarding the threat of extremism 
in their local areas, for example through the dissemination of Counter Terrorism Local Profiles (CTLPs).  
 
Like all agencies named in the Prevent Duty, the police must ensure that Prevent is embedded across 
all areas of their organisation including “patrol, neighbourhoods and safeguarding functions” (HM 
Government, 2015, p.19) and all agencies (including the police) must link in with their local authorities 
who will direct and guide local efforts through their Prevent Coordinators through existing partnership 
forums such as the Community Safety Partnerships or local safeguarding children boards. Given that 
over a third of the specified agencies fall within the criminal justice sector and the guidance states that 
existing community safety mechanisms should be used, there is an implied level of responsibility placed 
on Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) to coordinate and ensure that all named agencies within 
their force area are delivering on the Prevent Strategy as PCCs already have this overarching supervisory 
function across organisations. PCCs are elected officials who first came into being in November 2012 
replacing the former Police Authorities, their core functions are to secure community safety within their 
areas through the oversight and coordination of their police force and local statutory partners.  
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Perhaps the clearest example of how the police are intended to work in partnership with other agencies 
are the Channel Panels. Channel or the Channel Programme was first piloted in 2007 and was later rolled 
out across England and Wales in 2012. Sitting within the wider Prevent Strategy, its purpose is to bring 
relevant partners together to assess and provide early support to people identified as being vulnerable 
to radicalisation. The Channel Duty Guidance which was published alongside the Prevent Duty Guidance 
in April 2015, directly states that Channel is a multi-agency programme and can only be effective with 
appropriate contributions from the key agencies; the “success of the programme is very much dependent 
on the co-operation and coordinated activity of partners.” (HM Government, 2015b, p.5) It goes on to 
explain that Channel is a safeguarding function and should be considered alongside efforts to safeguard 
those from harm by each agency involved. With reference to the role of the police within Channel; the 
Prevent Duty guidance states that the police must “work in partnership with and support Channel Panels 
chaired by local authorities to co-ordinate Channel partners and Channel actions” (HM Government, 
2015, p.20). Principally the key role of the police is to assist with the referral stage of the process, by 
gathering information and producing an initial assessment file for the panel to consider; “the police co-
ordinate activity by requesting relevant information from panel partners about a referred individual.  They 
will use this information to make an initial assessment of the nature and extent of the vulnerability which 
the person has. The information will then be presented to a panel” (HM Government, 2015b, p.6). From 
this point on the police should have no more involvement in the programme than any other agency. In 
reality there has been mixed levels of police involvement across Channel panels; the theory is that 
Channel, and indeed Prevent as a whole, is safeguarding and should be dealt with as such by a 
partnership involving the most appropriate safeguarding bodies much like any other safeguarding issue 
such as neglect, or abuse (Stuart, 2005). However, the fact that the threat or vulnerability concerned is 
terrorism and potentially has a much bigger impact on the wider public means that it is difficult for the 
police to take a step back. The deeper reasons for this and the associated criticisms of Prevent Policing 
are discussed later in this chapter, however it is important to note that whilst Channel should be chaired 
and led by organisations other than the police, this is not the reality across all panels yet. 
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Despite attempts to redress the partnership balance within Prevent it is still often referred to as a police 
led programme. One of the key objectives of this research is to understand the role that the police play 
within the delivery of the strategy, whilst understanding the intended role is important, existing literature 
can also point to the actual role played and the reasons for this inadvertent onus on the police. Much like 
any partnership working arrangement there are a number of challenges which partners must overcome 
as a collective. Those such as Golding and Savage (2008), Phillips et al. (2002) and Pease et al. (2003) 
provide good overviews of such challenges, the governance arrangements around effective partnership 
working, and how this links to community confidence. Many of the key obstacles to strong partnerships 
within policing also relate to Prevent delivery; information sharing and accountability processes are 
perhaps the most significant (Berry et al. 2011). Until these obstacles are overcome, the partnership 
approach is hindered and the responsibility to deliver Prevent therefore falls back to the police.  
 
To understand the issue of information sharing across organisations in relation to Prevent it is important 
to first set out the origins of the information being shared and the culture of ownership which often 
becomes a barrier. Although the origins of Prevent and Prevent Policing may stem from the community 
policing principles as highlighted above, they have also been influenced by other models. Tilley (2003) 
describes three “relatively new models of policing: community policing, problem-oriented policing, and 
intelligence-led policing” (Tilley, 2003, p.320). Community policing is not a single concept and often 
incorporates elements of the latter two models. Problem-Oriented Policing is an approach which aims to 
proactively address the underlying causes of incidents and crime rather than simply responding to the 
aftermath. It is heavily reliant on analysis and partnership working, with more recent commentary 
highlighting that communities are also considered a partner (Scott & Kirby, 2012). Intelligence led policing 
is essentially a way of focusing resources and efforts on the areas of most need to be more efficient and 
effective, which again relies on analysis to identify target areas. Those involved in the delivery of Prevent 
often stress that “the most important element…is that Prevent is situated within a healthy community 
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policing environment and that engagement is proactive rather than reactive” (Stuart, 2015, p.16). This 
suggests that elements of all three models are required; community policing allows staff to build 
meaningful and sustainable relationships with communities, whilst problem-oriented policing helps the 
police to get upstream of issues such as those linked to cohesion, political events, cultural developments, 
or potential triggers of vulnerabilities, intelligence led policing allows the police to analyse information 
available to them (some of which will emanate from the community) around the risks so that they can 
respond in a focused and proportionate way. Whilst these models are often described independently of 
each other, there are many similarities and overlaps between them. What is important to note here is that 
although much of the intelligence (or information) stems from the community or partners, it is collated, 
analysed and evaluated by the police and as such becomes ‘police owned’. In order to ensure that this 
potentially sensitive information is not disseminated or used in a way that increases the vulnerability, 
threat or risk to the community or individuals concerned there are a number of legal safeguards in place.  
 
The Government Protective Marking Scheme (GPMS) is perhaps the most relevant safeguard to 
partnership information sharing; it traditionally set out five classifications for any information (document, 
report, intelligence etc.) not protectively marked, restricted, confidential, secret and top secret. Although 
changes were made in April 2014 to condense the first three categories into ‘official’ and ‘official 
sensitive’, the principle remains that these classifications indicate how sensitive the information is and 
thus how it should be handled within organisations. Whilst the vast majority of statutory partners involved 
in the delivery of Prevent are allowed access to information which is protectively marked (even up to the 
point of top secret in certain circumstances), there are often practical barriers to sharing. IT systems are 
often one such barrier; for security reasons, information graded under the GPMS system may not be 
shared on an email system which does not meet the required security standards as it can potentially be 
breached. Whilst partners have generally overcome this issue for information in the lower classifications 
it remains a perennial problem for those attempting to work together to share sensitive intelligence. An 
additional formality around information sharing which adds to the sometimes unhelpful culture of 
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ownership stems from the Management of Police Information (MOPI) which is a statutory code of practice 
for all police services. The Home Secretary implemented MOPI following the Bichard Enquiry into the 
2002 murders of Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman which found key failings in how the “social services 
and the police shared information” (Bichard, 2004, p.2). The new code of practice was intended to 
formalise information sharing structures and intelligence review processes. On the whole MOPI has been 
a positive move for partnership working, however there are instances where it can appear to be an 
obstacle. One of the key outputs of MOPI was the creation of the standardised Intelligence Report for 
police and partners also known as a ‘Form A’. The key aspect of this report is that each one must be 
graded along three separate categories; the reliability of the source, the reliability of the information 
contained in the report, and the dissemination options for the report. This third category provides a 
handling code as to how that information can be shared, it is graded 1-5 with 1 meaning it can be shared 
widely if needed and 5 meaning that it must not be shared outside of the owning organisation. Whilst the 
original intention of this approach may have been to encourage better sharing of information across 
agencies, in the sense that any report graded 1, ‘should’ be shared where appropriate, the culture across 
policing and partners is very much that the report ‘could’ be shared if appropriate. Those such as 
Commander Jones of the Metropolitan Police Service and Simon Peace of the Association of Directors 
of Adult Social Services are working towards overcoming this misinterpretation and culture across all 
statutory organisations including the health sector who have likewise been criticised for failing to share 
relevant information with other agencies due to patient confidentiality guidelines (NHS, 2016). There is a 
growing movement to attack the problem more broadly and replace the current ‘Data Protection Act’ to a 
‘Data Enabling Act’ which has a more positive emphasis on the sharing of information. However at present 
the situation remains that partnership working arrangements in general and in relation to Prevent are 
often hindered by such barriers to information sharing. As a result, the information often stays with the 
police as the ‘owners’ and consequently so does the responsibility to respond.   
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One other suggested reason for why attempts to place a higher onus on partners to deliver Prevent 
instead of the police have struggled is that the level of accountability and governance over these partners 
as a collective is not currently as robust as is needed. As outlined previously, the Prevent duty placed a 
legal obligation on key partners to deliver Prevent, but it did not include any reference to how this would 
be monitored or enforced and as a relatively young piece of legislation there is no precedent yet to 
demonstrate what will happen to partners who do not meet their duty. Although it does not specifically 
state that PCCs are responsible for ensuring partner contribution, the literature (NCVO, 2017) has shown 
that there is an indirect inference placed on them as the Prevent duty states that existing partnership 
arrangements (which they have oversight of) should be utilised. The key obstacle here, as pointed out by 
Afzal (2012), is that PCCs do not have the same level of governance and accountability over other 
partners as they do the police. The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act (2011), under which 
PCCs were established, states that PCCs have a responsibility to “hold Chief Constables to account, 
dismissing them where necessary”, and to “bring together community safety and criminal justice partners, 
to make sure local priorities are joined up” (HM Government, 2011b). From this alone, it is clear that the 
focus of governance for PCCs is very much on the police over the partners and that PCCs simply do not 
have the same level of control or power over partners to hold them to account should they not meet their 
obligations. Even with the best intentions, it is unlikely that whilst PCCs are given the responsibility to 
coordinate Prevent through all partners, that will inevitably fall more towards the police than to the other 
partners. There is no single position or department which oversees the collective work of all the partners 
concerned at a local or regional level, for example the courts and tribunal service is overseen by the 
judiciary, whilst the prison service is managed by the Ministry of Justice etc. The first point of overall 
oversight is in fact the Home Office, to further emphasise this issue the 2005 Audit Commission report 
‘Governing partnerships for better accountability’ highlighted that until a collective scrutiny body is formed 
which monitors and inspects the progress of partners as a whole is developed, responsibility will still fall 
to those who are monitored the most. Burns-Williamson (2013) argued that there is more scrutiny placed 
on the police than any of the other public services including those named under the Prevent Duty, through 
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national bodies such as HMICFRS the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) and more 
local arrangements such as PCCs themselves, Police and Crime Panels, and the general public. 
Ultimately, the police are being actively monitored than others, and must be able to evidence their 
contribution to the Prevent delivery, and therefore it is more difficult for them to rescind responsibility to 
other partners who are perhaps not equipped in the same way. This chapter will further draw on literature 
around the role of the police within the delivery of the Prevent Strategy and whether it is an appropriate 
role as it presents some of the key criticisms of Prevent policing.   
 
Criticisms of Prevent policing  
There are a range of criticisms directed at the Prevent Strategy which some now consider to be a “toxic 
brand” (Shah, 2017), however for the purposes of this research, they have been grouped into three key 
areas; police as the lead agency and the Prevent/Pursue crossover, the alienation of Muslim 
communities, and the ethical issues around policing the pre-crime space.  
 
Police as the lead agency 
The police as a law enforcement organisation are inherently structured to catch or pursue criminals, 
consequently their involvement in the Prevent Strategy (as outlined above) has led to a key criticism 
which is that Prevent and Pursue are theoretically separate strands of CONTEST but ones that have 
merged in many ways not least by the police’s role in both of these strands. The North East Counter 
Terrorism Unit (NECTU) as an example, is predominantly staffed and led by West Yorkshire Police, it 
has teams dedicated to Pursue (intelligence and investigation) and Prevent (engagement) who are all 
housed under the same roof, sharing the same systems and the same chain of command. Although these 
teams will have very different day to day duties depending on their remit, the overall goal is the same; to 
reduce the threat from terrorism in the North East of England. Aside from the natural evolution of the 
police’s role in Prevent as outlined above, the merge between Pursue and Prevent perhaps stems more 
inherently from the style of modern policing utilised in the UK which, as outlined above, draws on elements 
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of community policing, problem oriented policing and intelligence led policing. Although Pursue teams 
may have less of a focus on community policing than their counterparts within the Prevent teams, Pursue 
teams often rely on information or intelligence gained from communities to direct their investigations or 
activities. In many cases this information will have been gained via the Prevent teams who are actively 
engaging within communities so they can familiarise themselves with the issues at hand and work with 
the people in these communities not for them. This information sharing between the two teams also works 
in reverse; the efficient and effective use of limited Prevent team resources must be directed appropriately 
which will draw on intelligence led policing methods to identify the most suitable positioning of police 
officers within communities. Whilst supporters of Prevent would argue that the intentions behind this cross 
over are admirable, logical, and necessary to identify and prevent terrorist attacks, the fact that the 
policing strategies used here draw on aspects from all three models is also at the root of concern for 
many.  
 
The fact that the Prevent Strategy relies heavily on the need for information (or intelligence) to direct 
activity; whether this is intelligence from covert tactics during an investigation led by the Pursue team or 
intelligence gained from communities via Prevent, feeds into the criticism that police ‘engagement’ within 
communities is no more than a ploy to gather intelligence from them. Furthermore when community 
engagement is used for the purposes of Prevent policing the sensitivities are intensified and this 
negatively impacts on the ability of vulnerable communities to trust the authorities trying to engage with 
them “The young people we discussed these issues with in Bradford were clear that there was a 
breakdown in trust and Prevent was not working. A recent study has found that Muslim parents are so 
worried about a lack of support, and so mistrustful of the security services, that they are reluctant to report 
radicalisation” (House of Commons, 2016, p.18). Unfortunately there is a wealth of evidence showing the 
detrimental impact that tactics which would traditionally associated with Pursue can have on perceptions 
of Prevent; Anderson, (2016), House of Commons (2010); Husband and Alam (2011), a well-publicised 
example being the use of Prevent funding to install CCTV cameras within a community deemed to have 
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a high vulnerability to extremism (Project Champion, Birmingham City Council, 2010). Of course this is 
just one example of this crossover and what is perhaps more problematic is the establishment of specialist 
police Prevent roles such as Prevent Engagement Officers intended to work within communities at ground 
level to learn about the local issues and feed back into a wider decision making model. The sceptics 
would say that this is no more than the tactical positioning of police officers for the purpose of intelligence 
gathering, and it has even been said that “the Prevent programme has been used to establish one of the 
most elaborate systems of surveillance in Britain” (Kundnani, 2009, p.8). 
 
While there is an abundance of commentary against the involvement of the police within the delivery of 
Prevent and the resulting crossovers with Pursue (Kundnani, 2009; Thomas 2012; Khan, 2009), it is also 
important to acknowledge the benefits of having such a public facing and accountable organisation 
involved. As alluded to previously, the level of scrutiny placed on the police as a public sector service is 
intense, in addition to media and public opinion, the formal structures in place to hold the police to account 
on behalf of the public including PCCs, Police and Crime Panels, HMICFRS (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate 
of Constabulary, and Fire and Rescue Service), internal professional standards departments and the 
IPCC (Independent Police Complaints Committee). It could be suggested that if any organisation is going 
to ‘lead’ on the delivery of the Prevent Strategy either for engagement or intelligence purposes then 
perhaps the police are a safe option for the public. This of course leads on to a wider debate about the 
levels of confidence that the public have in the police, and would only be considered a positive, if the 
public could trust in the accountability procedures in place. In the strategy’s early days, much of the police 
Prevent funding was focused on establishing specialist roles and teams, as time has passed, and perhaps 
in response to criticism, there have been concerted efforts of the police to mainstream the delivery of the 
Prevent across all areas of policing starting with those proactively working within communities; the 
Neighbourhood Policing Teams. These are officers who are already working within communities and in 
theory should have the trust and two-way communication to relay and alleviate concerns around their 
intentions and activities whether this is preventative or in pursuit of criminals. It is also worth considering 
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that the crossovers between Prevent and Pursue would likely occur to some extent regardless of which 
organisations are involved. Even if the current trajectory towards an increased partnership focus 
continues, and the strategy becomes truly led by a different statutory organisation such as the 
Department of Education; would this result in a greater separation of Prevent and Pursue? Whilst it is 
easy to see that the lack of uniformed officers involved in Prevent engagement would perhaps put some 
communities at ease with those engaging on sensitive topics, the fact remains that for the Prevent 
Strategy (or any other strategy) to work effectively, it must be directed by information about where the 
vulnerabilities within our communities are. The question of which organisation owns this information be it 
the police or Department of Education is irrelevant given that once any information comes to light which 
requires a police investigation or Pursue action it will need to be shared with the police under legal and 
ethical guidelines relating to ‘duty of care’. The public will be aware of this link and so will still have the 
same reasons for mistrust and nervousness as they would if the police were the taking the lead. This 
leads into the wider discussion around what the role of the police should be within Prevent; if anything, it 
could be argued that the police taking such an overt approach within communities whereby Prevent 
Officers openly explain that they work for the police and will feed information into a wider effort to reduce 
terrorism is actually a tactic which is gradually helping to build trust and openness between them and 
these vulnerable communities. Spalek (2010) comments that “partnerships between police and members 
of Muslim communities carrying out sensitive intervention work with those deemed at risk from committing 
acts of terrorism appear to feature implicit trust…This suggests that police within specialist counter-
terrorism units underpinned specifically by principles of community policing are best placed to provide 
the kind of long-term interaction and trust-building that is required for sensitive partnership work to take 
place, for contingent trust to be built into implicit trust.” (Spalek, 2010, p. 792). This debate is integral to 
this research as we cannot fully understand what role NPTs should play within Prevent without also 
understanding what role the police as a whole should play within the strategy. This will be covered in 
much more depth throughout this thesis, however for the purposes of understanding this criticism of the 
strategy it should be noted that the true intentions of police involvement in Prevent (whether for 
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engagement or intelligence) can be argued from both sides. That said the initial intention or purpose of 
police involvement is somewhat irrelevant; the very presence of a uniformed authority within Prevent is 
enough to cause nervousness amongst many vulnerable communities causing many of them to withdraw 
from the strategy, this is potentially at least, Prevent’s biggest downfall. Whether the solution to this is to 
reduce police involvement or to better communicate the role of the police within the strategy to the public 
is also open to debate and is an area in which this research seeks to contribute.  
 
Alienation of Muslim communities 
Perhaps one of the most prolific criticisms of Prevent is that it has systematically alienated Muslim 
communities. Numerous academics including Kundnani, Choudhary, Thomas and Lakhani have 
commented and sought to evidence that the strategy has done more damage to relations between the 
police and Muslim communities than good. The critics argue that Prevent was destined to fail from the 
start due to its formation being so grounded in a confused attempt to counter the growing threat of 
Islamism as oppose to the wider threat of terrorism. Lambert and Glithens-Mazer (2011) seek to explain 
this development by drawing on the Cantle report (Cantle, 2001) commissioned by the Home Secretary 
following on from the 2001 ‘summer of discontent’ which saw northern cities including Burnley, Oldham 
and Bradford engulfed by riots; “These cities were rocked by violence reflecting deep tensions between 
white working-class and Muslim communities” They argue that “the riot’s longer term impact has 
profoundly affected the way that the British government thinks about terrorism and Muslim communities,” 
it is claimed that this fed into a wider concentration “on cohesion, immigration and cultural difference… 
which in the run-up to the 2001 British general election… were regular topics of heated exchange, with a 
broadly centre-right appeal on the part of many politicians to condemn the ‘perils’ of unchecked 
immigration.” (Lambert & Glithens-Mazer, 2011, p.1). This shift in focus within British politics was 
reinforced by the declaration of the global war on terror stemming from 9/11 which specifically targeted 
Islamic extremism through its focus on Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. The link was made that 
radicalisation stems from poor community cohesion, which in turn stems from lack of integration of 
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minority communities (in this case Muslim communities). This notion (whether right or wrong) directly 
influenced political decisions in the early 2000s including the formation of the Prevent Strategy; it was 
feared that the growing threat of international Islamic extremism, increasing levels of immigration within 
the UK, and rising tensions between Muslim communities would result in an escalation of violent 
extremism from British Muslims. Critics such as Hussain claim that this nervous and clouded approach 
to link the one issue (social cohesion) with another (threat of terrorism) shows that: “Prevent was quite 
simply born out of a panic induced confusion/correlation of Islam, with bases for engaging in Islamically 
inspired political violence.” (Hussain, 2007, p.119).  
 
There has been no attempt by the government to deny the initial focus of the Prevent Strategy on Islamic 
extremism which it sought to justify by claiming that extremism rooted in Islamic ideology posed the 
biggest threat to the safety of the UK at the time; “Prevent should be proportionate and focused. We 
regard this as particularly important because of the view that the last Prevent Strategy was 
disproportionate – in particular, that it stigmatised communities, suggested that they were collectively at 
risk of radicalisation and implied terrorism was a problem specific to Muslim communities.” (HM 
Government, 2011, p.40). The concern around its initial anti-Islamic stance was compounded by the lack 
of transparency around the allocation of Prevent funding which saw the first 30 ‘priority areas’ chosen 
due to them having Muslim population of over 5% (Thomas, 2012). Whilst there are few who would deny 
that Islamic extremism was and still is a threat facing the UK, many feel that the way “this explicit targeting 
demonstrates that Islamophobia is central in shaping how the government (and wider society) define and 
construct extremism and terrorism as solely Islamic problems” and that this “not only institutionalises, 
legitimises and reinforces Islamophobia” (Qurashi, 2016, p.1), but has led to Muslim’s being identified as 
“the new suspect community” (Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009, p.17) from which vulnerability to social 
isolation and thus extremism has actually grown.  
 
42 
 
The criticisms around Prevent alienating Muslim communities are not limited to its inception. The strategy 
has undergone numerous reviews over the past decade and claims to have evolved to focus more evenly 
on all elements of extremism including the extreme right wing. “On the one hand, this widened strategy 
has been hailed as a welcome development that goes at least some way towards redressing the 
perceived imbalance against Muslim communities”, (Baker-Beall et al. 2015, p.123) however many would 
say that the damage has already been done, and that the added inclusion of right wing extremism was 
little more than a token gesture to hide the true target of the strategy (Bentley, 2015); “Although the 
program is presented as targeting all extremism, including that of the far right, in practice it is almost 
exclusively applied to Muslims” (Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2016). The lack of critical review 
around the strategy and its development during this time has done little to show the strategy as one that 
considers its impact on vulnerable communities. The 2010 national consultation on Prevent carried out 
by the Home Office took little more than three months and consisted of just 400 written responses to an 
online survey and less than 600 people involved in focus groups and discussions (HM Government, 
2011c) Given the population of Britain is over 60 million, it is difficult to see this as a genuine attempt to 
understand the issues around the existing strategy. Whilst the strategy has developed to include 
additional references to other forms of extremism the emphasis placed on Islamic extremism has not 
been tempered. Eriksen (2012) argues that the terminology and guidance around the Prevent Strategy 
wrongly identifies Al-Qaeda inspired terrorism and extreme Islamic ideologies as a threat to which all 
Muslims are vulnerable to, and seeks to create “a situation where Muslim communities reject and actively 
condemn violent extremism and seek to undermine and isolate violent extremists” (Communities and 
Local Government, 2007, p.9). This ultimately presents the view that “all Muslims are expected to play a 
part in preventing extremism, a demand that is not directed towards other segments of the British 
population” (Eriksen, 2012, p.4). This criticism is heightened by Greer (2010) who points out that “there 
is not a ‘Muslim community in Britain” (Greer, 2010, p.169),  this is something that is often overlooked but 
is fundamental to the debate; Muslims in Britain have been grouped into a ‘community’ by the 
government, media and academics alike to the extent that they are all deemed vulnerable to extremism 
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regardless of sect, age, culture or any other factor, Prevent has been pushed forward this mentality and 
as pointed out by the Institute for Policy Research and Development “Prevent labels all Muslims as 
potentially at-risk of becoming violent extremists, demonstrating that there is a confusion of Islam and 
extreme Islamism at the very base of the government’s counter terrorism strategy” (Institute for Policy 
Research and Development, 2010, p.9). Whether the language around ‘Muslim community’ is accurate 
or not is somewhat irrelevant; it’s use to many is unhelpful; when it is used in the context of countering 
extremism within our own populations it creates a fear and perception that all Muslims are dangerous, 
which is not only wrong but isolates Muslims, the fact that the Prevent Strategy is underpinned by this 
narrative means that according to some it is destined to fail.   
 
Those such as Innes (2006) and Spalek (2008) point out that despite many claiming that Muslim 
communities have been alienated by the Prevent Strategy, there is very little quantitative data to support 
this. Whilst data can show broad trends across populations, it is difficult to gather “data pointing to the 
experiences of specific populations within specific locales” (Spalek, 2008, p.82) due to the resource 
intensive work and large sample sizes needed. When referring to the issue of trust and confidence in 
policing amongst the Muslim population, the national data sets simply presents the ‘average’ Muslim 
community, and takes no account of age, religious sect, culture and area. Whilst it is understandable that 
some Muslims may feel targeted and disaffected by the Prevent Strategy, there is no “strong anti-police 
position detectable in the mainstream Muslim population” (Innes et al, 2011, p.75), and in fact analysis 
of the British Crime Survey data carried out by Innes for his report Assessing the effects of Prevent 
Policing 2011 showed that as a whole Muslims in England and Wales actually held higher levels of trust 
and confidence in police than the general population. This led Innes to conclude that “counter-terrorism 
policing is not causing widespread or wholesale disengagement and disenchantment within Muslim 
communities” (Innes et al, 2011, p.54). It could also be argued that police forces with an active Prevent 
agenda, are actually engaging with Muslim communities in a more structured and considered way than 
those without, and that as a result positive relations are being formed, which are gradually easing the 
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concerns of some within the community. The impact of Prevent policing on Muslim communities is integral 
to this study and it is hoped that this research will be able to evidence some of the positive and negative 
effects of the strategy at least within West Yorkshire.  
 
Prevent and the pre-crime space 
One of the more elementary criticisms to the Prevent Strategy and in particular the role of the police 
within it is that it potentially criminalises vulnerable individuals based solely on their thoughts as oppose 
to their actions. In 17th century England it was established that no person could be deemed guilty of an 
offence without evidence of a guilty mind (mens rea) and a guilty action (actus reus). This remains an 
integral principle within the criminal justice system of England and Wales and essentially means that to 
prove guilt there must be the intention to commit the crime and the action of committing it. When this is 
translated to extremism critics could argue that the Prevent Strategy criminalises individuals who may 
have been radicalised based solely on their ‘guilty mind’ with their being no evidence of a ‘guilty action’. 
Whilst this is technically not true; Prevent activity (or indeed any police activity) would not result in 
conviction without evidence a criminal act being committed, there are instances whereby the response 
would certainly result in the inevitable labelling of an individual as a criminal or terrorist without trial and 
ultimate determination of guilt through the courts, meaning that the ethical concerns of police involvement 
in the ‘pre-crime’ space are valid nonetheless. Measures such as the Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures (TPIMs) which can be put in place based solely on reasonable belief and without 
trial, to restrict the freedoms of somebody suspected of being involved in terrorism, potentially go against 
basic principles of human rights including freedom of expression and the presumption of innocence. The 
frequent introduction of new crime categories related to the Prevent Strategy such as the encouragement 
of terrorism (s.1 Terrorism Act, 2006) has also resulted in an increase in ‘acts’ which individuals can now 
find themselves guilty of. Advocates of civil liberties such as Cummings (2010) would suggest that the 
Government is gradually creating unnecessary legislation and new powers in an attempt to combat 
terrorism but at the expense of civil liberties, “we already have criminal law to deal with terrorism, hate 
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speech and the incitement of violence, so all that’s left for these new proposals to ban are people and 
views that the Government disagrees with” (Robinson, 2016, p.1). These fears are compounded further 
when related to Prevent, as by definition those identified and “supported” through the Prevent Strategy 
are vulnerable to radicalisation, but have not yet committed any criminal acts. Those defending the 
strategy and indeed any preventative policy would argue that the strategy does not seek to demonise 
these individuals but aims to divert them away from terrorism before they get to the stage of committing 
a ‘guilty act’ by which point it is often too late for them and others they may harm. Furthermore, it could 
be argued that the vast majority of Prevent activity is actually focused on providing support, safeguarding 
and diversionary options alongside intervention providers, community members and other partners, and 
that it is only when concerns are raised around actual criminal activity does the Pursue activity take over. 
That said the previous criticisms outlined above relating to police involvement in Prevent often means 
that the very presence of the police near an individual vulnerable to extremism gives the impression of 
criminality which is a challenge that the police must overcome if they are to continue involvement within 
the strategy, perhaps by passing over more responsibility to more suitable partner agencies.  
 
Regardless of the legal terminology around criminalisation and the perception of police involvement, the 
criticism that Prevent and indeed the term ‘extremism’ demonises those with radical views is still a strong 
one; Sabir (2016) argues that “there is no empirical evidence to prove a correlation between ideology and 
violence, but that is what Prevent is based on – an unverifiable, flawed premise.”  (Sabir, 2016, p.1). The 
success of the Prevent Strategy, particularly with regards to increasing the involvement of partners in its 
delivery, is pinned on frontline practitioners and members of the public identifying signs of vulnerability 
which are often no more than uncomfortable comments which could potentially indicate a more sinister 
ideology; “Local authorities will be expected to ensure appropriate frontline staff, including those of its 
contractors, have a good understanding of Prevent are trained to recognise vulnerability to being drawn 
into terrorism and are aware of available programmes to deal with this issue”. (HM Government, 2011, 
p.7). Organisations focused on protecting human rights claim that this is a clear impeachment on the 
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freedom of expression which is enshrined in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights; 
“everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and 
to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers.” (Centre for Human Rights and Global Justice, 2011, p.43) goes on to argue that the risk with 
Prevent is not just limited to breaching human rights but that it is actually contributing to radicalisation by 
“creating an atmosphere of self-censorship – where young people don’t feel free to express themselves 
in schools, or youth clubs or at the mosque. If they feel angry, or have a sense of injustice but nowhere 
to engage in a democratic process and in a peaceful way, then that’s the worst climate to create for 
terrorist recruitment.” (Khaleeli, 2015, p.1).  
 
Claims that the Prevent Strategy (and indeed other counter terrorism policies) breach the European 
Convention on Human Rights are often dismissed through section 2 of the same article which includes 
exceptions to the freedom; “the exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed 
by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity 
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals…” (Article 
10, ECHR). With the inference being that this policy and accompanying measures introduced to prevent 
extremism are in the interests of national security, public safety the prevention of crime and for the 
protection of health. This does not negate the worries and trepidation of those such as Liberty who feel 
that “powers to radically curb free speech will be placed in the hands of ministers who paint their political 
opponents as extremists and threats to national security” but that “the fact that the Government is still 
struggling to define the ‘extremism’ they want to ban should be a clear indication that this legislation 
[counter terrorism legislation] has no place in a liberal democracy”. (Robinson, 2016, p.1). Essentially 
any legislation which seems to impede on a basic human right will attract challenge (and rightly so).  
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This research does not seek to (nor would it be able to) determine the appropriate balance between 
protection of the public and the rights of the individual, however what it will do, is provide a greater 
understanding of Prevent activity, how and why individuals are identified as vulnerable, and what the 
police do to support these individuals by preventing the vulnerability from manifesting into more harmful 
behaviour. In doing so it will provide additional data to inform those who seek to criticise or legitimise the 
Prevent Strategy.  
 
Summary 
This chapter has drawn on literature to set out the key discussions around community policing principles, 
the threat of radicalisation, how and why the UK government has sought to tackle this through the Prevent 
Strategy, and what the role of the police has been within it. Although many debate the concept of 
radicalisation and dispute its causal link to terrorist acts, the government chose to pin their efforts of 
stopping terrorism on the principle of stopping radicalisation, and stopping radicalisation through 
community policing. Believing that radicalisation could stem from poor community cohesion, social 
isolation and divisive religious ideologies, the Prevent Strategy was formed with the fundamental 
objectives of engaging with communities to build resilience and supporting those vulnerable to the 
influence of harmful narratives. The literature review has found a wealth of information relating to the 
research aims and specifically information which helps to justify the heavy focus on community 
engagement within the Prevent Strategy; essentially the premise stands that good community policing 
can lead to improved community cohesion, in turn, strong community cohesion, can help prevent 
extremism, therefore good community policing can help prevent terrorism.  
 
This literature review has also shown that there is a disparity between the theory behind the Prevent 
Strategy and how it is delivered in practice. The police were never intended to be the lead agency 
delivering the Prevent strategy, but perhaps out of fear, necessity or habit, the police were commissioned 
to guide local authorities and other key partners to the areas of most need through the information or 
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intelligence that they held around ‘vulnerable’ individuals and communities, and to build up links within 
these communities through traditional community policing principles. Perhaps a lack of information 
sharing and governance processes, have resulted in the police maintaining the lead on the Prevent 
Strategy despite much of the academic literature and political intention insisting on a shift to more suitable 
partner agencies. The role of the police within the Prevent Strategy continues to be more prominent than 
intended or than the majority would like to see and is a key source of criticism. The Prevent Duty will go 
some way to shifting the onus back on to partner organisations but there is a worry that the Home Office 
have given the instruction without first putting in place the governance and accountability framework to 
do so. This relatively new development within the Prevent Strategy will take some time to become reality 
and it will be interesting to see how central government responds to those who do not or cannot take up 
the mantel. In the meantime, much of the Prevent Strategy will continue to be led by the police, who 
themselves are seeking to develop a more safeguarding focused approach to the Strategy. This may in 
time help to overcome some of the mistrust and denunciations which stem from the initial allegedly 
Islamaphobic version of the Prevent Strategy which continues to mar its reputation amongst many 
academics and communities alike. Similarly it would in theory help to challenge the criticisms around the 
involvement of Pursue tactics within the strategy by better illustrating the risk and thus the need to 
investigate. Whether the police seek to do so through utilising safeguarding mechanisms, more open and 
transparent communications, relinquishing responsibilities to partners, or through the increased utilisation 
of NPTs, will have a direct impact on the success of the Prevent Strategy as a whole. The rest of this 
thesis will look closely at what the current role of the neighbourhood policing in Prevent is in practice and 
will compare this against what the literature, government policies and communities believe their role 
should be.    
 
Prevent in practice 
Perhaps one of the most interesting and useful case studies to help understand Prevent in practice is 
that of the Munshi brothers from Dewsbury, West Yorkshire. In 2008 Hammaad Munshi was the youngest 
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person to be convicted of terrorist offences in Britain aged just 18. He is thought to have become 
radicalised and subsequently involved in a known terror cell from the age of 15 and was arrested in 2006, 
later being sentenced to two years in a Young Offenders Institute for possessing article(s) for a purpose 
connected with terrorism. In early 2015, Hammaad’s younger brother Hassan travelled to Syria with his 
childhood friend and next door neighbour Tahla Asmal both aged 17. Reports later identified Tahla as 
Britain’s youngest suicide bomber after taking part in a coordinated Daesh attack against an oil refinery 
in Northern Iraq. Hassan’s whereabouts is currently unknown, however, it is believed that he is involved 
in the fighting somewhere in Syria, and he too would be convicted under counter-terrorism laws should 
he ever return to the UK. What is interesting about this case study is not that two brothers had been 
radicalised, but that second brother had apparently been radicalised after the ‘rehabilitation’ of the first. 
Following Hammaad’s conviction and subsequent release from custody, attention on Britain’s youngest 
terrorist and his family did not diminish; the local Prevent teams working closely with the police, probation 
service and other local authorities continued to engage (Ahmed, 2015) with the Munshi family in order to 
support them in line with the aims of the strategy and wider safeguarding efforts. Furthermore the 
brothers’ Grandfather a leading Islamic Scholar and Imam in the local Mosque had been a prominent 
public figure in the fight against extremism since before Hammaad’s arrest in 2006 and had continued 
working with local authorities and the community on these issues. Unfortunately much of the discussion 
around the brothers has been side-tracked by those wanting to identify the people who had radicalised 
the brothers; questions have been raised around the sincerity of Hammaad’s reform and the possibility 
that the two brother’s had been radicalised from within the family despite the official police response 
stating that the brothers were each radicalised online. But in many ways the force driving their 
radicalisation is somewhat irrelevant to this study; it is not important whether they were radicalised online, 
by each other, or by a family member, what is important here, is that the Prevent Strategy had been 
implemented following the conviction of the first brother but had apparently failed to prevent the second 
from being drawn into violent extremism ten years later. This begs the question, can the Prevent Strategy 
stop vulnerable people being drawn into extremism and what is the role of the police within this.  
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Research questions  
To summarise, this literature review has provided the basis for understanding existing discussions related 
to the research area. To recap the research aimed to:  
- investigate the significance of community engagement within the Prevent Strategy. 
- understand the current function of NPTs within the Prevent Strategy.  
- Ascertain whether NPTs should and could be utilised differently within the delivery of the Prevent 
Strategy. 
Chapter two will outline the methodologies chosen to achieve these aims and the justification for these 
decisions. 
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Chapter two 
Methodology Overview 
 
To achieve the aims of this research this thesis will explore policies and practices related to counter 
terrorism, local policing strategies, partnership working arrangements, radicalisation and community 
confidence. Due to the sensitivities around the topics covered and the restrictions of information sharing 
imposed on the agencies concerned; this research could not rely on the supply of data from the 
government organisations instead this thesis includes a heavy focus on data generated by a number of 
different research methods.  
 
Justifying a Case Study approach 
Whilst Prevent is a national strategy and extremism a threat to all areas, it was not considered a practical 
undertaking for this research to approach this on a national level due to the scale and differences in police 
practice across the 43 forces of England and Wales. As the fundamental research aims centre around 
policing practice at neighbourhood level it was decided that one police force would provide the 
appropriate scale and coverage of Prevent and local policing within communities for this research. West 
Yorkshire was identified as a suitable region to focus this research on. The county is policed by West 
Yorkshire Police the 3rd largest police force in England and Wales (outside of London) and in addition to 
this West Yorkshire is also home to the North East Counter Terrorism Unit (NECTU) one of four regional 
counter terrorism units in the country. Over 2.3 million people from diverse backgrounds reside in West 
Yorkshire, spread over five districts each governed by a local authority. Of these five districts three were 
categorised by the Home Office as Prevent Priority Areas (at the time of planning) which afforded them 
a higher level of funding and resource from central government to tackle what it describes as being “at 
higher risk of extremist activity” (Coker, 2015, p.25). The other two districts were considered lower risk 
but were still categorised as ‘supported areas’. Whilst other geographical areas may have offered the 
research more uniformity in how policing is delivered both generally and in relation to Prevent. It was 
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considered an advantage for this research that one police force covered such a diverse area with varying 
degrees of risk to radicalisation and the resulting response from the police and partners. Consideration 
was given to using just one of the districts such as Leeds which in itself is larger than some entire police 
forces and provided a good level of demographic diversity across its population, however it was deemed 
that due to slight variances in policing structures and practices across districts, focusing on just one 
district would not allow the research to make valid conclusions about the state of Prevent or 
neighbourhood policing as a whole.   
 
Prior to selecting West Yorkshire as the base for this research, other force areas including London (The 
Metropolitan Police Service) and West Midlands Police were considered. Like West Yorkshire, these two 
police forces have strong links to preventing violent extremism and also covered a range of diverse 
communities, they were all heavily involved in the PVE Pathfinder fund, have proven track records for 
implementing counter-extremism policies and have a high proportion of Prevent Priority areas. In addition 
to West Yorkshire’s unique mix of priority areas and position within the NECTU, there were other qualities 
which made it a suitable basis for study into the delivery of Prevent policing. West Yorkshire has deep-
seated links to Prevent stemming from the 7/7 terror attacks in London due to the fact that the bombers 
originated from West Yorkshire. The previous Chief Constable between 2007-2013 (a formative time for 
the Prevent Strategy) was also the ACPO5 lead for Prevent and was also a vocal advocate of the 
Neighbourhood Policing Model. As a result, West Yorkshire Police often pioneered various aspects of 
the Prevent Strategy and sought opportunities to more closely link the two policing purposes which are 
of relevance to this research. The force continues to prioritise neighbourhood policing and countering 
violent extremism as evidenced in the West Yorkshire Police and Crime Plan 2016-21 and the Chief 
Constable’s Policing Strategy 2017. When approached during the preliminary exploration stage of this 
research, West Yorkshire Police, NECTU and the West Yorkshire Police and Crime Commissioner each 
                                                          
5 ACPO – The Association of Chief Police Officers was replaced by the NPCC – The National Police Chiefs’ Council in April 
2015.  
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welcomed the opportunity to support research into this area and have been actively engaged in the 
research throughout.  
 
Justifying the Case Studies selected 
For the purposes of this research a number of case studies were required to provide an understanding 
of policing practice across West Yorkshire. Utilising case studies in research allows for in depth 
investigation into a group, scenario or population in a way that has clear boundaries to assist with 
management of resources; “the case study is used in many situations to contribute to our knowledge of 
individual, group, organizational, social, political, and related phenomena.” (Yin, 2013, p.4). West 
Yorkshire Police is made up of over 9,000 people and is broken down across five6 geographical districts 
and 37 Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs). Approaching this research from a ‘West Yorkshire wide’ 
perspective would not have been a realistic undertaking for PhD research nor would it have allowed the 
level of in depth focused study into policing at neighbourhood level within vulnerable communities. It was 
therefore decided that a number of NPTs across West Yorkshire Police would be identified as case 
studies to ensure that the fieldwork was designed to a manageable standard whilst allowing an accurate 
reflection of Prevent, communities and Policing across the region is encapsulated. The case study 
participants (police officers and staff from the chosen NPTs) would be actively involved in the research 
by providing information and data via a range of methodologies including interviews and activity reports 
as detailed later.  
 
The first step in identifying suitable NPTs to use as case studies was to decide how many case studies 
would be needed. It was crucial to strike a balance between getting a broad range of data which gives a 
true indication of all of West Yorkshire whilst allowing the researcher to dedicate enough time to each 
                                                          
6 When this research commenced West Yorkshire Police was structured into eight divisions. However plans were in place to 
change to a five district model prior to the fieldwork starting. As such all fieldwork was planned around the five district 
structure of Bradford, Calderdale, Kirklees, Leeds and Wakefield.  
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case study so that the information gathered is credible, worthwhile and detailed enough to allow for in 
depth analysis. As research aim two is fundamentally pinned on assessing of the role that NPTs within 
West Yorkshire play in preventing radicalisation through community engagement, it was crucial that the 
case studies reflected the diverse environments within which the NPTs were operating. Research aim 
three required an understanding of whether or not NPTs are able to adapt their style of neighbourhood 
policing to additional vulnerabilities to extremism within communities, and so it was essential that the 
case studies also covered a range of different ‘vulnerable communities’.7 Finally a fundamental principle 
of community policing is that local officers respond to local issues in a way that the local community 
requires, this translates in practice to NPTs adapting their policing response depending on the need, 
meaning that it was also crucial that the case studies included at least one area with no additional 
vulnerability for comparative purposes. These considerations meant that the bare minimum number of 
NPT case studies needed for this research was two; one which policed a vulnerable community and one 
that did not. However using only two case studies, would not be sufficient in ensuring a reflective 
indication of policing across West Yorkshire nor would it have allowed for the collation of enough data to 
draw valid conclusions. Consideration was given to the validity of having one NPT case study per district 
which would equate to five in total, however during initial enquiries a number of logistical issues became 
apparent.  
 
NPTs (at the time of the fieldwork) operated on a three week shift cycle, therefore the researcher would 
ideally have needed to be in direct contact with each case study at least once every three weeks to 
discuss any issues, observe, take feedback and gather data. If five case studies were used, the 
researcher would need to attend around two visits to different locations across West Yorkshire every 
week, this would have been unmanageable for part-time study in addition to personal and work 
                                                          
7 The term vulnerable community is used throughout this research to denote communities which are considered to 
potentially be vulnerable to extremism or the influence of extremists. The process for deciding this is documented later in 
this chapter.  
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commitments given the time needed for travel, analysis of results, writing up and further research. 
Consideration was then given to using four case studies; logically the best way to achieve a 
representative spread across West Yorkshire Police would have been to ensure that they are in separate 
districts to determine a stratified sample, however this would also have meant excluding one district. 
Initial concerns regarding this option were hinged on the fact that each district was structured slightly 
differently and corresponded to a different local authority, therefore the research may have missed 
valuable insights. Although all districts are in the same police force, there is some discretion to implement 
certain policies and practices in slightly different ways depending on the need. However preliminary 
research also revealed that for Prevent purposes, the districts were grouped according to demand; Leeds 
and Bradford were each allocated a Detective Sergeant and prioritised equally, whilst Kirklees, 
Calderdale and Wakefield were all managed under one Sergeant and were often resourced in a similar 
manner. During the planning stages of the fieldwork, Bradford and Leeds were also the only districts 
within West Yorkshire to be deemed priority areas, although Kirklees followed suit soon after, at the same 
time Calderdale became a supported area, whilst Wakefield remained unclassified. It was concluded that 
although there was a slight risk that certain community issues may have been missed by excluding one 
of the districts, four case studies was enough to allow for a broad view across the spectrum of Prevent 
delivery within West Yorkshire whilst maintaining the level of focus and data quality required.  
 
The selection of the four NPT case studies was based on two connected sets of criteria referred to as the 
‘overall criteria’ and the ‘vulnerability criteria’ which were developed for this purpose. The general criteria 
ensured that the NPTs would be suitable as a collective set of case studies, whilst the vulnerability criteria 
focused on ensuring that the NPTs selected would be able to add value to the research. However, before 
the researcher decided to identify case studies by devising their own criteria a number of other options 
were considered including relying on West Yorkshire Police and NECTU to provide the details of 
communities which they have already identified as vulnerable, focus less on geographical locations of 
communities and instead approach it from a cultural sense, or carry out analysis of where Prevent teams 
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operate and target highest areas. Each of these had their own strengths and weaknesses however mainly 
for the purposes of impartiality it was decided that establishing tailored criteria would be the more robust 
approach.  
 
Overall Case Study Criteria 
The choice of case study was crucial; in choosing four NPTs out of a possible 37 the research simply 
could not rely on a random selection as although this may have given a level of impartiality to the research 
the risk of selecting NPTs which covered no vulnerable communities or were all in the same districts 
would be too high to justify. Instead a seven-point criteria was devised based on necessary 
considerations for the fieldwork from which the case studies were selected:  
1. All of the NPTs must be in different districts across West Yorkshire Police. 
2. At least two of the NPTs must cover communities that have been identified as vulnerable to 
extremism.  
3. At least one of the NPTs must cover a community that is identified as vulnerable to Islamic extremism.  
4. At least one of the NPTs must cover a community which is vulnerable to a different type of extremism. 
5. At least one of the NPTs must cover a community which is not identified as vulnerable to extremism. 
6. At least two of the NPTs must have a Prevent Team working alongside them.  
7. All of the NPTs must be able and willing to cooperate with research. 
 
From this criteria the case studies selected will essentially reflect the following:  
Table 1. Case study general criteria 
Case Study 1  NPT covers an area vulnerable to Islamic extremism. 
Case Study 2  NPT covers a community vulnerable to a different form of extremism to case study 1. 
Case Study 3  NPT covers a community vulnerable to a different form of extremism to above 
Case Study 4   NPT covers an area not deemed to be vulnerable to any form of extremism. 
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The most important aspect which dictated which NPTs should be selected for case studies was the local 
community’s vulnerability to extremism. In order to accurately identify these communities, a secondary 
criteria was established which identified factors which could represent vulnerabilities and will be 
presented later however this section will first provide the explanation and justification for this.  
 
1. All of the NPTs must be in different districts of West Yorkshire.  
As discussed above; it was crucial that the case studies reflect the particularly diverse environments 
within which the NPTs in West Yorkshire were working. It was clear to see when comparing the official 
‘Local Community Priorities’ of neighbourhoods in different areas within West Yorkshire (or even within 
the same city), that one NPT might be dealing with very different issues and daily duties than another. 
When the delicate issue of policing terrorism was concerned it became even more important to ensure 
that any analysis of police practices provided a fair representation of what was happening across the 
force. 
 
2. At least two of the NPTs must cover communities that have been identified as vulnerable to extremism.  
As a fundamental aspect of this research was based on evaluating how NPTs engage with the 
communities in their ‘beats’ which could have been vulnerable to extremism, it was crucial that the some 
of the NPTs studied, covered such communities. If not the research would have been limited to assessing 
NPT engagement with ‘typical communities’ and there would be no comparative value for analysis against 
the implementation of the Prevent Strategy across policing. The process of identifying communities which 
may be vulnerable to extremism is set out under the ‘vulnerability criteria’ and will be presented next.  
 
3. At least one of the above NPTs must cover a community that is identified as vulnerable to Islamic 
extremism.  
The logic behind this criteria was two-fold; firstly Islamic extremism was a prominent threat to the UK at 
the time of planning (CPNI, 2013), and secondly the Prevent Strategy (although not solely for Islamic 
58 
 
extremism) was designed in response to the rise of home-grown Islamic extremism and radicalisation 
“Although there is serious work to be done in relation to Northern Ireland-related terrorism and extreme 
right-wing terrorism, the bulk of current activity is in relation to Islamist extremism” (Carlile, 2011, p.4). 
For these reasons it seemed pertinent to ensure that one of the case studies is an NPT which covered a 
community vulnerable to Islamic extremism. Furthermore, there had been an abundance of reporting 
regarding the view that Prevent targeted and isolated the Muslim communities therefore it would be 
interesting to the research to understand any differences in policing practice towards Muslim 
communities.  
 
4. At least one of the above NPTs must cover a community which is vulnerable to a different type of 
extremism. 
In order to get a broad perspective of Prevent and community engagement within West Yorkshire it was 
crucial to assess NPTs which cover communities with different vulnerabilities to Islamic extremism. This 
enabled a deeper understanding of Prevent and community engagement and whether more could be 
done to ensure that Prevent can be tailored to suit the needs of individual communities. Moreover, as so 
much research to date has been focused on whether the Muslim communities are targeted and alienated 
by the Prevent Strategy, utilising NPTs in different communities could help to confirm or negate these 
claims.  
 
5. At least one of the NPTs must not cover a community which is identified as vulnerable to extremism. 
The decision to ensure that at least one of the NPTs did not police a community vulnerable to extremism 
was based on the need to assess if there is a difference between the engagement with ‘typical 
communities’ and ‘vulnerable communities’ but also provides comparative value with regards to the 
preparedness of all NPTs to be included in the mainstreaming of Prevent. One aspect of the research is 
to assess the training and guidance given to NPTs regarding Prevent therefore it would be valuable to 
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see whether this is different in NPTs operating in priority areas. The same comparisons will be carried 
out in relation to structures, resources, and partnership working arrangements.  
 
6. At least two of the NPTs must have a Prevent team working alongside them.  
It was fundamental to identify any working links between Prevent teams and NPTs; this would not only 
help to identify the current function of NPTs within the Prevent delivery (research aim two), but would 
also inform the discussion around whether the mainstreaming of Prevent across NPTs would be viable 
with regards to practicality, logistics and working relationships.   
 
7. All of the NPTs must be willing and able to cooperate with research. 
The final criteria was both an ethical consideration as well as a practical concern. In order for the research 
to include ethical research using human sources (interviews, observations etc.) the consent of all of the 
participants was needed. Similarly the accuracy and effectiveness of the research depended largely on 
those involved being able and willing to partake; there would be a level of responsibility placed on each 
participant which was explained in depth first to ensure that they were aware and happy to commit to. To 
ensure this the researcher gained permission from the Police Crime Commissioner and Chief Constable 
on behalf of all of West Yorkshire Police, and also spoke to and gained consent from every individual 
involved in the research in accordance with standard guidelines.  
 
‘Vulnerability’ criteria 
One of the key requirements of the research was to analyse how NPTs engage with the vulnerable 
communities in their local area, therefore it was crucial that such communities could be identified to inform 
the case study selection process. The initial step in identifying communities vulnerable to extremism was 
to review a range of guidance on the subject from both professional and academic arenas which highlight 
the ‘key characteristics’ or ‘impact factors’ which may make a community vulnerable to extremism. 
Comprehensive reports from the OSCT, and the National Community Tension Team (NCTT) along with 
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academic literature relating not only the vulnerability of communities but of individuals too were utilised 
to inform the criteria with what are commonly accepted as main factors of vulnerability. These are outlined 
in Chapter one – Literature Review within the wider discussion relating to radicalisation and the internal 
and external factors which can contribute to radicalisation and vulnerability to extremist influence. 
Following this review of the key literature on vulnerability factors a list of criteria was established; for the 
purpose of this research it was decided that vulnerable communities would be identified as having most 
or all of the following:  
- Poor community cohesion in the local area.  
- Significant number of people who follow the same or similar ideology in the locality. 
- History of local community tensions. 
- Historic or current mistrust of the Police or Authority notable in community. 
- High levels of deprivation and disillusion 
- Links to international struggles or conflicts.  
- Prominent controversial individual or group active in that area.  
- Abundance of community meeting points.  
- Notable levels of signal crimes.  
 
Once this criteria had been established and tested, the next step was to identify and apply data from a 
range of different sources to ensure that the case studies were not influenced by one particular 
organisation or set of statistics. After extensive searching and liaison with different organisations a list of 
possible data sources was drafted against each of the criteria. Whilst other data sources could also 
provide valid indications, it was deemed important to focus more on official data sets and organisations 
to give a level of legitimacy to the information provided and the subsequent case study selection. The 
below data collection table illustrates where the information was available from, full references can be 
found in the bibliography. 
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Table 2. Data sources for case study vulnerability criteria 
Characteristic 
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Poor community cohesion in that area   X  X X X  
Significant number of people of same ethnicity or who follow the same 
ideology  
 X X X X X X  
History of local community tensions  X X X  X  X  
Historic or current mistrust of the Police or Authority notable in 
community. 
X  X  X  X X 
High levels of deprivation and disillusion   X X X  X X 
Links to international struggles or conflicts  X X X    X 
Prominent controversial individuals or groups active in that area X X  X X  X X 
Abundance of Community Meeting Points X  X  X X X  
Notable level of signal crimes X  X X X  X X 
 
Case Study Selection 
Once the criteria had been decided, it was applied in the most efficient way, beginning with the more 
specific vulnerable criteria, consideration was then given to each requirement in isolation by applying the 
relevant data and compiling a list of suitable options which would then be cross referenced against the 
general criteria. The results were as follows:  
 
Case Study 1 - Vulnerable to Islamic extremism 
Significant number of people who follow the same or similar ideology in the locality - Islamic 
As mentioned above one of the case studies needed to be an NPT which covered a community which 
was identified as being vulnerable to Islamic extremism. Identifying extremist influences within 
communities of any sort is naturally difficult and potentially any community within West Yorkshire or 
indeed the UK, could be vulnerable to extremism (Islamic or otherwise). As such it was logical to attempt 
to narrow down the initial search area by looking first at communities which had a higher Muslim 
population. This is not to say that these communities were vulnerable to Islamic extremism, just that they 
could be more vulnerable, as Islamic extremists were more likely to target people within these 
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communities to recruit and radicalise. To do this a range of existing and reliable data bases such as the 
2011 Census (Office of National Statistics) which incidentally was the first census to include a survey of 
religion was utilised. The census showed that the largest population of people identifying as Muslim in 
West Yorkshire was Bradford with 129,041 registering Islam as their religion, in comparison Leeds had 
40,772, Kirklees had 61,280, Calderdale 14,802 and Wakefield had 6,475. (Office of National Statistics, 
Table QS210, 2011 Census). Although the exact numbers cited in the 2011 census may have changed 
slightly by 2014 when the fieldwork commenced, for the purpose of this research it acted as a valid 
indication that Bradford had a far larger population of Muslim people than any of the other districts in 
West Yorkshire. For this reason it was decided that it would be justifiable to use Bradford as the basis for 
the search for a community which is vulnerable to Islamic extremism.  
 
History of Local Community Tensions 
The next step was to look at the other aspects of the vulnerability criteria to narrow the results down 
‘further, one of which is ‘a history of local community tensions’; Perhaps the most prominent example of 
this in West Yorkshire was in Bradford was the Bradford Riots in 2001, which despite affecting the entire 
city did have ‘hot spots’ or ‘flash points’ where the disorder was worst, such as Manningham, Toller Lane 
and Sticker Lane. These areas have often been referred to as a racial tinderbox (The Guardian, 2011) 
and place of hostile segregation (Buhler. et, al, 2002) owing largely to the riots. From this it was clear that 
these areas met this criteria perfectly, furthermore it was difficult to think of anywhere in West Yorkshire 
that would be more suitable.   
 
Poor Community Cohesion 
Similarly it was also fair to suggest that these areas ticked the box of having poor community cohesion.  
Following the Bradford riots, the city became the focus of a number of reviews including the Cantle and 
Ouseley Reports (2001), the aim of these reports were to understand the causes to prevent repeat 
occurrences; both reports concluded that poor community cohesion was the underlying cause of the 
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disorder. Subsequent studies and follow ups showed that despite some pockets of good practice, little 
progress had been made in the area to improve cohesion; “the key concern in the District is that 
relationships between different cultural communities should be improving, but instead they are 
deteriorating” (Ouseley, 2001, p.6). Reporting from the National Community Tension Team (NCTT) in 
2014 further corroborated that community cohesion in these three areas of Bradford was still weak and 
an indicator table published by Bradford: Stronger communities, showed that Manningham was the worst 
area in Bradford for residents feeling that they get along with people from different backgrounds, followed 
again by Toller. Bowling and Barkerend ward scored higher but was still below the national average. 
Therefore the criteria for poor community cohesion is met in all of these areas.  
 
Prominent controversial individual or groups that may be active in that area 
Following this process the number of potential vulnerable communities for the first case study was 
narrowed down to three locations covered by two NPTs. It was then possible to identify prominent 
controversial individual or groups that may be active in that area. The wording of this criteria was 
intentionally designed to ensure that no communities or groups would be accused of extremism or 
terrorist offences. Instead it was designed to include groups that may unintentionally provoke extreme 
views through discussing controversial subjects as well as those that are proscribed in the UK. Such an 
example may be Hizb ut-Tahrir which is an organisation that is not violent and has no clear links to any 
terrorist group, however has caused controversy over its calls for an Islamic Caliphate, its racial hatred 
particularly against Jews and its refusal to condemn the 7/7 bombers (The Guardian, 2006; The National 
Union of Students, 2008; Cameron, 2007). To continue with this example, this group was prominent in 
Bradford and had held meetings in all four communities in the two years prior to the case study selection, 
(Hizb-ut-tahrir Britain, 2011) its messages could potentially be interpreted as extremist and could 
contribute to the radicalisation of a vulnerable individual, thus it met the required criteria.   
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Links to international struggles or conflicts 
This refers to the ‘Global to Local adage’ which is often used to illustrate how communities are affected 
by international events. With regards to the links to international struggles or conflicts it would be fair to 
say that this criteria would have been met by any of the potential vulnerable communities which have 
been identified so far. This is due to the fact that in the current international climate there is an abundance 
of conflicts involving Muslim states all over the world for example Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia, Egypt, 
Algeria, Indonesia etc. Granted there are many different sects of Islam to consider but ultimately by 
default every community identified in this process so far had Islam in common thus shared similar 
connections to the international situations involving their fellow Muslims, although their personal views 
on the conflicts may differ, the links were undeniable and thus this criteria was also met. Moreover, 
Bradford had one of the highest Bangladeshi populations within all of the UK with a percentage of 1.89% 
which was more than double the national average. The civil conflict in Bangladesh regarding the 
execution of Bangladeshi Muslim Leaders was ongoing at the time of selection and had divided the 
Bangladeshi Muslim community, provided another example of how local communities can be influenced 
by international events.  It was noted that the areas of Bradford which had the highest concentration of 
Bangladeshi Muslims were again, Manningham (highest at over 6%) (West Yorkshire Observatory, 2011), 
followed by Bowling & Barkerend and Toller which were all close behind.  
  
Abundance of community meeting points 
Similarly a mapping search using any open source facility would show an abundance of community 
meeting points in each of these three areas, such as Mosques, Madrassas, restaurants, book shops, 
community centres etc. therefore none were ruled out at this stage either. If a more in depth analysis of 
the number, type and risk level of each location were required this would have been easily be completed 
based on further open source mapping, media reporting and community contact.  
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To conclude the process above identified two NPTs Manningham, and Bowling & Barkerend. In this 
instance both of the potential areas case studies met the criteria for vulnerability equally and so both were 
deemed suitable options.  Their corresponding NPTs were put forward against the general criteria and 
one was chosen as case study one (Islamic Extremism), this final stage of the process is outlined later.  
 
Case Study 2 – Vulnerable to a Different type of Extremism (Not in Bradford) 
According to the requirements of the general case study selection criteria the 2nd case study chosen could 
not be in Bradford (as the fieldwork needs to be spread across West Yorkshire) and should cover a 
community which is vulnerable to a different type of extremism. To identify suitable options, a similar 
process as outlined above was followed but a different criteria was utilised to narrow down the initial area 
of research in order to identify different potentially vulnerable communities.  
 
Links to international struggles or conflicts 
Links to international struggles or conflicts was the initial criteria used as the starting point. It was fair to 
assume given the range of international conflicts that were ongoing and the diverse ethnic, cultural and 
religious group that they relate to, that this would identify a number of differing potential communities to 
then look at in more detail. For an initial indication of what was going on in the international arena world 
media was used as a reference. A quick recap over the international political issues of the previous 12 
months provided a list of conflicts or issues which could have impacted on related communities within the 
UK and links to extremism. A brief summary of the top 10 most featured political issues was as follows; 
Somalia, Syria, Afghanistan, Kurdistan, Mali, Israel, Palestine, Northern Ireland, Egypt, and Algeria etc. 
Using these as a basis for further elimination the consideration was then given to the following; did any 
of these struggles involve non-Islamic extremist groups and did any of these have links to a prominent 
community in West Yorkshire (excluding Bradford)? The first question initially ruled out most of these; 
Somalia’s main issues surrounded Al–Shabaab, a Muslim group which aims to enforce Shariah Law, 
Afghanistan involved the Taliban and Al-Qaeda which were two of the most prolific Islamic terrorist 
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organisations, Palestine’s struggle was headed by and linked to groups such as the PLO, Al-Qaeda, 
Hamas etc. and focus on driving out Zionism, the struggles in Egypt were also heavily directed by groups 
such as the Muslim Brotherhood which has suspicious yet tenuous links to Islamic terrorism, finally Mali 
and Algeria were predominately Muslim countries which were struggling to drive out Muslim extremist 
control. This left three; Kurdistan, Israel and Northern Ireland, although there were Islamic extremist 
elements to the conflicts in Israel the main population was Jewish and the issues were predominately 
linked to nationalism, human rights and political revolution, not Islamic extremism. Ultimately the process 
narrowed down a large collection of communities linked to International struggle and extremism to just 
three for further scrutiny.  
 
Significant number of people who follow the same or similar ideology in the locality 
The next question to ask was whether any of these have well represented communities in West Yorkshire 
(excluding Bradford). Just like in the search for a community vulnerable to Islamic extremism resources 
such as the 2011 census were used to gather data on population figures to support this query. 
 
Starting with the Israeli struggle; Leeds had the highest population of Jewish people in West Yorkshire 
by far (6,847 with Bradford next highest with just 299). (Office of National Statistics, 2011 Census, table 
KS209EW). This meant that if specific neighbourhoods with a high Jewish population and links to 
controversial groups could be located in specific neighbourhoods then one of the case studies could in 
theory be chosen based on Jewish extremism.  
 
Looking at Kurdistan next; the 2011 census showed that Leeds has the highest population of Kurdish 
people with 1,461, the next highest (not including Bradford at 1,037) is Kirklees with 737 which still shows 
a clear indication that if choosing Kurdish communities for a case study Leeds would be the logical choice.  
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Northern Ireland was the last conflict identified above for possibly providing a vulnerable community; 
there were 3,390 Northern-Ireland born people in Leeds, 1,362 in Bradford, 1,167 in Kirklees, 808 in 
Wakefield and 732 in Calderdale. 
 
From analysis of the three related populations it was clear that regardless of which one selected the case 
study would be in Leeds as it had the highest number of all of the districts regardless of which ideology. 
However, it was crucial to then narrow these three communities down to more geographically specific 
areas related to NPTs from which case study two could be based on.  
 
In doing this one key problem became apparent specifically with Northern Irish communities; ultimately 
although figures on Northern Irish People in West Yorkshire were easy to locate based on place of birth, 
narrowing this down to certain community areas was more difficult as the Northern Irish Diaspora in West 
Yorkshire is much more spread as oppose to localised in specific areas. This effectively meant that a 
specific Northern Irish community (which would be covered by an NPT) would be very difficult to locate. 
With Kurdish and Jewish communities there was no such problem; In general Kurdish and Jewish 
diasporas were much more concentrated into smaller areas and communities had a characteristic of 
being very close-knit and visible in the towns where they resided. It has been suggested that this is 
because of their business-driven culture or in the case of the Kurdish; a desire to promote Kurdistan as 
a legitimate nationality following decades of persecution. This speculation was somewhat corroborated 
through local knowledge and looking through business directories and city council maps by which it 
became fairly easy to identify that the places with a prominent Kurdish population were Lincoln Green, 
Roundhay and Harehills. Similar methods were used to show that there was also a high concentration of 
Jewish people in Leeds areas such as Moortown, Lidgett and Moor Allerton, incidentally all of these 
communities fall under two neighbouring NPTs; Burmantofts & Richmond Hill and Roundhay Alwoodley 
& Moortown. To conclude on this point although further work would have been necessary to pursue 
Northern Irish communities as a legitimate option, at this stage it appeared that Kurdish and Jewish 
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communities meet the criteria of “Significant number of people who follow the same or similar ideology in 
the locality”.  
 
Prominent controversial individual or group active in that area.  
Although both of these initially seemed to provide valid options there was one key problem with Jewish 
communities which was that ultimately Jewish Extremism was not deemed significant threat in the UK (or 
indeed anywhere outside of the Middle East).  This ultimately meant that although there were prominent 
Jewish communities they would probably not be vulnerable to extremism as there were no active 
extremist groups to which they could be vulnerable. Kurdish communities on the other hand compared 
better with this criteria. Not only were there active groups such as the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) 
(White, 2015), but the issues surrounding Kurdistan as a legitimate nationality (it is a geographical area 
which spreads across the borders of Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran) meant that these communities would 
potentially also have links to the conflicts in Syria and Iraq as well as the struggle for Kurdish 
independence, ultimately creating an interesting point of research. Similarly with Northern Irish 
communities in Mainland UK there was the ever present influence of the organisations involved in the 
troubles; The IRA, PIRA, UVF, etc. therefore it was not felt that meeting this criteria would be an issue if 
Northern Irish communities were pursued as a possible Vulnerable Community on which to base a case 
study.  
 
Notable level of signal crimes 
Finally the last criteria in identifying a vulnerable community was also satisfied; notable level of signal 
crimes”. Signal crimes include hate crime such as racially aggravated crime, anti-social behaviour, 
criminal damage and vandalism, violent crime etc. There is a range of published information available for 
mapping these crimes such as the British Crime Survey, the Census and the new Police Crime Website 
where the public can interactively view the crimes in their area. As such the task of analysing this 
information and comparing it to other areas was relatively straightforward. The statistics from 2012 show 
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that Burmantofts & Richmond Hill ranked 3rd out of its 10 closest (geographically) NPTs with regards to 
these signal crimes (UK Crime statistics, 2013). 
 
Ultimately in using Links to international conflicts or struggles and Significant number of people who follow 
the same or similar ideology in the locality as a starting point to focus the initial scope of research two 
further communities were identified as being potentially vulnerable communities and thus corresponding 
NPTs which upon cross-reference against the general criteria could have be chosen as the 2nd case 
study. Due to the fact that Kurdish communities appeared to be much more suitable with regards to the 
practicality of assessing conventional Prevent engagement than Northern Irish communities, the decision 
was taken to progress with the Kurdish communities only.  
 
 
Case Study 3 – Vulnerable to a Different type of Extremism (Not in Bradford or Leeds) 
Wakefield was ruled out as an option as for the location of this case study as it was felt that it would 
provide a better basis for the final case study choice; an NPT which covers a community that is not 
vulnerable to extremism. This decision was based on a number of reasons mainly relating to the fact that 
it was not as much of a Prevent concern in comparison to the other areas in West Yorkshire evidenced 
by it being the only district not to be categorised as a priority area by the Home Office. This will be 
explained in more depth once the selection for the 3rd vulnerable community case study has been 
outlined, but as a result of this it meant that the search area was already reduced to just Calderdale and 
Kirklees.  
 
As the fundamental criteria driving the selection of Case Study 3 was that it must be different to a different 
type of extremism to Islamic, logic suggested that a good option would be right wing extremism; as noted 
by Backes (2007) in the literature review even though the process of radicalisation is thought to be the 
same, the two ideologies upon which these types of extremism are based are polar opposites. The key 
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problem with utilising communities vulnerable to right wing extremists as a basis for the case study was 
that they are traditionally much harder for Prevent and the police to engage with due to a fundamental 
characteristic which is that other than rallies, demonstrations and closed meetings there is little 
opportunity for the officers to engage with them as a group as they do not typically have community or 
faith centres, such as with the Muslim and Kurdish communities. Furthermore the people who attend right 
wing demos and protests are typically gathered for the event and are from different areas of the country 
as oppose to living in one neighbourhood such as with Kurdish or Jewish for example. That said there 
were still key characteristics that could be used to identify communities which might be vulnerable to right 
wing extremism; high white population, high disillusion, unemployment, community tensions (RUSI, 
2009). These factors were then used to narrow down areas which might fit the criteria.  
 
There were many areas within the Kirklees and Calderdale which have a high white population, but this 
in isolation does not suggest that they would be areas which were likely to support extreme right wing 
groups. A better indication was to focus on areas which were not only predominately white but that were 
also in close proximity to areas which had a high BME population, from which community tensions and 
resentment based on race may arise. The wider area of Dewsbury was one option for this as it was often 
identified in the media as being one of the most racially divided towns in Britain, however as an area it 
was too large to use as a case study so instead all areas of Kirklees and Calderdale were assessed to 
identify more suitable options. A quick look at the detailed data collated by West Yorkshire Observatory 
highlighted the following areas which would fall into this category; Batley, Thornhill, Birstall, Mirfield, 
Dewsbury Moor, Bradley and Elland. Each of these had a white population of over 95% and neighbour 
areas with a high BME population in some cases as high as 65%. Given that the national BME population 
of England was 13% and in West Yorkshire 16%, finding an area with a 65% population was quite 
significant.  
 
71 
 
To further narrow down these potential case study areas attention was then turned to indications of 
deprivation; starting with the percentage people of working age who were claiming income support 
benefits again utilising the West Yorkshire Observatory data. The national average was 14.4% and the 
West Yorkshire average was 16.7%, therefore 15% was chosen as cut off point to identify areas with a 
higher rate of deprivation than usual. This left four; Batley (24.9%), Thornhill (21.3%), Dewsbury Moor 
(20.7%) and Birstall (17.3%). None of the Calderdale locations scored over 15.0% therefore they were 
provisionally excluded from further research (unless the Kirklees areas proved unsuitable). It is worth 
noting that the these figures were also corroborated against figures of children in poverty which is another 
indicator of deprivation, these statistics are not included here however they effectively mirror the above 
figures thus further illustrating that these are areas of high deprivation. A similar point is that the 
unemployment rate across England was 3.8% (2012); each of the areas other than Birstall at 3.7%, 
scored higher than this (between 3.9% - 5.9%). Therefore Birstall was excluded as an option for the case 
study narrowing down the potential case study areas to three.  
 
Looking at community tensions in these areas to give a better indication of which would be the most 
suitable area for a case study. Information from the National Community Tension Team was used along 
with a brief interrogation of open source media reporting. The area of Thornhill was often highlighted with 
issues relating to poor  community cohesion including a well-known incident that has often been referred 
to as a trigger in poor community relations in the area between White and Asian people; the murder of 
Jack Carter in August 2011. Carter (a white male) was killed by two Asian males during a fight in the 
area, it is reported that the conflict stemmed from ongoing neighbourhood issues and sparked further 
tensions (Tehrani, 2012). There is also uncorroborated reporting that Carter had links to the English 
Defence League and had the English Defence League logo as his Facebook Profile picture at the time 
of his death. (The Press: Intelligent Weekly, 2011). Although the English Defence League has since 
denied any involvement in the incident the victim’s support for the group is acknowledged, furthermore 
the murder and subsequent sentences of the two Asian males which were seen as low by many has been 
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a point of anger across many right wing groups such as the English Defence League, Combat 18 and 
Combined ex Forces often making reference to it during campaigns and holding demonstrations in his 
honour. With reference to Dewsbury Moor there was less media attention given to the community 
tensions in that area however this did not necessarily mean that such issues did not exist, the same was 
found of Batley.  
 
Ultimately in utilising characteristics which are specific to communities that could be vulnerable to right 
wing extremism the number of potential case studies was down to three NPT areas; Batley, Thornhill and 
Dewsbury Moor. There was no need to narrow it down any further than this at this stage however to 
ensure that they were suitable the further aspects of the initial criteria had to be applied to each of them. 
Much of the criteria was subsequently met through the above process i.e. poor community cohesion, 
significant number of people who follow the same ideology and historic or current community tensions. 
However one key difficulty with right wing extremist groups is that they are active across the country and 
do not limit themselves to one geographical area therefore it was hard to identify if they are prominent in 
a specific area. To ensure this criteria was met further analysis was carried out:  
 
Prominent controversial individual or groups active in area 
When looking at the activities of the English Defence League, Combat 18 or other XRW groups it was 
apparent that the area of Dewsbury as a whole attracted a great deal of attention. Media reporting was 
full of stories relating to English Defence League demos in Dewsbury Centre and the English Defence 
League even had a website dedicated to its Dewsbury Division. (Facebook, Yorkshire EDL Dewsbury 
Division; live as of 2014). One thing that was apparent though was that there was very little open source 
reporting which could narrow down the area any more than Dewsbury, and although all three of the areas 
are classed as Dewsbury, it would be safer to corroborate that there was support for prominent groups 
in these areas. To do so official government results for the 2008 local elections were consulted (House 
of Commons, 2009). Assuming the voting rates for the British National Party (BNP) could provide an 
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indication for people who may have been sympathetic to the right wing view points helped to justify the 
areas up for selection at this point. Despite the BNP only getting 14% of the votes across all of the local 
elections, in Batley they got 45.8%, in Thornhill 50.5% and in Dewsbury Moor 41.7% which was a 
considerably high figure in comparison and although the BNP are not classed as an extreme group this 
a clear indication that there was a high number of people who were sympathetic to right wing ideology in 
these areas.  
 
To conclude the process of elimination detailed above provide three areas which all met the criteria of 
including communities which may be vulnerable to right wing extremism. To clarify they were; Batley, 
Thornhill and Dewsbury Moor which were policed by two NPTs; Batley, Birstall & Birkenshaw and 
Dewsbury & Mirfield. These NPTs were then put forward to see if they fit the general criteria for case 
study selection.  
 
Case Study four – Not deemed vulnerable to any type of extremism beyond the average 
As mentioned above, Wakefield was chosen as a basis for the starting point of the search for the case 
study 4 which was an area which was not deemed to be vulnerable to any type of extremism. This was 
based on the findings that out of all of the local authority areas within West Yorkshire, Wakefield received 
the least Prevent funding (Tax Payers Alliance, 2009), so it would be fair to deduce that central 
government did not believe there were vulnerable communities which warrant the level of attention as 
places such as Bradford, Leeds and Kirklees. To narrow it down further the various areas of Wakefield 
were compared to identify which might be the most suitable. Due to the fact that the vast majority of 
neighbourhoods in the Wakefield and indeed the UK will not be vulnerable to extremism it was not 
deemed necessary to go to the same length of research as with the previous case studies, instead the 
research simply needed to show that the areas selected were not vulnerable. Logic suggested that such 
an area will be similar to the national average with regards to deprivation, ethnography, and crime, etc. 
so this was used as a basis for the search for case study four.  
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Deprivation 
According to the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 2010, Wakefield as an area ranked 67th in the most 
deprived district in England (out of 326 districts),  (Department for Communities and Local Government, 
2010), indicating that it was in no way an affluent area. This means that out of the seven policing areas 
that Wakefield was divided into most of them would fall below the national average of deprivation thus 
ruling out the majority. Looking at the IMD figures from 2010 it is clear that these areas were; Wakefield 
Central (which incidentally would have been ruled out due to it having the highest Muslim diaspora in 
Wakefield anyway), Castleford, Normanton & Featherstone, Pontefract & Knottingley and Wakefield 
South East. These were therefore excluded from selection which only left Wakefield North West and 
Wakefield Rural. Within these areas there were neighbourhoods which were closest to the average 
figures for deprivation in West Yorkshire such as Stanley, Ossett & Outwood, and Sandal. As such these 
were investigated further.  
 
Ethnography 
The national average for people of a white ethnicity in England and Wales was 79.8%, in West Yorkshire 
it was slightly higher with 88.6% and in Wakefield higher again at 92.8%. The two remaining areas have 
96.3% (Wakefield Rural) and 93.2% (Wakefield North West). Although it cannot justifiably be said that 
either of these reflected the national average, Wakefield North West was almost exactly the West 
Yorkshire average and given that the purpose of case study four was to somewhat act as a control in a 
PhD which is focused on reflecting West Yorkshire as an area was the logical choice. It was difficult to 
get standardised statistics regarding ethnicity that were more geographically narrow than this, but 
nevertheless these were useful in that they show that the areas in Wakefield North West was more 
suitable than Wakefield Rural.  
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Crime 
Similarly when looking at signal crimes such as criminal damage and ASB a quick comparison showed 
that Wakefield North West had slightly higher crime rate (incident per person, per year) than Wakefield 
Rural (3.2 vs 2.8). However again this was closer to the national average of 3.4 in the same period 
suggesting that it was the more suitable choice for a comparison case study.  
 
Further open source research into community tensions or active controversial groups showed that it was 
in no way more vulnerable than any other area in the UK and that it was extremely close to the national 
average in most indicators therefore making it a perfect option. Although there were few statistics 
available to narrow the area down further than this, it was not necessary with case study four as the 
necessity is no vulnerability and moreover the case study was the NPT not the area. Consequently the 
selection for case study four was Wakefield North West NPT possibly with a focus that looks at 
engagement with the areas of Stanley and Ossett & Outwood. 
 
The case studies 
To conclude, the case study selection process developed and adopted has been described as a step by 
step process that the researcher went through to select the possible areas which could have been used 
as case studies according to the pre-defined criteria for vulnerable communities. In some cases there 
were a few options remaining and in others there was one clear area. Below is a table which presents 
the results of the above process.  
Table 3. Case study initial selection results 
 Option Area NPT Vulnerability 
C
as
e 
st
ud
y 
1 
1 Manningham Manningham & Toller Islamic 
2 Toller Manningham & Toller Islamic 
3 Sticker lane Bowling & Barkerend Islamic 
C
as
e 
st
ud
y 1 Lincoln Green Burmantofts & Richmond Hill Kurdish 
2 Roundhay Roundhay, Alwoodley & Moortown Kurdish 
76 
 
3 Harehills Burmantofts & Richmond Hill Kurdish 
4 Irish Centre Burmantofts & Richmond Hill Irish 
C
as
e 
st
ud
y 
3 
1 Thornhill Dewsbury & Mirfield Extreme Right Wing 
2 Batley Batley, Birstal & Birkenshaw Extreme Right Wing 
3 Dewsbury Moor Dewsbury & Mirfield Extreme Right Wing 
C
as
e 
st
ud
y 
4 
1 Ossett & Outwood Wakefield North West None 
2 Stanley Wakefield North West None 
2 Sandal Wakefield Rural None 
  
Each of these NPTs options were approached to gage interest and the final case studies were selected 
based on levels of willingness and other practicalities such as staff absences.  The final case studies 
have been anonymised and will be referred to as case study A, B, C and D, from this point to abide with 
ethical and legal guidelines. For reference:    
Table 4. Case Study selection results 
Case 
Study 
NPT Division Vulnerability 
1 Case Study One Bradford Islamic 
2 Case Study Two Leeds Kurdish 
3 Case Study Three Kirklees Extreme Right Wing 
4 Case Study Four Wakefield None 
 
Case Study Participants 
The participants involved in the research were intentionally varied to offer differing insights and 
perspectives on the research areas. In addition to the case studies participants were sought from the 
Counter Terrorism arena, the general public, and members of the vulnerable communities which were 
identified. The involvement that these participants varied according to what they could offer to the 
research. 
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NPT Participants 
The Officers, PCSOs and PEOs from the Case Study NPTs were the main participants. Considering that 
one NPT typically consists of three shift-teams amounting to approximately 15 PCs, 15 PCSOs, three 
Sergeants and one Inspector it was not practical to include all of these as participants. The researcher 
would not be able to manage this many subjects, (especially when multiplied by four case studies) nor 
could it be expected that all of these individuals would be willing to commit to such work. Therefore, it 
was decided that using a sample of two PCs, two PCSOs, one Sergeant and one Inspector from each 
case study would be the best option, and where there was a PEO embedded in the NPT they would be 
included too. Identifying the participants from each NPT was largely dependent on staff volunteering, 
however, meetings took place with the Inspectors of each case study prior to approaching the rest of the 
potential participants and all Inspectors stated that they were willing for both themselves and willing 
members of their teams to participate. Preliminary enquiries confirmed that the stated requirements would 
be met without complication, i.e. in each NPT there are over 30 possible participants but only 6-7 were 
required. The only restrictions placed on the subjects was that they needed to be spread across the NPTs 
(not all from one shift), and that they need to be willing to commit to the full 12 month period of research. 
The table below shows the potential pool of participants compared to those selected to take part.  
Table 5. Police participant pool of candidates. 
Rank/Role Pool of participants per case study Participants chosen per case study 
Inspector 1 1 
Sergeant 3 1 
PC 5 (average) 2 
PCSO 5 (average) 2 
PEO 2 (excluding Wakefield) 1 
Total 16 7 
 
This table shows the pool for each case study, to summarise the NPT Participants in total across all four 
case studies are detailed below:  
- eight PCs 
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- eight PCSOs 
- three PEOs (Wakefield does not have one) 
- four Sergeants 
- four Inspectors   
 
Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) participants 
As the research is directed at the delivery of the Prevent Strategy the research also needed to engage 
existing Prevent staff. As the Prevent Engagement Officers (PEOs) were generally embedded within the 
NPTs on a day to day basis, within these case studies, their participation would be incorporated through 
the case study fieldwork. However, the research required a separate way of dealing with the Community 
Contact Officers (CCOs) and other Prevent staff who were more distinct from NPTs. This involvement 
was not as intense as with the case studies and was predominantly used to provide a comparative context 
to the work with the NPTs. As such it consisted mainly of interviews with the CCOs, Sergeants and 
Inspectors involved in managing the Prevent delivery in these areas. There was one Inspector, one 
Detective Sergeant and one CCO for each area, all of whom stated that they were willing to participate 
in the research.  
 
Public participants 
As community engagement is the fundamental logic behind the Prevent Strategy the research also 
utilised members of the public and key community contacts. Ultimately, the research needed to identify 
what the views of the vulnerable communities were regarding Prevent and establish how the delivery of 
Prevent actually translates in terms of community engagement and cohesion. To do this key community 
figures (such as Imams, community centre workers, teachers) were invited to contribute to the research 
to gage their views on Prevent, whether it helped to promote community engagement and whether this 
in turn helped to build resilience to violent extremism. Various Police and Community Together (PACT) 
meetings were also utilised as an avenue of engaging with audiences which were keen to resolve 
community issues, and focus groups including members of the public who would not typically volunteer 
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their opinions in a public arena were also set up. Many of the focus group participants were identified 
based on what was found in the activity reports (detailed later) i.e. if a certain group or business had been 
engaged with regularly they would be contacted as potential participants. Ultimately, it would never be 
possible to engage with the community as a whole and selecting certain individuals would not provide an 
accurate reflection either; consequently this is aspect of the research would play more of a supporting 
role as oppose to being the primary source of information. 
 
Participant Grading 
For the ease of organisation and reference, the researcher categorised the participants in Tiers as 
detailed below:  
- Tier One Participants = PCs, PCSOs and PEOs of case studies 
- Tier Two Participants = Sergeants, Inspectors of case studies and CTU, along with CCOs 
- Tier Three Participants = Public 
- Tier Four Participants = Any other participant who was called upon for this research i.e. other WYP 
staff members, the PCC, academics etc.  
 
It is important to note that Tiers were not graded on importance in anyway rather they are grouped 
according to the level of direct involvement that they would have with the research. The Tier One 
participants were called upon the most frequently during the fieldwork. The below table demonstrates the 
numbers and types of participants used, broken down by case study and tiers of participation.  
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Table 6. Participant tiers. 
 
 
Duration and Intensity 
It was expected that the period of fieldwork would last 12 Months commencing around April 2014. This 
was deemed a beneficial time to start for a number of reasons; Ramadan 2014 occurred between 
28/06/14 – 27/07/14 thus would hopefully allow time for fruitful working relations to be established 
beforehand in order to see if this period of religious and cultural significance affected Police – Community 
engagement. Furthermore, much of NPT work is seasonal in the sense that certain periods experience 
higher rates of certain crimes for example winter with burglaries, summer with public order etc. hopefully 
starting the fieldwork at a time when NPTs attention was taken up less by burglars and more by the 
increased number of people out on the streets would provide a more productive initial insight into the 
nature of NPT and community engagement.  
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12  months was assessed to be a sufficient period to undertake in depth research into the four case 
studies and it was decided that the actual data collection (which was to be done through activity reports; 
detailed later) would be carried out on a ‘one month on – one month off’ approach’. This provided sufficient 
time to collate the required amount of good quality data, whilst ensuring a true reflection of the overall 
research period was gained. It also allowed time in the ‘one month off’ periods to focus on other aspects 
of the fieldwork such as interviews, focus groups and analysis. Furthermore, it was thought that the Tier 
One participants were much more likely to maintain an interest if done this way as oppose to a continuous 
12 month period. 
 
As NPTs in West Yorkshire worked on a three week shift cycle it allowed a visit to each NPT at least once 
every three week period. This was sufficient as the ‘routine’ data was gathered by way of 24 hour activity 
reports, thus there was little need to have physical contact too often. The visits served more of a 
supportive purpose and allowed any issues to be resolved and provided the participants with the 
opportunity to discuss anything about the research any issues that the participants may have wanted to 
discuss. It also provided some additional time to carry out the observations and interviews. The below 
time table displays the planning process for how each of the participants would be met with at least once 
a month (every other month). It took into account shift patterns;8 and meant that all 19 meetings could be 
achieved in a one month period as four participants could be seen on one day – in two sessions (with the 
exception of the PEOs). For this to work it was crucial that the participants from each case study were 
spread only over two shifts, ideally one PC and one PCSO per shift for balance. It should be noted that 
the below table is only an example and simply served the purpose of ensuring that the proposed intensity 
was possible and practical.  
                                                          
8 The Green boxes represent when the participants are working an early shift (8:00-16:00), whilst the Ambers represent late 
shifts (15:00-00:00). The “X” shows when the meeting would take place. 
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Table 7. Police participant interaction time table. 
 
Research Methodology  
When devising the research strategy careful consideration was given to the various research method 
options available and it was decided that a mixed methodological approach including semi-structured 
interviews, activity reports, observations and focus groups would be most suitable. The benefits of using 
a mixed methodological approach have been noted extensively (for wider discussion see De Lisle, 2011; 
Creswell, 2006; Lieber, 2009). For this research it was felt that utilising multiple mixed methods would 
provide a broader perspective of the topics pertinent to the aims, not least by allowing the research to 
explore the views and experiences of the police and the communities which they are policing. It is widely 
accepted that utilising more than one method also gives further strength to the research as it provides an 
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opportunity to validate the results of one method, with the results of a secondary data set; “The ability to 
triangulate the data and assure its validity and level of variance can also be invaluable.” (Migiro, 2011, 
p.1) it was felt that this would be a particularly useful tool given the sensitive nature of the topics in 
question and potentially conflicting perspectives. Whilst there are additional challenges which come with 
designing and merging multiple datasets around set questions or research aims, many feel that the a 
mixed method approach which produces both qualitative and quantitative information adds credibility to 
the research and subsequent findings; “the combination of methods provides a better understanding than 
either the quantitative or qualitative method alone” (Creswell, 2006, p.8).  
 
Research aim one; to investigate the significance of community engagement within the Prevent Strategy 
was met by the literature review which looked at existing knowledge and theory on the matter, focus 
groups provided a community perspective based on first-hand experience of the importance to members 
of the public, whilst the interviews provided the police perspective on the importance of community 
engagement to policing and Prevent.  
 
Research aim two; to understand the current function of NPTs within the Prevent Strategy was largely 
met through the activity reports which provided quantifiable data on the day to day operations of NPTs. 
The interviews and observations then allowed a comparison of these findings along with additional 
discussion which contributed qualitative evidence to the research question. To a lesser extent the focus 
groups also allowed for triangulation of these findings and comment on whether the activities of their 
NPTs translates into meaningful delivery of the Prevent Strategy to the communities it aims to serve.  
 
Research aim three; to assess whether NPTs should and could be used differently within the delivery of 
the Prevent Strategy; is met through all of the methodologies used. It is not only linked to the findings of 
the first two research aims, but the interviews and focus groups allowed for further discussion around not 
just the current state of policing and Prevent, but the possible future state linking to whether NPTs 
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“should” be involved in a different way in the delivery of Prevent. These suggestions for change would 
then be then tied into the findings of the activity reports and observations which related to the challenges 
and barriers to determine if the delivery of Prevent “could” be changed.   
 
Crucially this mixed methodological approach allowed different methods to be used to further investigate 
suppositions at different levels meaning that the overall results of the research had increased coverage 
and were comprehensive, overcoming the limitations of using any of the methods in isolation. This 
chapter briefly summarises the mixed methods chosen for this research but further detail relating to the 
advantages and disadvantages associated with the specific elements of this approach are detailed in the 
respective chapters of this thesis.   
 
Interviews 
The author used a series of semi-structured interviews throughout a 12 month period of research in which 
the questions were tailored to suit the subject and the various aspects of the research aims. The majority 
of the interviews took place with Tier One participants; namely 1 PC, 1 PCSO and 1 PEO from each case 
study area to provide a stratified sample (detailed in chapter three). Tier Two participants were also 
interviewed as part of the process to provide an alternative perspective. The interviews were short in 
length (planned for approximately 25-45 minutes) to minimize the impact on the participants other duties 
and were based on a range of topics to help inform the different areas of the research, including their 
perceptions of the communities which they serve, their thoughts on Prevent, their experiences of 
engagement and any suggestions regarding the possibility of mainstreaming the Strategy across NPTs. 
A brief outline schedule was provided to the participants beforehand in order to allow them time to prepare 
so the research could get the most out of the interaction. The interviews were recorded and transcribed 
both of which were stored securely and in line with all legal and ethical guidelines. Thematic analysis of 
the interview records was carried out, with a focus on comparisons and differences across participant 
role and case study area.  
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Police activity reports analysis 
The majority of the quantitative data was gathered from activity reports. An activity report was a template 
designed by the researcher, which was given to the entire case study Tier One participants to fill out at 
the end of each shift set. The report covered such issues as the geographical areas that they patrolled in 
during that shift, the duties that they performed, and the recording of any community engagement. This 
was effectively the area which required the most work for any of the subjects and thus it was important 
that they were fully aware of the responsibilities and level of commitment required of them beforehand. 
Similarly when designing the report, consideration was given to their other priorities such as workload 
and getting home after a long shift, therefore making the report as short and simple to use as possible 
was a priority. The report covered six main questions with space for short answers (or in some case tick 
boxes). The researcher made it clear to the participants beforehand that they were not expected to write 
overly long reports, and advice was provided regarding the quality of information that was required in the 
responses.  
 
Focus Groups  
Once the researcher began to receive information from the Tier One participants, it became possible to 
identify key contact points within the community who could be consulted. Certain representatives or local 
businesses which had received a lot of attention from the Officers were approached to allow those 
concerned to provide their views of Prevent and the Police. Although the researcher identified most of 
the focus groups beforehand based largely on the vulnerable communities criteria and preliminary 
research, this two stage process to the fieldwork added strength and direction as the focus groups were 
carefully selected according to what they could be expected to offer the research. One specific focus 
group from each area was held, but the researcher also attended existing community events such as 
PACT and School meetings, in order to get a more holistic coverage of the community.  
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One key aspect of community participation in the research that had to be addressed was that Prevent 
and extremism is a very sensitive issue, therefore people could have been scared to speak honestly in 
an open forum about it. In order to overcome this the  researcher created opportunities whereby people 
felt comfortable sharing their opinions in confidence, for example it was explained beforehand that 
everything they shared would be anonymised and provided private feedback forms that they could fill in 
if they did not wish to speak about such issues in front of others.  
 
Observations 
As a Special Constable within West Yorkshire Police, the researcher already had the access and consent 
of the force to patrol with the Tier One participants9 in order to observe them on duty which provided an 
excellent insight, but also the opportunity to validate what was being recorded on the activity reports. The 
key consideration regarding this was whether or not the author should observe as an On-Duty Special 
Constable, or simply as an independent observer. If the researcher were to work alongside the 
participants as a Special Constable then the benefits would be that the community members that are 
dealt with during that shift would not know that any assessment of the participants was taking place and 
would in theory act as normal. However the weaknesses were that simply by working as part of that NPT 
the researcher would potentially be influencing the actions of the participants, i.e. if tasks may be given 
to that participant because they are in a pair which would not have otherwise. Alternatively if the author 
went out simply as an observer the community members may be affected by the fact that there was 
somebody observing and may act differently than normal putting added pressure on the participant. More 
crucially though, the researcher could not simply turn-off being a Police Officer due to legal requirements, 
therefore if a situation arose where the participant needed assistance they would have a duty to act as a 
Police Officer and help. There was also the question of personal safety; if the researcher was to go simply 
as an observer they would not be wearing any personal protective equipment for example; i.e. radio, stab 
                                                          
9 Observing the PEO’s may not be possible due to limitations regarding sensitivity of the community and issues that may be 
discussed etc.  
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vest, baton etc. despite the fact that they would still be attending the same situations. The wider 
discussion and decision regarding participant and non-participant observation is covered in chapter six. 
 
Ethical considerations 
When carrying out any research, a number of key ethical principles must be abided by to protect the 
participants and to a lesser extent the results of the research. Ethics and the need to regulate practice 
has been a defining feature of social and medical research since the 1940s, and many have sought to 
develop set principles. For wider discussion and comparison of examples see (Cowburn et.al. 2016; 
Israel, 2014; and Grix, 2010). To ensure the practical application of these principles was appropriate, the 
research also adhered to the University of Huddersfield’s School Research Ethical Panel (SREP) 
guidelines. This involved a formal application to the panel prior to the research taking place which outlined 
the methodology intended, the ethical considerations, and the steps taken to mitigate harm. In addition 
to this, the researcher also gained permission to study from key representatives for West Yorkshire Police 
and the North East Counter Terrorism Unit, including the PCC, Assistant Chief Constable for local 
policing, Head of Prevent at NECTU, in addition to informed consent from each of the participants. 
Examples of the letters requesting permission to study and informed consent forms can be found in the 
appendices. The next chapters in this research outline the more specific ethical issues and steps taken 
in relation to each methodology used, however as a general overview, the wider research strategy took 
account of the following five commonly accepted ethical principles for research: minimising the risk of 
harm; obtaining informed consent; protecting anonymity and confidentiality; avoiding deceptive practices; 
and providing the right to withdraw from the research.   
 
Minimising the risk of harm 
There are a number of harms that can come to a research participant including physical, psychological, 
and financial. This research was designed around a strategic which would ensure protection against each 
of them. Steps were taken to ensure that no participant would be put in any additional danger as part of 
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this research. The members of the public who would be taking part in focus groups would be consulted 
with beforehand to ensure that all participants were aware of standards for appropriate behaviour and all 
venues were carefully risk assessed prior to the sessions. They would also not be widely advertised to 
reduce the chance of anybody targeting the sessions for any reason. Protection of the police participants 
was also taken into account. The research was designed in a way that meant there was no reason, 
advantage or incentive for a participant to put themselves in any situation whilst taking part in this 
research that they would not ordinarily do whilst on duty.  
 
Providing psychological support to participants was crucial given the fairly sensitive nature of the subject 
matters. All participants were provided with the researcher’s contact information so they could discuss 
any issues either before, during or after the fieldwork. Furthermore details of relevant agencies were 
provided including Victim Support, Samaritans and West Yorkshire Police are be able to offer different 
forms of help and guidance in relation to any psychological support that they may require. 
 
The research methodologies chosen were carefully selected and designed to ensure that no financial 
cost would be attributed to taking part in the research for participants. Consideration was given to financial 
remuneration for taking part in the focus groups, however instead it was decided that all focus groups 
would be planned with existing social groups and would be scheduled for a time and place that they 
would be meeting anyway. This meant that there was no additional travel costs or time associated for 
participants taking part. The activity reports, interviews, and observations for the police participants were 
all designed to take place in their working time. They would not be required or expected to work overtime 
to complete the research or be expected to travel to any different locations other than their own police 
station.  
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Obtaining informed consent 
This research was approved by the Police Crime Commissioner (PCC) of West Yorkshire Police along 
with other senior members of the organisation who will have a more direct involvement for example, the 
head of NE CTU and the Assistant Chief Constable in charge of Local Policing. All of the NPT Inspectors 
for the Case Studies were also liaised with and were happy for their teams to be used for the research. 
In addition to the key participants the researcher also gained the consent of the following representatives 
from West Yorkshire Police:  
- Police and Crime Commissioner. 
- Assistant Chief Constable for Local Policing 
- Detective Superintendent for Prevent (North East Head) 
- NPT Inspectors from all 4 case studies.  
- Sergeants of Prevent (Local Divisional Heads)  
- Community Contact Officers from all 4 case studies.  
- Various NPT Officers to be used in Pilot tests. 
 
Ensuring participant anonymity and confidentiality 
All data collated during the research was sanitised to ensure that no individual participant could be 
identified. Each participant was allocated a numerical pseudonym for example a PC from Case Study 1 
may be referred to as 1A. A similar system was employed for members of the focus groups or wider 
community. However, participants were informed prior to consenting to the research that whilst every 
step would be taken to protect their anonymity, it may not be possible to offer a complete guarantee as 
other participants (particularly in the focus groups) could reveal identities and it was difficult to conceal 
which NPTs were being used as case studies due to the distinguishing features which made them so 
useful to this research. For example any person with local knowledge of Leeds will be able to identify the 
areas with a notable Kurdish and thus could identify the NPT which polices this area. However this was 
been discussed with the PCC, ACC, relevant NPT Inspectors and participants who were happy for the 
work to go ahead given that ultimately the Police are an accountable public body.  
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Precautions were also taken to ensure that all data collated in the course of this research would remain 
confidential and all participants were informed of this from the outset. All data was stored securely on a 
password protected computer on the West Yorkshire Police encrypted systems and any audio data 
(interview tapes) were transcribed immediately and stored in the same way allowing for the deletion of 
the recording. All data was destroyed upon the completion of the research.  
 
Avoiding deceptive practices 
Whilst some forms of covert methods are widely used for example during observations (see chapter six), 
it is generally accepted that deceptive practices cause conflict with the principles of informed consent and 
therefore should only be used where absolutely necessary. For the purposes of this research it was 
decided that no deceptive practices would be used as it was crucial for the integrity and impact of the 
research that all participants are willing based on open and transparent information regarding the 
methods and aims of the research.  
 
Upholding the participants’ right to withdraw from the research 
A common ethical standard is that participants are able to withdraw from the research at any time up until 
the point where it is no longer feasible, i.e. publication. This standard has been adhered to in this research 
and all participants were informed of this right from the outset. Participants were provided with the 
information of the researcher, the research supervisor and details of the university so that they could 
withdraw if they chose. It was also important that they did not have to provide a reason for their withdrawal 
and that any indication that a participant wanted to withdraw was not challenged in order to make this a 
free-choice. One participant did choose to withdraw from the research as they changed roles during the 
fieldwork period, in this instance, the individual still provided continued consent to allow the researcher 
to use the data that had been gathered so far.  
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Conflict of interest   
During this period of work, the researcher was also a serving Special Constable within West Yorkshire 
Police which warranted consideration of whether there would be a conflict of interest. Whilst research 
into organisations may traditionally be carried out by individuals or groups external to that organisation 
to ensure independent review. However, as noted by Brown (1996), the blurring of the insider/outsider 
line within police related research is becoming more common as academic institutes carry out more 
knowledge exchange programmes with practitioners, and police forces seek more evidence based 
practices in their operational policies. There are multiple advantages and disadvantages to this blurring 
of the lines, some of which were relevant in this research. Advantages of the researcher being a Special 
Constable included a level of trust between the participants and the researcher which may not have been 
there with an entirely external researcher, understanding of language and acronyms used in policing, and 
existing access to police IT systems which were used to store the unsanitized data. There are however, 
also disadvantages which needed to be considered when planning this research relating to inadvertent 
bias and potential pressure from colleagues.  
 
After a full assessment and discussions with senior police representatives and the research supervisors 
it was deemed that there would not be a conflict of interest, but that reasonable steps should be taken to 
ensure that the researcher’s position as a Special Constable would not have any indirect influence over 
the research. This research was not intended to be a critical review of West Yorkshire Police and there 
was no financial or career related motivation involved in carrying out the research or indeed pre-empting 
any conclusions. When approached, West Yorkshire Police representatives were supportive of 
independent research being carried out in their organisation which they would be able to utilise for their 
own purposes upon conclusion. The only potential issue related to the researcher’s access to information 
relevant to this research which was not in the public domain. It was crucial not only on a legal basis but 
also on ethical grounds, that the researcher did not use or was influenced by this information or ‘prior’ 
knowledge. To mitigate against this, steps were taken to ensure that every key analytical conclusion and 
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decision made during the planning stages was recorded in a “decision log”, for example which NPTs 
would be used as case studies, was based entirely on a systematic review of open source data. The 
researcher regularly revisited and discussed these decisions with the research supervisors.  
 
Consideration was also given to whether the researcher should declare their position as a Special 
Constable to the participants prior the research taking place. It was decided that it would be more 
beneficial to be open and transparent with the participants about the researcher’s position in order to 
build trust and avoid deceptive practices. It was quite possible that the participants could discover this 
during the course of the research which would potentially damage relations. Safety was also a 
consideration; the researcher would be taking part in non-participant observations as part of the field 
work (covered in chapter six), and so it was important that the participants knew that the researcher was 
a qualified Special Constable. It was however likely that the participants could be hesitant sharing their 
views about their organisations practices with another internal member, particularly if these views were 
negative. To overcome this, the researcher was clear to stress that their input would be anonymised and 
they would not be able to be identified by any readers of the research. 
 
Summary 
To summarise, the research strategy was designed to meet the aims outlined in the previous chapter in 
a practical, appropriate, and ethical way. It was decided that West Yorkshire Police would be utilised as 
the overarching base for the research, under which four NPTs were identified as case studies to represent 
the wider police service, its policies, and practices. These case studied were identified according to two 
predetermined sets of criteria which were based on evidence from literature and open source data sets. 
The research focussed on three forms of extremism to provide a broader basis of understanding in 
relation to the role of NPTs in the delivery of the Prevent Strategy, community policing practices and 
whether this differed across communities. A mixed methodology approach was chosen to ensure that 
suitable data was gathered to meet all three research aims whilst providing differing perspectives and the 
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opportunity to validate findings across methods. The fieldwork consisted of interviews, focus groups, 
activity reports and observations (detailed in the following chapters). Participants were a mix of police 
personnel and members of the public, and were chosen on a voluntary basis then tiered for organisational 
purposes. Informed consent was gained from all participants who were aware of their right to withdraw, 
and further steps were taken during the design stage of the research to ensure that their rights, safety 
and anonymity would be protected as much as possible.  
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Chapter three 
Interviews with Frontline Participants 
 
Introduction 
Qualitative research interviews can quite simply be defined as the verbal conversation between two 
people with the objective of collecting relevant information for the purpose of research. The primary 
purpose of an interview is to gather information from an individual (or group) about a topic, based on their 
opinions and experiences. “The purpose of the research interview is to explore the views, experiences, 
beliefs and/or motivations of individuals on specific matters” (Gill et al, 2008, p.1). Interviews can provide 
more detailed information than many other qualitative research methods such as surveys, predominantly 
because they offer the opportunity investigate responses further through follow up questions or asking 
the interviewee to expand or elaborate. Interviews with participants from West Yorkshire Police (detailed 
later) were chosen as part of the mixed methodological approach, to specifically address research aims 
two and three:  
1. To identify the current function of NPTs within the Prevent Strategy.  
2. To assess whether NPTs could and should be utilised differently within the delivery of Prevent.  
 
There are three fundamental types of research interviews; unstructured, semi-structured and structured. 
Unstructured interviews allow a level of flexibility in that they typically start with one pre-determined 
question but then develop based on the responses provided. This type of interview is difficult to plan for 
and has a higher risk of veering off topic, making it a less reliable way to ensure that the research aims 
are met. Structured interviews are in essence the opposite in that all of the interview questions are pre-
written and the interviewer follows the order of the questions much like a script, regardless of the 
responses being received. Semi-structured interviews provide a middle point for researchers; they are 
designed around a set number of key questions but allow the interviewer to add additional questions or 
alter the wording depending on the responses of the interviewee.  
95 
 
 
For the purpose of this research, it was decided that semi-structured interviews would provide the best 
opportunity to address the research aims consistently across the case studies, by allowing further 
investigation into pertinent topics or opinions which could arise. Although unstructured interviews can 
help researchers develop early knowledge on a topic, it was felt that the questions for this research 
needed to be identified and asked in a more systematic way, to ensure that participants could provide 
information on the relevant issues which could later be compared across the case studies: 
“Unstructured interviews are usually the least reliable form of interviews from 
a research viewpoint, because no questions are prepared prior to the 
interview… comparison of answers given by different respondents tends to 
be difficult due to the differences in the formulation of questions.”  
(Dudovskiy, 2016, p.172).  
 
Unstructured interviews can also be much more time-consuming to carry out, can be difficult to manage 
and confusing for participants to take part in. “Unstructured interviews are usually very time-consuming 
(often lasting several hours) and can be difficult to manage, and to participate in, as the lack of 
predetermined interview questions provides little guidance on what to talk about (which many participants 
find confusing and unhelpful). (Gill et al, 2008, p.3). Often the reason for choosing to use unstructured 
interviews is to be flexible to the needs of the participant and to allow for a deeper disclosure into elements 
that the interviewer may not necessarily have planned for but would find useful nonetheless. As a result 
it also means that the interviewer has less control over the direction of the discussion than with other 
forms of interview. Furthermore, the lack of pre-determined interview questions places an additional 
emphasis on the participant to identify topics of discussion, which they may not be prepared for or 
comfortable with doing. It is important when carrying out unstructured interviews, that the interviewer is 
able to provide prompts and guidance to encourage dialogue. The flexibility of unstructured interviews 
also means that it is difficult to predict how long they will take as this is not set around a specific list of 
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questions or research objectives. As the interview participants in this research were serving members of 
West Yorkshire Police and would be taking part in the interviews during working hours, it was important 
that the interviews were as efficient as possible to minimize the impact of the research on the participants 
and their wider teams.  
 
Structured interviews are much quicker to carry out and are much easier to manage; “Structured 
interviews are, essentially, verbally administered questionnaires, in which a list of predetermined 
questions are asked. Consequently, they are relatively quick and easy to administer.” (Gill et al, p.3, 
2008). Although using structured interviews would have made the process more efficient for the 
participants and would have given the researcher the control over the questions asked (allowing the 
interview to stay relevant to the research aims), it was felt that there needed to be a degree of flexibility 
to adapt the questions to the different case studies and occupations of participants. There are also 
efficiencies in the analysis of structured interviews; because the exact same questions are asked of each 
participant, the responses can be more easily compared. “Data analysis in structured interviews usually 
tends to be more straightforward compared to other forms of interviews, because researcher can 
compare and contrast different answers given to the same questions.” (Dudovskiy, 2016, p.172). Despite 
the appeal of simpler analysis, the key disadvantage for using structured interviews for this research was 
that they do not allow for further exploration of responses and thus the data provided could have lacked 
the level of detail required to meet the research aims. “With no scope for follow-up questions to responses 
that warrant further elaboration… they only allow for limited participant responses and are, therefore, of 
little use if 'depth' is required.” (Gill et al, 2008, p.3). It was felt that semi-structured interviews would be 
more suitable for this research as they would not only allow for the comparison of responses against a 
series of set questions, but would allow for more in depth exploration of responses in addition to this.  
 
Semi-structured interviews were chosen for this research over the two alternatives based on the merits 
that they allow for pre-determined questions, and so would be relatively easy to manage, keep the 
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conversation pertinent to the research, and allow for a comparison of key responses. They would also 
allow flexibility to explore responses further and adapt the sub-questions to suit the differing roles of the 
participants across the case studies. It was also felt that individual face-to-face interviews would be the 
most appropriate for this research. Alternatives such as phone or group interviews were considered as a 
potentially more efficient way of obtaining views, but it was decided that the research would benefit most 
from face-to-face interviews given that there had already been a level of engagement built up between 
the researcher and the participants which was important to maintain throughout the fieldwork period. It 
was also thought that group interviews would not empower the participants to speak openly about their 
views amongst their team members and colleagues. Although this research was not intended to be a 
critical review of policing practice, it needed to pose questions around the effectiveness and efficiencies 
of current working practices in order to meet the research aims. This could potentially invite criticism of 
the organization or colleagues which the participants must be comfortable in sharing without fear of 
reprisal.  
 
Planning 
Consideration was given to a number of factors when planning the interviews to ensure that the research 
was valid, reliable and ethical. This section of the chapter outlines these considerations and the decisions 
made.   
 
Number of interviews and participant selection  
The purpose of the interviews was to gain a fuller understanding of the current function of NPTs within 
the delivery of Prevent and to assess whether this could or should be changed. For this reason, it was 
thought that the best participants to interview would be those who are working within neighbourhood 
policing and Prevent delivery. As noted in the previous chapter, participants for this research had been 
categorised into tiers depending on their level of involvement with the research. Tier One participants 
included two PCs and two PCSOs per case study in addition to one PEO (where applicable). It was felt 
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that these participants would be able to offer the most in depth insight into how neighbourhood and 
Prevent policing works in practice in West Yorkshire and so they were put forward for inclusion in the 
interviews. The Tier Two participants (Detective Inspectors, Detective Sergeants and Community Contact 
Officers (CCOs) who worked within Prevent) were also chosen for inclusion as it was thought that they 
would be able to provide a useful Prevent focus beyond that of the PEOs.  
 
Although every participant would have offered valid information for the research, planning, implementing 
and analysing interviews for all 19 Tier One participants and 8 Tier Two participants would have been too 
much of an undertaking in addition to the other elements of fieldwork. The research plan also had to take 
into consideration the level of demand already being placed on these participants through other 
methodologies used, for example the activity reports. Logistically trying to schedule time in with 27 
operational members of West Yorkshire Police would have also been extremely difficult as the nature of 
their roles mean that they could be called away at any time. Instead, the decision was made that 
interviewees would include one participant in each of the Tier One roles for each case study. In short, 
one PC, one PCSO, and one PEO for each area would be interviewed thus providing a stratified 50% 
coverage of all Tier One participants. One Detective Inspector, one Detective Sergeant and one CCO 
from across the four case studies would also be interviewed to provide their perspective. In total this 
amounted to 14 interviews. 
 
As all participants had already been identified, informed of the research and had given consent to take 
part, there were no issues in recruiting participants for interview. Where multiple participants volunteered 
to be interviewed in the same role/case study, two individuals were scheduled for interview to account for 
last minute cancellations, with the second being told they were a contingency. This system worked well 
and was utilised on one occasion saving time for all involved. It should also be noted that where a 
participant was keen to be interviewed but was not scheduled in, plans were made to allow them the 
opportunity to share their views more informally during the observation shifts.  
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Interview duration 
Planning for the duration of the interviews had to take into account a number of considerations. First and 
foremost, it had to provide enough time to cover all the necessary topics in a relaxed manner so that the 
participants felt comfortable in providing detailed responses. However, it was also important to keep the 
interview focused and engaging. Literature and guidance explains that the duration of the interview is 
very much determined by the topic being explored and the level of detail required, with estimates of good 
practice ranging from 10-60 minutes (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006; Creswell, 2007; and Gill, 2008). 
It would be difficult to meet the aims of this research through interviews which last any less than 10-15 
minutes, however it was not thought that 60 minutes would be necessary or appropriate given the fact 
that the participants are on duty members of West Yorkshire Police. It was decided that the interview 
schedule (detailed next), should be designed primarily around achieving the research aims, with 
consideration for the time permitted. Minimum and maximum boundaries were set as 10-30 minutes. Pilot 
interviews were also carried out as part of this planning process with serving members of West Yorkshire 
Police (who were not primary participants, but did sign the relevant informed consent forms).   
 
Interview schedule and questions 
Once the research objectives had been identified for the interviews, the type of interview and the 
participants selected, the planning turned to designing the interview schedule. Many practiced 
researchers would stress that the first step in encouraging willing and open responses from participants 
is actually setting the environment for the interviews before any questions are asked. The environment 
should be comfortable, private, and free from any distractions; “the interviewer should attempt to create 
a friendly non-threatening atmosphere” (Connaway and Powell, 2010, p.170). One benefit of carrying out 
this research within a police service is that there were plenty of functioning interview rooms available for 
use across each of the case studies. However, although this would have met the criteria for being private, 
free from any distractions, and already had recording facilities built in, it was felt that they would be too 
100 
 
formal and would project more of an investigatory atmosphere than the open and inquisitive ambiance 
that was sought. Instead, private meeting rooms within the police stations where the participants were 
based were inspected for suitability and then booked.  
 
Once the appropriate venues had been identified, an initial explanation of the interview process was 
provided in writing to those who had volunteered approximately two weeks ahead of the interviews. This 
included a short overview of the wider research and its aims, the location / date / time for the interview, 
intended duration, and information around the anonymity assurance and plans for recording the interview. 
A basic topic guide reflecting the interview schedule was also provided so that the participants felt 
prepared. However it was stressed, that there was no need to prepare, learn about any of the topics or 
improve their knowledge in any way ahead of the interviews, as it was not a knowledge test, but more of 
discussion around their views and experiences. For context, the interviewees were asked during the 
introductions if they had done any additional preparation ahead of the interview, in order to understand 
any influence that this process may have had.  
 
Designing the interview schedule was the next task. As the interviews were to be semi-structured, an 
extensive list of questions was not deemed necessary. Instead four key topics were identified aligned to 
the research aims, with sub-questions and prompts drafted to help keep the discussion focused or to 
develop a point further. The four key sections of the interview schedule were:  
1. Neighbourhood policing.  
2. Prevent policing. 
3. Local community. 
4. The role of neighbourhood policing in Prevent. 
 
Each of these topics consisted of between three and five sub questions, and further prompts should the 
interviewer feel it necessary. These topics and order were chosen as they linked directly to the research 
aims of understanding the current role of neighbourhood policing within communities and within the 
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delivery of Prevent, and would culminate in a discussion around what the participants felt the role of 
neighbourhood policing was. This order intentionally started with what was perhaps the simplest or less 
provocative topics, before gradually moving on to the more challenging discussion which would draw on 
their own perspectives and suggestions for potential improvements.  
 
“It is usually best to start with questions that participants can answer easily and 
 then proceed to more difficult or sensitive topics. This can help put respondents at  
ease, build up confidence and rapport and often generates rich data that  
subsequently develops the interview further” (Legard, 2003, p.142).  
 
It is also common practice to start an interview with a quick introductory section to relax the participant 
and set the boundaries for the interview. In doing this the interviewer introduced themselves to the 
participant, gave a quick overview of the research and its aims, outlined the process, what was required 
of the participant, gave reassurance of confidentiality, and an explanation of any recording devices being 
used. This in essence marked the start of the interview, which then moved on to the first main section.  
 
As with any qualitative interview method it is crucial to carefully select and word questions in a way which 
will provide the required focus and level of detail. “When designing an interview schedule it is imperative 
to ask questions that are likely to yield as much information about the study phenomenon as possible 
and also be able to address the aims and objectives of the research.” (Gill et.al., 2008, p.292). The 
questions used were open-ended to prompt more detailed response (Britten, 1999) and language was 
used to emphasise the point that this was the participant’s opportunity to share their opinions, and was 
not a knowledge test. For example the first main question asked was;  
“In your own words, please explain what neighbourhood policing is?” 
This was deemed a strong first question for many reasons; it was open ended and so encouraged 
participants to break their silence early on in a way which required more than just a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response. 
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It also covered a topic that all participants should feel comfortable in discussing given their background 
working within neighbourhood policing. Finally there is no right or wrong answer to this question, although 
there are accepted definitions of neighbourhood policing, it is accepted as being a broad and varying 
concept. Some prompts were drafted for the interviewer to use if needed which included “what do you 
think the purpose of neighbourhood policing is?” It was important that the prompts used (as with the main 
questions) did not influence the answer but rather encouraged the participant to be more specific or keep 
them focused on the research aims; “Planned follow-up questions or probes are the questions that make 
an interview question more speciﬁc and help direct the participant to the central issues of the study” 
(Bolderston, 2012, p.70). Further questions followed this format and although some were more closely 
linked, the interviewer was careful to ask one question at a time, avoiding double-barrelled questions and 
allowing the participant to respond fully before moving on. In addition to the topic specific prompts that 
were pre-prepared the interviewer would also use generic probing statements to encourage further 
elaboration. Examples of these would include; “can you please give me more details?” or “why do you 
think that?” as recommended by practiced researchers such as Polgar and Thomas (2000). Key literature 
on the use of interviews within research also stress the importance of body language, the use of pauses, 
eye contact, and reflective actions which reassure the interviewee that they are being listened to, and 
encourages further dialogue. The interviewer made the effort to use these techniques as appropriate 
during the interviews.  
 
It is also important to note that, in line with standard guidance, the draft interview schedule was also 
piloted with individuals in the same roles as the participants. “As in any research, it is often wise to first 
pilot the interview schedule on several respondents prior to data collection proper”. (Pontin, 2000, p.293). 
Although those involved in the pilot interviews were not official participants of the research, informed 
consent forms were gained and the same ethical standards were adhered to. These pilot participants 
were serving members of West Yorkshire Police who worked in the same or similar roles to those being 
interviewed. This pilot stage allowed for final amendments to be made to the interview schedule to ensure 
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that the questions were easy to understand, respond to and would gain the right level of detail for the 
research. The final interview schedule (see Appendix A) sought to gage: the participant’s perspective on 
the function of neighbourhood policing within communities and their role within it; their understanding of 
the Prevent Strategy and the dynamic between Prevent policing and community policing, and their 
knowledge and understanding of their local communities. All of these questions can be directly linked to 
the overall aims of this research. 
 
Ethical considerations 
Beyond the overarching ethical considerations outlined in chapter two (methodology, there were also 
some specific issues to take into consideration before carrying out the interviews including the recording 
of the interviews, confidentiality, personal safety, and interviewer bias.  
 
Recording 
All of the interviews carried out were recorded by the use of a Dictaphone. The participants were informed 
of this prior to interview and reminded before the interviews commenced. Although consideration was 
given to filming the interviews, this was not deemed necessary as the interviewer was more interested in 
what the interviewees had to say as opposed to any body language of visible indicators. The interviewer 
also took notes during the interview to assist with the structuring of any additional questions, however it 
was not feasible to expect the interviewer to keep a verbatim record of the interviewer at the time. 
Although an assistant could have been employed to take a minute of the interview, it was decided that a 
digital recording that could be played back and transcribed would not only allow for a more accurate 
record of the interview, but would also be less intimidating that an additional person in the interview room.  
 
Immediately after each interview, time was set aside to transcribe, anonymise and sanitise the recording 
which could then be stored on a secure system so that the original audio recording could be deleted. This 
was a crucial safeguard to protect the identity of the interviewees. Transcribing the interview so soon 
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after the event also helped address any inaudible responses, as it was more likely that the interviewer 
would remember what was actually said, than if there had been anymore considerable time left between. 
To this end, the interviewer also considered that it was pertinent to record any notes that they made at 
the time, or any initial thoughts on the transcribed document. This was conducted in a different font colour 
and style though so it could easily be differentiated from the verbatim record. Once the transcription was 
complete, the recording was deleted, and the document was password-protected and saved on a secure 
West Yorkshire Police system.  
 
Confidentiality 
All participants who took part in the research had their identities protected and were given aliases such 
as Participant 1A. However, due to the public facing nature of their roles, complete anonymity of the Tier 
One and Two participants could not be guaranteed. Although the case study NPTs were not specifically 
named in this research, any individual with a good local knowledge of West Yorkshire may be able to 
identify the case study by its defining features which make it so valuable to this research, for example, 
and area with a strong Kurdish community in Leeds. This extends to the participants involved in that there 
are only a limited number of NPT PCs, PCSOs or PEOs working in these areas and thus there is the 
potential for them to be identified inadvertently. This risk was clearly outlined to the participants, their line 
managers, and also the PCC and ACC who gave organisational level consent for the research to go 
ahead. All concerned were satisfied with the steps taken, understood the risk, and were happy to take 
part as ultimately West Yorkshire Police is a publicly accountable service.  
 
There was still a need for the interview recording to be sanitised. All interviewees had been asked not to 
provide/discuss any confidential information in the interviews as the findings of this research would in due 
course be presented in the public domain. However it was important that no interesting or significant 
points of discussion were lost through the sanitisation process. This included any operational detail or 
personal information such as names, places, restricted tactics etc. One final reason for undergoing this 
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process was that although participants were aware of the purpose of this research, they may have felt it 
necessary to share more critical views of the organisation or their colleagues during their interview. It was 
important that that they felt comfortable in doing so if they felt it was of use to the research, and so 
knowing that their names would not be aligned to any of the statements made was also intended to 
reassure the participants. 
 
Personal safety 
Although each of the interviewees were serving members of West Yorkshire Police, it was still crucial to 
ensure the personal safety of the interviewer by following the same processes as one would for an 
interview with a member of the public. This included inspecting the venues beforehand and choosing 
sites which are secure but with clear escape routes, informing the research supervisor and others of the 
time and place of each interview, contacting them before and after the interview to provide a welfare 
update, and taking a mobile phone into the interview. As a side note, as the interviews were all carried 
out in police buildings, the majority had alarm strips on the walls of the meeting rooms which could be 
activated if needed. This was not a prior requirement, but was considered a benefit.  
 
Interviewer bias 
As noted earlier in this chapter, considerable care was given to the structure of the interview and the 
wording of the questions to minimise the influence that they would have on the responses and subsequent 
results. This level of consideration also extended to the role and behaviour of the interviewer to avoid 
what is commonly referred to as ‘interviewer bias.’ Interviewer bias is defined by Roller, as “the potential 
distortion of research outcomes due to unintended influences from the researcher.” (2012, p.4) It is a 
particular challenge for qualitative research such as this, where the researcher has taken the time to build 
relationships prior to the interviews, and so must carefully balance their actions to reduce the impact that 
they may have on any results. Guidance and good practice around maintaining asymmetrical 
relationships between the interviewer and interviewee, visual cues and non-verbal motivating-factors has 
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been outlined by those such as Turner (2010) and Sandy & Dumay (2011) and was carefully adhered to 
during the interviews. However there are also elements which cannot be controlled by the interviewer 
such as their race, gender, socio-economic standing etc. Any perception that the interviewee has of the 
interviewer’s demographic background could potentially have an inadvertent effect on their response. 
Although this cannot be controlled (without changing the style of interview to a non face-to-face format 
such as online), it is something that the interviewer should be aware of. For this research, it was not 
deemed to be a significant concern given the line of questioning, but it was something that the interviewer 
would look out for and would if needed be factored into the analysis.  
 
Timing of interviews 
One final consideration in the planning stages of the interviews was the need to schedule all of the 
interviews into the same time-frame. The world of policing and counter terrorism is continually changing 
and evolving therefore it was important that the interviews were reflective of the same point in time so 
that valid comparisons could be drawn. The significance of this decision was highlighted by the fact that 
the initial dates proposed by the researcher for the interviews to take place, clashed with a change in shift 
patterns. Due to the staggered roll out of the changes, it would have meant that some of the participants 
being interviewed would be working to the old shift patterns, whilst some would be working to the new 
ones. Given the impact that this would have on daily duties and practices around community engagement 
it was crucial to ensure that all participants were in the same situation for interview. For practical reasons, 
the interviews were scheduled to take place within the same month (and were delayed slightly to allow 
for the shift pattern changes). It was thought that one-month was a reasonable window to still reflect a 
point in time, whilst allowing for scheduling with the participants and the transcription of each interview. 
The researcher did also make sure to monitor any changes in legislation, police policies or practices, and 
significant events in the media or local communities to ensure that there were no unknown factors which 
could reduce the validity of comparisons across interview responses. 
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Implementation 
Overall the interviews were a success. The level of planning and preparation was beneficial and each 
interview took place without incident. The number of interviews carried out (14) provided enough usable 
data for the research without placing too much of an administrative burden on the researcher or 
participants. The process for choosing participants (based on a stratified sample of willing volunteers) 
was also a success as it provided a broad overview across all case studies and roles within the Tier One 
and Two participant groups. The contingency participants (those who volunteered but were not initially 
chosen) came in useful on two occasions as the first participants became unavailable at the last minute. 
Each of the interviews lasted approximately 15 minutes, (range: 13:46 to 20:28 mins.), this was 
considered appropriate for the level of detail required and number of topics covered, and was also noted 
as a positive from many of the participants in their feedback forms. There were also no personal safety 
issues and the interview records were transcribed relatively easily and efficiently following each interview. 
Perhaps the greatest success stemmed from choosing the format of semi-structured interviews for this 
research. This worked very well and also provided the interviewer with the opportunity to add in two extra 
questions (detailed later) following the first interview which provided a great insight into differences across 
the case studies which had not been captured in the pilots. The set questions allowed for useful 
comparison of responses whilst the flexibility of the prompts and spontaneous sub-questions allowed for 
more in depth discussions where specific issues arose. It did also allow the interviewer a level of control 
over the flow of the dialogue as in some cases participants were initially quite brief in their responses until 
they understood that they would be prompted for more information where necessary. In general, the 
participants all appeared comfortable in sharing their views, to the extent that one participant needed to 
be closely managed to keep the conversation on the topic at hand as they had on occasion divulged 
additional unnecessary information.  
 
Perhaps the only element of the interview that did not go entirely as planned related to the use of the 
Dictaphone. One of the interviews took place on an unusually warm day; in order to make the room more 
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comfortable, a window was opened. Unfortunately this produced background noise which was not 
noticeable during the session, but made the interpretation of the recording a little more difficult. To 
overcome this issue, the interviewer transcribed as full a record as possible and then sent it to the 
participant with gaps highlighted to ask for clarity around what they said. As notes were taken at the time 
too, there were only four small gaps for the participant to fill, and thankfully they were able to do so with 
ease. Nevertheless, this was noted on the official transcription and would also count as a learning point 
for the researcher.  
 
Analysis and findings  
Once all the interviews had been transcribed they were analysed. It was decided that thematic analysis 
(as outlined in Chapter Two), would be the most suitable analytical approach to compare across the roles 
and case studies, given the relatively low number of interviews that took place and the overall purposes 
of the research. The first step in doing so was to give each participant an alias which would allow their 
role and case study to be identifiable to the researcher, for example PC1, or PCSO2. The letters quite 
simply denoted their role, whilst the number aligned to their case study. The Tier Two participants were 
not specifically aligned to any individual case study as their roles required them to work at a West 
Yorkshire level as opposed to NPT level, for this reason their numerical identifier was ‘5’.  
 
The next stage of preparing the data for thematic analysis was to code the responses. The responses to 
each question were reviewed and a coding framework covering the different themes was developed. The 
numerically coded responses were then collated on a spreadsheet to allow for statistical analysis of the 
data as well as reflective interpretation of the language and terminologies used. Consideration was given 
to the use of automated software to code the responses such as NVIVO, however given the relatively 
small number of responses concerned it was decided that manual coding would be sufficient. The 
researcher carried out all coding personally to negate the need for inter-rater agreements, vetting of 
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users, and the transfer of data. Fuller findings are discussed in chapter eight, but this chapter will provide 
a summary of some of the key findings pertinent to the research aims.  
 
Neighbourhood policing 
The first set of questions focused on neighbourhood policing; the purpose was to gauge the participants’ 
level of understanding and perceptions of both neighbourhood policing and Prevent policing. This would 
help identify any similarities or differences which could indicate reasons for or against the increased 
involvement between the two, (research aim three). The opening question asked interviewees to explain 
neighbourhood policing in their own words. All of the participants were able to provide a basic definition 
of neighbourhood policing with ease; some of the common themes across all responses was the 
inclusion of terms such as ‘community’, ‘working together’, and ‘local’. For example: 
 
“Neighbourhood policing is all about working together with local communities to 
build trust and relations.” (Participant DS5).  
 
Although all responses followed a similar pattern as the example provided above, there were some 
subtle differences in the responses when compared across role types. The terminology and language 
used in responses from NPT participants was very much focused on ‘problem solving’, with six out of 
the eight NPT participants using these words. Although this term was used by some of the other 
participants, it was occasional and not in the same frequency. Interestingly though, there were 
commonalities across the PEO and CCO roles, and also between the DI and DS roles. The responses 
from the PEO and CCOs had a clear emphasis on the ‘engagement’ and the relationship elements of 
neighbourhood policing: 
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“Neighbourhood policing focuses on building relationships between communities 
through consistent engagement, that way trust and confidence grows and the 
local community begin to work with us [the police].” (Participant PEO3). 
 
This focus on engagement and building relations became more apparent in responses to the next 
questions in this section which related more to the specific purposes of neighbourhood policing. The 
answers provided by the DS and DIs in the interview were similar but had a more strategic sense to 
them; both responses covered the basic terms of ‘community’ and ‘working together’ as noted above, 
but also included terms such as ‘proactive’, ‘intervention’ and ‘long-term’. None of these words were 
found in any of the responses from other participants. The logical explanation for this strategic 
perspective is that these roles have a higher level of responsibility over West Yorkshire as a whole and 
how the Prevent and local neighbourhood teams police all communities consistently. For this reason the 
role requires more of an overarching and systematic approach than those who are working directly within 
smaller communities.  
 
Interestingly, there were no clear differences in the way participants responded to this question based on 
the case study area that they were aligned to. This suggests a level of consistency in the training and 
practice of staff across the districts in West Yorkshire Police which would be encouraging to senior 
leaders. The same was apparent in responses following the initial sub-question; “What do you think the 
purposes and aims of neighbourhood policing are? The coding of these responses showed that the most 
common themes were to “build trust and confidence in local communities” (Participant PCSO4), and “to 
focus more on problem solving to stop issues escalating in communities” (Participant DI5) with very little 
variation from these themes regardless of role or case study. 
 
The second key question in this section asked interviewees what they thought their role was within 
neighbourhood policing, or for those more aligned to Prevent policing (i.e. PEOs, CCOs, DSs and DIs), 
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it asked whether they thought they had a role, to avoid inadvertently influencing the responses. Again 
there were clear differences in the answers across roles; the Tier One participants (PCs, PCSOs and 
PEOs) typically stated that their role was to “provide the link between the police and the community” 
(Participant PCSO2), whilst interestingly responses from Tier Two participants CCOs, DSs and DIs, also 
used the term ‘link’ but in the sense that their role was to “provide the link between the NPTs and the 
Prevent teams.” (Participant CCO5). This finding is particularly pertinent to the research aims, as it 
illustrates the differentiation between the two teams at present; currently PEOs are aligned to and 
embedded within NPTs but with joint line management from the NPT Inspector and the Prevent team 
(CCOs and above). The fact that the responses from the PEOs were more similar to the responses from 
NPT participants than the Prevent team participants is very noteworthy; it could suggest that the system 
of embedding PEOs within NPTs is working very well, conversely it could also suggest that PEOs are 
less in touch with their Prevent teams than perhaps they should be. From this initial finding, further sub-
questions were added into section four of the interview schedule to investigate this suggestion further. It 
should be noted however, that the responses provided to this question did represent the intended 
functions for these roles; that PEOs, as with PCs and PCSOs should be working directly with the public, 
whilst CCOs, DSs and DIs provide the Prevent oversight and link with the NPTs. So at the very least the 
responses to these interview questions suggest that the theory of how neighbourhood and Prevent teams 
should interact at present appears to be working in practice.  
 
This was one of the only questions throughout the entire interviews where there was a discernible 
difference in how participants answered across the case study areas. All of the participants from case 
study three mentioned ‘community cohesion’ as one of the purposes or priorities of neighbourhood 
policing, whereas none of the other participants included this in their responses prior to being prompted.  
 
“Everyone in our NPT has a responsibility to improve cohesion in our area.” 
(Participant PC3) 
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“As a PEO I should be engaging with people from different cultures, improving 
relations and cohesion between them, and nipping any issues in the bud.” 
(Participant PEO3).  
 
In the other interviews, the interviewer followed up the main question with the following prompt; “Do you 
feel your role has a part to play in maintaining community cohesion?” All of the participants answered 
‘yes’ to this further question, and although there were some slight discrepancies in the level of importance 
that they felt their roles played in maintaining community cohesion, this was not considered to be 
significant. 
 
The final question in this section asked whether the participants thought neighbourhood policing in their 
areas could be improved for the benefit of community cohesion and if so how? The interviewer had 
prepared some examples to be used as prompts in case the participant did not understand the question 
but these were only required in one interview (PCSO4). It should also be noted that the wording of the 
question was altered slightly for the Tier Two participants to refer to neighbourhood policing in West 
Yorkshire as opposed to their area. The coding of these responses included; the recent changes to shift 
patterns (which many thought was hindering their ability to engage with communities), the existence of 
specific community based roles such as PCSOs and PEO (which helps serve the community’s needs), 
and the allocation of ward areas of geographical responsibility (which some felt was a good idea but isn’t 
working in practice due to demand). Most notably though, analysis showed that every participant felt that 
neighbourhood policing could be improved, and that every participant felt that ‘workload and current 
demands’ were having a negative impact on the ability to deliver neighbourhood policing to a better 
standard.  
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“Neighbourhood policing should be about spending time in communities and solving 
problems with people, but we’re too busy now rushing from job, to job, to job, to do 
anything how we’d like, we’re always rushing. When I started people would know my 
name and I’d know them, but now I’m just a stranger in a uniform.” (Participant PC2).  
 
The same reflective sentiment was found in most responses in that people would compare current 
practices with previous years. When the interviewer asked what had changed in this period to affect the 
way that participants worked, the resounding answer was that workload had increased.  
 
“We’ve always had workloads, but as an NPT we’d generate a lot of it ourselves and we’d 
be proactive, now we just get allocated that many jobs to get through, we can’t even think 
about being proactive anymore” (Participant PC1).  
 
This was echoed across all roles and all case study areas, with some participants specifically commenting 
on the level of impact that this has had on communities;  
 
“PCSOs traditionally didn’t carry workloads so that we could be more proactive, that’s not 
the case anymore. We should be called Police Constable Support Officers, not Police 
Community Support Officers, because now we’re basically just police officers without the 
same powers”. (Participant PCSO1).  
 
Although this last comment was said with a level of humour the participant was very serious in their belief 
that the increasing pressures and workloads being placed on NPTs was negatively affecting their ability 
to proactively engage within communities. This was perhaps best summed up by Participant PC2 who 
claimed that;  
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 “Neighbourhood policing doesn’t exist anymore. Calling us an NPT doesn’t make us an 
NPT, we’re just another response team now”. (Participant PC2). 
 
This conflict between increasing demand being placed on the police and re-prioritisation away from 
neighbourhood policing over the past five years will be discussed in more detail in chapter eight, but 
nevertheless the fact that every single participant involved in these interviews stated that increasing 
workloads was impacting on their ability to deliver neighbourhood policing should be noted. It not only 
informs research aim two, ‘what is the current role of neighbourhood policing in Prevent’, but also 
impacts on the debate around research aim three and the potential for this to be increased.  
 
Prevent 
The second section of the interview schedule focused on Prevent, in particular the participants’ 
understanding and perceptions of Prevent. The first question simply tried to gage what the participants’ 
current understanding and knowledge level of the Prevent Strategy was. This was perhaps the most 
revealing question in relation to the level of awareness of Prevent across ‘mainstream’ policing. Although 
all of the PEOs, and Tier Two participants were able to answer this question easily and fully; most likely 
due to their role being so heavily linked to Prevent, only two of the PCs and PCSOs were able to give 
substantial answers, with most claiming their knowledge was “minimal at best” (Participant PC2). One 
NPT participant actually stated that prior to taking part in this research they had “never heard of Prevent” 
(Participant PCSO2).  For the benefit of the research and developing dialogue, the interviewer provided 
a pre-written summary describing Prevent to the participants. This appeared to prompt some of the 
participant’s memories who then recalled experiences of working with Prevent which varied from “ticking 
a Prevent box when you fill out an intelligence report” (Participant PCSO3), to having “a training input a 
few years ago” (Participant PC1). Further prompts asked participants if they had ever received training 
on Prevent, to which the response was mixed; some stated that they had but not recently, some stated 
that they had on entry into the police, and some stated that they could not recall ever being trained on 
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Prevent. Importantly, all of the participants were asked if they had conducted any sort of research or 
preparation to bolster their knowledge of the topic areas prior to the interview, to which they all stated 
that they had not. Whilst it would be meaningless to compare the level of understanding of Prevent 
across the participants’ roles it was useful to compare and find that there was no apparent difference in 
the level of understanding across the case study areas. That said, this assumption is based on a 
particularly small sample of eight individual staff members across West Yorkshire. 
 
Perhaps the most instrumental question in this section was “how well do you think Prevent Policing and 
Neighbourhood Policing are integrated in your area?”  Although the overarching question remained the 
same for all participants, the prompts provided were slightly different as they were tailored to the roles 
of the participants. The responses to this question were particularly enlightening as two key themes 
emerged; firstly that there was a clear difference in how well integrated NPT participants felt compared 
to the PEOs and Tier Two participants, and secondly that all NPT participants felt that integration was 
weak but when prompted could cite positive examples of interaction.  
 
None of the NPT participants felt that Prevent and Neighbourhood policing was well integrated in their 
area, although half did state that they had ‘some level of integration’. Incidentally, the half that felt there 
was some integration were from the same two case study areas (one and three, Islamic and right wing). 
None of the NPT participants from case study two (Kurdish) or four (no specific vulnerability) felt there 
was any real integration. Although this is somewhat understandable for case study four, given there is 
no aligned PEO or specific vulnerability, it is interesting that case study two presented in this way. When 
the PEO, CCO, DS and DI participants were asked the same question, the responses were much more 
positive. These participants generally felt that “there is a good level of integration but more could always 
be done” (Participant DS5). The difference between how the NPT participants and the Prevent 
participants answered could simply be down to perspective; NPT staff by their nature must focus on 
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almost all elements of policing whilst PEOs, CCOs and the Prevent team DS and DIs are solely focused 
on Prevent and so they see the integration more clearly.  
 
“NPT officers are the GPs of policing, they need to know enough about everything to 
get the job done, but Prevent teams are the specialists who focus on this one very 
niche area of policing” (Participant DI5).  
 
Although this statement was not made specifically in relation to this question the point remains; perhaps 
the NPTs and Prevent teams are integrated, but that it is more of a subconscious link for NPT PCs and 
PCSOs, and one that is much more overt and intentional for the Prevent staff. This idea could be 
supported by the fact that when asked prompt questions such as ‘who would you go to if you had a 
Prevent related query or issue?’ Or ‘do you know how to contact the Prevent team if needed?’ all of the 
NPT participants could answer these questions in a way that would be in line with West Yorkshire Police 
guidance, with some going further to cite examples of positive interactions between their NPT and 
Prevent teams.  
 
“I don’t know their names but they’re just down the corridor and their door is always 
open, so to speak. I’ve bobbed in a couple of times to ask for advice and they’re 
always more than happy to help.” (Participant PC3) 
 
“If I needed to speak to somebody from Prevent I’d probably just search for an email 
address or phone number on the system and give them a call, I don’t know who they 
are per se but I’d know how to get in touch with them.” (Participant PCSO4).  
 
“We don’t work with them every day, but **named PEO** is always calling into the 
office and tries to sit in on our briefings, so that works pretty well.” (Participant PC1).  
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Further discussions around this issue suggested that although NPT participants do not necessarily feel 
that there is a clear level of integration, they did all know how to contact the Prevent team, feed in 
information in the correct way, what sort of issues they would be interested in, and would ultimately feel 
comfortable in interacting; this suggests that the level of integration is perhaps higher than the early 
responses would portray. Analysis of responses across the case study areas does however allude to a 
lack of systematic integration; the relations between the two teams vary across the case studies and 
appear to be attributed more to the efforts and of individuals in these roles than to any organisational 
systems or standard practices for integration. Whilst this is encouraging in relation to the calibre of the 
individuals in these roles, it does potentially pose problems for the organisation with regards to 
consistency and resilience across West Yorkshire Police should these people move roles.  
 
Responses to the final question of this section of the interview schedule appeared to compound this 
finding. The Tier One participants (only) were asked about their knowledge and involvement in Prevent 
activity in their local area. The interviewer stressed the importance of not mentioning any operationally 
sensitive information and explained that the purpose of this question was to understand what level of 
Prevent activity is ongoing and what level of involvement NPTs had in it. The responses to this question 
generally presented similar themes to the earlier answers; NPTs were aware of only a small proportion 
of specific activity, but knew that it was ongoing. PEOs could naturally provide more detail and claimed 
that NPTs had a higher level of awareness than was suggested by the NPT participants. 
 
NPT Participant, case study three:  
“I know they’re quite active in the **named area** part of our beat and that they’re 
always working with the Mosques. They’ll tell us sometimes when they’re doing a 
Mosque visit but that’s about it.” (Participant PC3).  
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PEO Participant, case study three:  
 “We have an active programme of engagement with all our Mosques and community 
centres in **same area** which in short consists of visits, helping them with crime 
prevention, open days etc. we always inform the NPT sergeants beforehand and when 
its appropriate we’ll take PCSOs along with us.” (Participant PEO3) 
 
These two different accounts of what is apparently the same activity is revealing as it shows two very 
differing perspectives. This was reiterated across the case studies, on more than one occasion the NPT 
participants in a case study area could not provide any examples of Prevent work in their area, whilst the 
PEO for that area could provide an extensive overview of activity. Prompts to the PEO in particular asked 
whether NPTs had been made aware of this activity, if so how, and if not, why not. In the vast majority of 
the cases the PEO response was that the NPT had been made aware through briefings, in that either the 
PEO had attended the briefing in person to provide the information or had emailed through the plans to 
the Sergeant for inclusion. When the PEOs were asked how often they attended NPT briefings the 
responses varied across the case studies quite significantly from two a month to three times a week. This 
again suggests that a lack of systematic guidance on how the Prevent teams and NPTs should be 
integrating is causing differing practices and perceptions across the case study areas.  
 
The local community 
The third section of the interview schedule related to the participants’ local community, in particular 
its needs and vulnerability to extremism. The first question was a fairly generic and was intended 
to put the interviewees at ease whilst gaging their level of familiarity with the communities in which 
they police, and simply asked how well they felt they knew their local community and its needs. 
The responses were vastly similar across roles and case study areas in that all participants felt 
confident that they knew their community and its needs well. One perhaps interesting theme to 
emerge was that the NPT participants all felt that they were less familiar with their communities 
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now than in previous years, whilst the majority of PEOs (and CCOs) felt more confident in their 
local knowledge now than perhaps two years ago. When this was discussed further with NPT 
participants it linked back to the themes of the previous questions around additional demands being 
placed on NPTs and thus a lesser time available to engage;  
 
“I’m supposed to be ward manager of **named area** but I barely get to spend any 
time there because I’m too busy covering everywhere else and responding to jobs. 
I should be spending most of my shift there, but I think last set [of shifts] I went there 
once for about 10 minutes.” (Participant PC4) 
 
When the same question was explored further with PEOs and CCOs the findings were quite different in 
that they felt better resourced and supported now than in previous years: 
 
“Prevent is gaining more and more momentum, the hard work is paying off and we’re 
finally starting to shake off the old reputation of being anti-Muslim and a toxic brand. 
We’re more open and honest now than we used to be, so communities who would 
once have nothing to do with us, ring us up and invite us to their events, they see 
that we’re safeguarding now.” (Participant PEO1). 
 
These two themes were apparent across almost all responses and are of particular significance to 
research aim three (“to understand whether NPTs could and should be more involved in Prevent”). It 
would appear that whilst the work of Prevent teams is becoming less of a public battle, and thus more is 
being done, NPTs are being left with less capacity to do even the most basic levels of engagement. The 
wider shift in focus in policing from traditional neighbourhood policing priorities of anti-social behaviour 
and volume crime, to safeguarding the most vulnerable people in our communities will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter eight, but at this stage it is safe to say that this re-prioritisation has clearly had a 
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marked impact on the ability of NPTs to engage with their communities, even if it has been beneficial to 
Prevent teams. There was one exception to this theme which is particularly noteworthy. One of the PCSOs 
mentioned that they had fought hard to carry on with engagement work with local women’s groups by 
offering to work in their own time, because their current workload made it too difficult to do everything 
required during their shifts. When the interviewer asked what sort of work this was the response given 
was;  
“I worked with some local women from the South Asian community to set up a group a 
few years ago, a lady came to me, worried that there were more and more women at 
the school gates who couldn’t speak English; together we set up a small group at the 
local centre and it’s just grown and grown. It’s more of a social group but it also teaches 
English lessons, helps with school applications, and they just talk about issues that 
matter to them. It’s definitely helped these women feel less alone and more at home 
here, so I think it’s important to keep that going no matter what.” (Participant PCSO2).  
 
Although the participant was sharing this to make the point that demands on NPTs are hindering their 
ability to work with communities, there is potentially a more significant point. The work that this PCSO had 
done, is essentially a textbook example of Prevent engagement; it is a focused intervention with an 
isolated group of individuals, for the purposes of improving cohesion, building trust and confidence and 
reducing vulnerabilities. Of course the PCSO never mentioned any vulnerability to extremism and 
incidentally never linked this to Prevent, however fundamentally this is the same type of work. The fact 
that it had been carried out without any input from Prevent could be seen as a criticism of the relationship 
between the two teams, but it also shows that NPTs are capable of delivering Prevent style policing.  
 
The next three questions in this section of the interview were intended to establish the participants’ 
awareness of extremism and vulnerabilities within their communities. The interviewer initially asked 
whether the participant was aware of any parts of their community which were vulnerable to extremism. 
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It is important to note that the purpose of this question was not to check the responses for factual 
accuracy, but more to understand any similar or differing perspectives across the roles. Interestingly all 
of the PCSOs across all of the case studies answered ‘yes’ to this stating that they did think certain 
elements of their community were vulnerable to extremism but only two out of four of the PCs did. 
Naturally all of the PEOs and Tier Two participants said yes. Perhaps what is also interesting is that, all 
of the PCSOs identified potential vulnerabilities to extremism within their local Muslim communities but 
no other community or form of extremism was noted (even in case studies three and four; ‘right wing’ 
and ‘no specific vulnerability’). The PC from case study three identified a local community which could 
be vulnerable to right wing extremism, but only after they had talked for four minutes about the 
vulnerability of the local Muslim community first. When the NPT participants who had answered ‘yes’ 
were asked why they felt that, only two out of six stated briefings had influenced their view, whilst one 
said they got their information from the media, one said from experience, and two said they did not really 
know they just assumed. This again points to a lack of awareness of Prevent related issues across 
NPTs, and inconsistencies in how information is shared across teams. Encouragingly, the PEOs (and 
Tier Two participants) could all provide fuller evidence based responses identifying various vulnerable 
communities across the case studies in relation to multiple forms of extremism.  
 
The next question followed on from this quite closely and was asked in order to broaden the discussion 
to include triggers and driving factors of vulnerability to extremism. The question included some examples 
of potential factors including poverty, racial tensions, and presence of controversial groups to direct the 
participants. Although this question was again answered with relative ease by the PEOs and Tier Two 
participants, it seemed to be a little more thought provoking for many of the NPT participants.  
 
“I hadn’t really thought about it in that way before, but yes I suppose there are a few 
communities who could go that way” (Participant PC2)  
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The responses to this question were quite varied with many of the NPT participants visibly less keen to 
offer their thoughts, perhaps because of their lack of confidence around the topic area, or a reluctance to 
make assumptions about local communities based on the potential factors discussed “I probably shouldn’t 
cast aspersions” (Participant PCSO4). It did however broaden the discussion from the talk of Muslim 
extremism to other forms of extremism; NPT participants from three of the case studies then identified 
communities in their local area who could potentially be vulnerable to right wing extremism, and one 
recalled a community group he had previously worked with that was supportive of the Palestinian cause 
and linked this to a potential vulnerability.  
 
These discussions helped lead participants on to the final question in this section which was “are there 
any communities in your local area which you think could be vulnerable to extremism but are showing 
good signs of resilience?” Only two NPT participants answered ‘yes’ to this with the rest stating that they 
didn’t know. Participant PCSO1 felt that a local Muslim community in a named area was “doing some 
really good work to mix in with different groups and show that Muslims are good and not terrorists”, whilst 
Participant PC3 explained;  
“The working class white community in this area have had their problems in the past, 
but I think now they’re getting better. In fact a lot of them came to a community 
meeting a few months ago to oppose an EDL demo that was being planned. I know 
that some of these people used to go to National Front marches so that shows you 
how far they’ve come.” (Participant PC3) 
 
PEO and Tier Two participants were also able to provide some examples of communities that are getting 
stronger at (and showing more resilience to), extremism across the case study areas and the three forms 
of extremism that this research is focused on. A supplementary question asked whether the police had 
done anything to aid this resilience and although the PC and PCSO did not feel they knew enough to 
answer substantially, the PEOs and Tier Two participant provided a range of examples of work that the 
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Prevent team (and wider policing service) had done to assist. Coding of these responses roughly broke 
them down into three main categories; increased proactive engagement based on honest interactions, 
help around general policing issues such as crime prevention, and assistance with events. The interviewer 
asked the DS and DI whether they felt this sort of work could be done by NPT staff, to which they both 
answered ‘yes’ leading on to the final section of these interviews.  
 
Neighbourhood policing in Prevent 
The last section of questions in the interviews referred specifically to research aim three; to understand 
whether NPTs could or should play an increased role in the delivery of Prevent. Crucially, this section 
asked the participants, as experienced practitioners in both neighbourhood and Prevent policing, for their 
opinions and suggestions in this regard. The first question; “what do you think the role of NPTs should be 
within preventing violent extremism in your area?” was direct, and built upon earlier discussions in the 
interviews. The responses to this question varied in the detail provided, but there was a general consensus 
that participants felt NPTs should be more involved in the delivery of Prevent. The variations came when 
participants were asked what areas of work NPTs could increase involvement in. Whilst every participant 
felt that NPT officers and PCSOs should carry out more ‘Prevent-focused’ engagement and do more 
intelligence gathering there was a clear difference in opinion as to whether they should only be acting 
under the close supervision of the Prevent team, or whether they should be able to do the “low-level 
Prevent stuff as part and parcel of their daily duties” (Participant PC2).  
 
Many of the participants who felt that NPT should be utilised more in Prevent based this on similarities 
between the community based policing models of Prevent policing and neighbourhood policing; these 
were recognised (un-prompted) in nine of the interviews:  
“Prevent staff and NPT staff are doing the same work just with a slightly different 
audience. Prevent has had a bad reputation over the years but it’s basically just 
community policing, yes it’s more focused on certain communities where there may be 
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a threat or vulnerability but that’s no different to NPTs doing more patrols in high crime 
areas.” (Participant PEO1). 
 
This acknowledgement of the similarities between the two forms of policing was generally qualified by the 
claim that it would not be too much of a reach to expect NPT staff to carry out more Prevent work. The 
majority of participants felt that NPTs and Prevent teams should carry out more joint engagement and 
that Prevent teams should use NPT officers to gather more intelligence on issues which are pertinent at 
the time: 
“When Prevent officers are going into Mosques and community centres, we should be 
going with them whenever we can. It’s our community too and we should be engaging 
with these groups too.” (Participant PC2) 
and; 
“One thing PCSOs are good at is submitting intelligence from the community, but the 
best intelligence is focused and actionable. Prevent should be telling us what they’re 
interested in, so we know what’s useful to them and what’s not.” (Participant PCSO1) 
 
Many of the participants (both NPT and Prevent based) felt that NPTs should be able to carry-out this sort 
of work with guidance but not direct supervision from the Prevent teams, however of the participants who 
felt that NPTs should be more involved, but under supervision, the majority stressed that this was because 
of sensitivities around Prevent:  
“We’ve worked really hard to show that Prevent isn’t spying, and that we can be trusted, 
but there’s still a lot of wariness in communities. All it takes is one over keen police officer 
or PCSO to go into a situation they don’t understand and create tensions that we’ll then 
have to try and fix.” (Participant CCO5).  
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This links back to the underlying question of this research aim, ‘is Prevent a specialist area which only 
expert officers should be responsible for, or is Prevent the responsibility of all members of West 
Yorkshire Police and should be ‘mainstreamed’ accordingly?’ It is also important to note, that this 
apprehension was not only shown by the Prevent based participants; many of the NPT participants also 
raised concerns about their lack of understanding and knowledge of Prevent and related issues. The 
interviewer asked whether participants felt comfortable in talking to members of the public about cultural, 
political and religious issues. The vast majority said ‘yes,’ however there was a lower level of confidence 
with the NPT participants than with the Prevent staff. Many of the NPT PCs and PCSOs said ‘yes’ but 
added a caveat such as “only if it was something I knew about” (Participant PC3). This issue was 
illustrated further in the responses to the final question; “Do you think anything would have to change 
for NPTs to become more involved in Prevent?” All of the responses provided included the need for 
additional training and information sharing so that the NPT staff could feel comfortable and confident in 
having potentially difficult conversations on sensitive issues.  
“I think most officers would want to feel like they can have these conversations, it’s our 
job to talk to people about their concerns and solve problems, we want to be able to do 
that regardless of the topic, but I personally don’t feel like I could do that without some 
training around Prevent, and a lot more information from the team.” (Participant PC2) 
 
Whilst the solution to this issue appears to be quite logical; provide more training and input to NPTs if 
they are to play an increased role, this suggestion also highlighted another logistical problem. The 
second question of this section asked whether anything would have to change for NPTs to be more 
involved in Prevent. Again the issues around training and improving confidence were raised, but more 
crucially, the issue of capacity re-emerged.  
“I would love to do more work around Prevent and be more engaged in these 
communities, but unfortunately, I just haven’t got the time. We already can’t do our own 
engagement, let alone specialised Prevent engagement.” (Participant PCSO4) 
126 
 
 
“I don’t think I’d even have the time to do the training right now, let alone actually put it 
into practice.” (Participant PC1) 
 
This was a resounding statement made in nearly all of the interviews, although some participants were 
more positive than others, “we’d make it work, because that’s what we do.” (Participant PC3), the point 
remains, that if NPTs were to become more involved in the delivery of Prevent there would have to be 
much bigger changes to their current roles and duties to allow for this increased responsibility. 
 
Overall, this section of the interviews showed that whilst there is clearly an appetite for NPTs to become 
more involved in the delivery of Prevent, there are some serious concerns about how this would work in 
practice. The debate still remains as to whether Prevent is a specialism that should be left to trained 
officers, and whether NPTs have the capability or capacity to effectively deliver Prevent at present. It is 
also worth noting that there were no clear differences in how participants answered these questions in 
relation to their case study area, suggesting that the issues raised are West Yorkshire wide. There were 
some differences in how participants from different roles responded in relation to the level of 
responsibility that should be given to NPTs, however again, the concerns raised around confidence and 
capability were spread proportionately across the participants.  
 
Summary 
Neighbourhood policing  
Responses to the questions around neighbourhood policing revealed two key findings pertinent to the 
research aims; West Yorkshire Police is under significant pressure to deliver neighbourhood policing 
because of increasing demand and reducing resources, and that this is having a negative impact on 
how the police engage with and build cohesion within communities. Participants repeatedly stressed 
how changes to their working environment such as shift-patterns and workloads were hindering their 
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ability to be present within their communities and how they felt out of touch with the local issues. It was 
suggested that if prioritised, West Yorkshire Police could use Prevent as a way to improve relations 
between the police and public; if Prevent was to be ‘mainstreamed’ across neighbourhood policing, the 
increased levels of community engagement could help to rebuild relations and improve cohesion.  
 
Prevent 
The discussions around Prevent provided a mixed picture; the initial awareness and levels of 
understanding of Prevent across NPT participants appeared to be minimal. However, each of the 
participants were able to outline how they would identify and engage with the Prevent team, if needed, 
to a satisfactory standard. This provides a level of reassurance that the police workforce is competent 
enough to deal with issues even if they fall outside of their specialism. It does, however, also pose 
questions around resilience, structures and consistency of practices across West Yorkshire Police as 
an organisation. These interview responses were integral to research aim two; ‘what is the current role 
of NPTs in Prevent?’ and it was interesting to note the different perspectives on the levels of integration 
between Prevent and NPTs, with many Prevent participants feeling that the levels of integration were 
sufficient, whilst the NPT participants generally wanted more interaction. Although this provides a great 
insight into the current practices and role of NPTs in Prevent, ultimately, this debate would not be 
resolved through these interviews alone, as the bigger question needs to be answered first; ‘what should 
the role of NPTs be in the delivery of Prevent?’ 
 
Local communities 
This section of the interviews provided the opportunity to explore some of the earlier points in more 
detail, particularly around the integration and information sharing between Prevent and neighbourhood 
policing. Many of the NPT participants again reiterated that their local knowledge has deteriorated over 
the past few years, as their workload and priorities have shifted away from proactive engagement. 
Although this is an issue across all forms of community engagement, it is clearly more apparent with 
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regards to engaging with vulnerable or hard to reach communities in their area, which many participants 
felt that they had even less knowledge of. This was contrasted in the responses from PEOs and CCOs 
who were able to provide quite full, evidence based responses to the questions about their local 
communities and the issues that they faced. This ultimately poses the question of information sharing 
between the two policing departments. Whilst the Prevent officers claimed that they provided regular 
briefings and inputs to the NPTs, it was clear from their own estimations that this varied significantly 
across the case study areas, suggesting that more could be done to formalise the information sharing 
processes between teams for the good of the local community.  
 
NPTs and the Prevent Strategy 
The concluding section of the interviews related directly to research aim three, posing the question to 
the participants; “what do you think the role of NPTs should be within preventing violent extremism in 
your area?” The responses to this were varied, and although every participant said that NPTs should do 
more to help deliver Prevent, there were different opinions regarding how this should happen in practice. 
In addition to this, the issues of capability and capacity were raised; generally participants (regardless 
of role or case study area) felt that even if NPTs were to be instructed to do more around Prevent, there 
would be a lack of confidence amongst some NPT staff to have the difficult conversations and carry out 
the more bespoke engagement required for Prevent. The final and perhaps more difficult to overcome 
obstacle related to the workloads and demands alluded to earlier in the interviews; ultimately participants 
felt unable to carry out community policing for general purposes to the level that they would like, let 
alone take on more the more complex responsibility of delivery Prevent focused community policing.  
 
To conclude, the interviews were very useful in uncovering some of the key issues relating to research 
aims two and three. They provided the opportunity to ask experienced practitioners in both 
neighbourhood policing and Prevent delivery crucial questions in relation to how the two areas 
compliment and differ. Perhaps the most significant finding was that although the results from the 
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interviews suggest that NPTs should play an increased role in the delivery of Prevent, considerable 
changes would have to happen to create a policing environment where NPTs could do more to deliver 
Prevent.  
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Chapter Four  
Focus Groups with community participants 
 
The mixed methodological approach adopted in the thesis included semi-structured interviews, activity 
reports, observations and focus groups. There were many benefits to using this combination, most 
importantly it provided multiple data sets covering the key research aims and helped to capture the 
different perspectives of the participants. It also allowed for triangulation across the datasets to help verify 
and in some cases reinforce the findings, crucially the different methods were used to further investigate 
suppositions at different levels meaning that the overall results of the research had increased coverage 
and were comprehensive, overcoming the limitations of using any of the methods in isolation. Each of 
the methodologies was chosen to provide different data around each of the three research aims:  
 
1. To investigate the significance of community engagement within the Prevent Strategy.  
2. To identify the current function of NPTs within the Prevent Strategy.  
3. To assess whether NPTs should and could be utilised differently within the delivery of Prevent.  
  
Focus groups were chosen to specifically inform research aims one and two but would also touch on 
research aim three. Focus groups can be defined as “a group of individuals selected and assembled by 
researchers to discuss and comment on, from personal experience, the topic that is the subject of the 
research” (Powell et al, 1996, p.501). The techniques used during focus groups can be described to some 
extent as a mix between interviewing and observing; a successful focus group is largely dependent on 
active participation from all members of the group, so the facilitator must be able to generate healthy 
discussions centred on the intended topic whilst allowing conversation to feel natural and supportive. In 
order to maintain concentration on the research aims, focus group facilitators often use a series of pre-
planned questions with discussion prompts, meaning that a focus group is less of an open conversation 
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and more of a structured consultation, “the researcher follows an interview guide in a focus group. In this 
sense focus groups are not natural but organised events.” (Gibbs, 1997, p.1).  
 
Focus groups have been historically used for the purposes of market research but are also a useful tool 
within the social sciences (Smithson, 2000). They provide the opportunity to generate qualitative data 
sets specific to the research questions and allow further exploration of the views, feelings and 
experiences of multiple individuals during the same session. This not only has benefits in efficiency but 
also generates relationship dynamics between group members (Krueger and Casey, 2000) which can 
often lead to deeper discussions than would be naturally occurring in an interview or observation session 
(Gibbs, 1997). Whilst focus groups present certain challenges for the facilitator such as the need to 
control and direct discussion without influencing the statements made, or maintaining balance between 
overly vocal and more hesitant participants, they do provide the opportunity to delve further into issues 
raised; “focus groups elicit information in a way which allows researchers to find out why an issue is 
salient, as well as what is salient about it” (Morgan, 1988, p.74). This methodology is also helpful in 
understanding the differences in opinions between the participants in the group, “the interaction also 
enables participants to ask questions of each other” (Kitzinger, 1994, p.114), and gage the level of 
agreement on set issues “focus groups are very valuable in providing access to consensus or diversity 
of experiences on a topic” (Cohen and Crabtree, 2006, p1.)  
 
One limitation of focus groups is that whilst useful in understanding the opinions and experiences of the 
group, the small sample sizes mean that it can be difficult to draw safe inferences about how the 
community as a whole feels, for further discussion around the relationship between samples and 
populations see (Etikan et, al, 2016; Gibbs, 1997). Other concerns relate to the management of more 
dominant individuals who can sometimes hinder the willingness of others to speak out and provide input, 
furthermore even in a friendly environment some individuals may be hesitant to speak openly in front of 
others particularly if the group is made up of their peers. To ensure that the impact of these potential 
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limitations was minimised as effectively as possible, the researcher took on the role of facilitator and 
employed the help of a neutral assistant. This allowed each session to be managed in a way that 
encouraged all members to contribute whilst ensuring that no individual overshadows or intimidates 
others. It is important to note that whilst there are issues to overcome, there are also additional benefits 
of focus groups for the participants involved; people may feel pleased to have been consulted with (Gibbs, 
1997), considered to be experts (Goss & Leinbach, 1996) and feel empowered that they are contributing 
to potential change (Race et al. 1994). Given the strong community focus of this research, it seemed 
pertinent to include focus groups consisting of members of the communities in question in the research 
strategy.  
 
Four focus groups were conducted with members of the public; one in each of the case study areas. The 
key purpose was to provide a community perspective of neighbourhood policing and Prevent in the very 
communities which had been identified as vulnerable to extremism, the process used to recruit suitable 
participants is outlined below. Although the other techniques such as observations and interviews with 
police officers provided some understanding of public opinion in these areas, this was largely second-
hand and unverified; holding focus groups with community members helped capture the views of 
community members formally and directly, and crucially provided the only data set from a community 
perspective within a research programme which is otherwise relatively police orientated.  
 
The main purpose of the focus groups was to understand, from a community perspective, how the 
delivery of local and Prevent policing affected communities. In order to cover these research aims the 
participants were asked a series of questions to prompt discussions regarding how they felt about their 
local NPTs, cohesion and community issues in their area, what their awareness of Prevent was, and what 
they thought were key priorities for the police in preventing violent extremism. From these discussions, 
the judgements could be made in relation to the three research aims about whether the police 
engagement was valued by these communities, what level of involvement both the local NPTs and 
133 
 
Prevent teams had within these areas, and whether the communities could benefit from increased 
interaction between NPTs and Prevent. In addition to providing information pertinent to the research aims, 
holding focus groups in each of the case study areas would also provide comparative information which 
could be used to assess how the NPTs and Prevent teams engage with the different vulnerable 
communities, identifying any areas for improvement or examples of best practice, which is essentially 
one of the fundamental goals of the entire research.  
 
Planning  
When designing the wider research strategy and focus group plan, consideration was given to a number 
of factors to ensure that the research was valid, reliable and ethical. These included both epistemological 
and practical considerations which have ultimately directed the overall research strategy and determined 
how focus groups were used within it. This section of the chapter outlines these considerations and the 
decisions made.   
 
Number of focus groups 
The decision was made that one focus group per case study area would provide sufficient data for the 
research and would achieve a justifiable balance between gaining the perspective of the vulnerable 
community and collating good quality usable information with the time and resources available. Academic 
guidance on the use of focus groups in research (Onwuegbuzie and Collins, 2007; Morgan,1997) 
suggests that three to four focus groups on one topic is sufficient to produce valid results without reaching 
the point of saturation (Eliot et al, 2005). Aside from increasing the chances of obtaining views from a 
wider cross-section of the community, it was not thought that carrying out additional focus groups would 
improve the quality of the data obtained here. However, choosing to conduct only one group per case 
study did put added importance on ensuring that the participants were selected could accurately present 
the issues and concerns of people living in the vulnerable community in question.  
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Participant selection 
It would be unreasonable to suggest that any one group could ever reflect the views of an entire 
community, however this is not the purpose of holding a focus group, rather the aim is to bring together 
people with shared experiences or characteristics to provide opinions and insights on the topic in 
question. In this instance the shared characteristic was that the participants were members of the 
communities at the heart of each case study which had already been identified according to a 
comprehensive criteria and preliminary research. This effectively made the selection of participants 
somewhat easier given the narrow geographical areas and communities in question; i.e. the case study 
in Leeds was based on the Kurdish community in the selected NPT area.  
 
There is a wealth of literature regarding the benefits of homogeneity across the group as it helps to 
“maximise disclosure amongst focus group participants” (Eliot et al, 2005, p.3). It is recommended that a 
selection criteria pays particular attention to gender, age, power (position), and social status. Whilst there 
are others who suggest that heterogeneous groups and participants who do not know each other reduces 
the risk of peer pressure, and limits the chance of conformity within the group (Steward and Shamdasani, 
1990) it was felt that, given the needs of this research to understand how policing practices affect pre-
determined communities around sensitive topics, it was felt that a degree of homogeneity across the 
group would be beneficial in minimizing potential conflict and providing common experiences to explore 
through discussion (or wider debate see Hines, 2008). For this reason, a selection criteria for the 
participants included that they were over 18 years of age (for ethical reasons) and ideally formed part of 
natural, pre-existing social group. Although the latter point was not crucial it was thought that this would 
not only help from a logistical perspective, but would also benefit the level of discussions as the 
participants would feel more comfortable discussing such issues with people that they know, and would 
share similar experience and understanding of the relevant issues in each area “existing and 
homogeneous groups are generally more comfortable and open with each other” (Keown, 1983, p.6). For 
the purpose of this research, it was felt that recruiting participants which were males between 18-30 years 
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of age would be most beneficial; as highlighted in the literature review, many suggest that this age group 
is the most vulnerable to radicalisation (for wider discussion see Kummer, 2012, why do young men fight 
wars?). Essentially the point of the focus groups are to gain the perspective of those who are vulnerable 
to extremism, therefore it seems logical to focus on these demographics.  
 
Recruitment of focus group participants can be conducted through a number of strategies including 
nomination, random selection, existing social groups and advertising for volunteers (Morgan, 1998). For 
the purposes of this research it was felt that random selection and advertisement would not be a suitable 
way of identifying appropriate members from the vulnerable communities in question. Instead, the entire 
research strategy was designed in two stages with the intention that the findings of the first stage (activity 
reports and officer interviews) would feed into the second stage (focus and working groups).  
 
It was intended that in starting the research with officer interviews and activity reports, potential groups 
which could be of use to the research could be identified based on their existing involvement with the 
NPTs and/or Prevent teams in these areas would be identified. This technique proved to be successful 
and multiple potential participants became apparent from the early results, for example in case study two 
a number of pre-existing Kurdish groups with varying levels of police engagement came to light, this was 
mirrored in both case studies one and three. Although this two-stage method was useful in identifying 
potentially suitable participants, the risk attached to relying entirely on police suggestion (nomination) 
was acknowledged. To minimise any impartial influence, alternative groups identified through 
independent enquiries (into local groups and networks who may be of interest), were also identified in 
order to avoid the selection of participants being solely dependent on police contact. Once a list of 
potential participants had been collated, the groups were assessed as to their overall suitability and those 
which were considered the most suitable were approached. In case studies two and three, the groups 
were chosen out of options which had emerged through the first stage of the research as it was felt that 
these was still the most appropriate based on their demographic make-up, however in case studies one 
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and four the participants were chosen from separate enquiries. The details of the focus group will be 
summarised later in this chapter but in brief;  
 
- Case study focus group one: Participants were part of a pre-existing Islamic study group of young 
Asian males between 18-25 years of age and who had mixed perceptions and levels involvement 
with the police.  
- Case study focus group two: Participants were part of a local Kurdish community association 
comprised of Kurdish males between the ages of 21-34 years of age, again the participants had 
mixed experiences and contact with the police. 
- Case study focus group three: Participants were part of an amateur rugby team located in the NPT 
area known to have cohesion issues and a higher than average level of support for right-wing groups, 
they were all white males between the age of 19-26 years.  
- Case study focus group four: Participants were also part of an amateur rugby team located in the 
NPT area identified as most closely reflecting the national and West Yorkshire average in the pre-
determined indicators for vulnerability to extremism. The participants were all of mixed ethnicity and 
nationality (but had a white British majority) and were aged between 18-32 years.  
 
Twelve pre-existing groups were identified through the process outlined above, however it is important to 
note that six of these groups either declined to participant or were deemed unsuitable for various reasons 
following the initial enquiries. In some instances, it was felt that the groups had too much prior involvement 
(either positive or negative) with the police to provide an impartial perspective in comparison to the levels 
of involvement across the wider community. Whilst the relationship with the police was not a prerequisite 
for selection, there was a risk that individuals who had strong relationships with the local police or Prevent 
teams through proactive community work which was above the typical standard within these communities 
would not provide the most balanced reflections on some of the topics being discussed. Similarly where 
potential participants came to light through their appearance in activity reports or interviews for more 
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negative reasons; i.e. reports of potential radicalisation or challenging police-community relations, it again 
was felt that this may not be fairly representative of wider perspectives within the community.  
 
Some of the groups approached were not willing to take part in the research, of those that provided 
reasons, the most common theme was hesitance due to the sensitivities around the topic matter and their 
fear of openly voicing negative opinions about the police. Another factor which became apparent was 
that when using existing social groups, some of the individuals approached raised concerns about 
speaking openly amongst peers about controversial topics. Furthermore one representative who runs a 
diversionary group for young adults that have been identified as vulnerable to radicalisation, declined the 
invitation to take part as he felt that having these open and challenging conversations may un-do a lot of 
the progress that they have made as a group with regards to viewing issues in a more positive light. 
Identifying a willing and suitable group for case study one (vulnerability to Islamist extremism) proved to 
be the most difficult; the early research had only revealed one viable option but they chose not to 
participate when approached, similarly three of the groups identified through independent enquiries also 
opted not to take part and were clearly hesitant to speak openly about the sensitive issues of extremism 
or the local police. Although one cannot read too much into this for risk of jumping to unfounded 
assumptions, it is interesting that this community were so much more difficult to engage with. Had there 
not had been enough willing volunteers following this approach, consideration would have been given to 
the other options and efforts would have been made to advertise the research more widely in these 
communities potentially with an added financial incentive to take part, however it was not necessary.  
 
Focus group sizes 
The aim was for each focus group to have between six and eight participants. Although larger numbers 
were considered for the purpose of collecting data from a wider cross-section of people, factors including 
the ease of organisation, cost, availability of large pre-established social groups, and practicalities of 
recording larger discussions resulted in the decision to limit the size of the groups to eight participants. 
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More importantly personal experience and leading literature on the use of focus groups in social research 
(Baumgartner, Strong, & Hensley, 2002; 2004; Krueger & Casey, 2000; Langford, Schoenfeld, & Izzo, 
2002; Morgan, 1997; Barbour, 2007) suggested that groups of six to ten were more likely to produce 
fruitful discussions, without either inhibiting less confident participants, or being too small to provide any 
depth or diversity to the discussions. Furthermore, preliminary discussions with community members 
suggested that the participants would not only be familiar with the topic area but would have a wealth of 
personal experience to draw on in discussions, it was therefore felt that introducing any more than eight 
participants would potentially have led to difficulties in providing every person with a platform to talk and 
could have resulted in frustrations within the group. It is also worth mentioning that once each of the case 
study groups had been identified and had confirmed their willingness to take part in the research, at least 
eight participants were invited (in some cases up to ten), this over-recruitment gave a degree of resilience 
for those who cancelled at short notice. It proved to be the correct decision as last minute cancellations 
across some of the groups meant that there was a minimum of six participants and a maximum of eight 
in each session.  
 
Duration 
Whilst planning the focus group agenda, the need for flexibility to accommodate different levels of 
engagement in each of the groups was valued. Therefore the agendas for the focus groups were 
designed to be between 45-60 minutes long, but facilities would be booked for longer to take into account 
late arrivals, over-running and to provide the opportunity for participants to talk to the facilitator afterwards 
should they want to discuss issues in a more private setting. A review of academic literature and 
practitioner guidance (Powell and Single, 1996; Eliot 2007; Krueger 2002), suggested that this would be 
a reasonable amount of time to ask participants to commit, taking into consideration additional travel time. 
Most importantly it was felt that, if planned correctly, 60 minutes would be ample time to discuss the 
relevant topics in an in depth and constructive way, therefore it was decided that the agendas would 
concentrate on just four key sections (detailed later), this concise structure would mean that the 
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discussions would hopefully be more focussed but without feeling rushed. Another factor in the decision 
for not choosing a shorter or longer duration for the groups was that personal experience and literature 
suggested that it is much harder to maintain a level of interest and engagement with participants for 
periods longer than 60 minutes, similarly it was not thought that a shorter time would allow for discussions 
of a suitable depth for this level of research.  
 
Ethical considerations  
Recording of the sessions  
Considerations relating to the recording of the sessions were centred around the need to keep an 
accurate record of the discussions whilst balancing the need to abide by legal and ethical guidance on 
the storage and retention of anonymised records. It was decided that no audio or visual recordings would 
be taken during the sessions as it might hinder the participant’s willingness to speak openly if they do not 
have complete trust in the facilitator (Al-Yateem, 2012). Given the sensitivities of the topics in question 
and initial conversations with the group representatives it was thought that the participants would prefer 
not to be recorded. It was also felt that between the facilitator and the assistant, an accurate record of all 
discussions could be made. A number of steps were taken to enable this. Firstly, the facilitator would use 
flipcharts and write down key bullet points of discussion at the time, and in front of the participants allowing 
them time to correct or challenge the record made. A3 sheets of paper and scoring sheets were also 
provided on the tables for participants to essentially record the results of each question as they worked 
through them, which would all be presented to the group (and facilitator) during the feedback session and 
also collated at the end. Straw polls and visual aids were also used to allow for the quick tallying up of 
responses by the facilitator without detracting from the flow of discussions. Perhaps the most important 
step taken to ensure a full and accurate record was that the facilitator and assistant scheduled time in 
immediately after each session to write up their understanding of what happened and what the key points 
and results from the focus group were. This was initially conducted in isolation to ensure integrity and 
then combined to provide a holistic perspective of the focus group sessions. It is important to note that 
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whilst there may have been some slight differences in the interpretations of the discussions between the 
facilitator and assistant, all statistical results were the same in each account, and matched the records 
made at the time. The facilitator and assistant were also careful to write a note of specific body language, 
tone, key statements and indicators of consensus during the session and also included a reflective 
section of write up relating to how they felt the session went, what worked well, what did not, and what 
their overall impression was.  
 
Anonymity  
Given the sensitivities of the topics covered in discussions it was crucial that the identities of the 
participants were protected. Whilst full anonymity is somewhat dependant on the participants adhering to 
confidentiality arrangements, “the higher number of participants in a focus group increases the risk of 
members breaching confidentiality agreements” (McParland & Flowers, 2012, p.496), steps were taken 
by the facilitator to protect the identity of those in the group. The importance of confidentiality was made 
clear to participants before they were asked to give formal consent and each focus group session opened 
with an explanation as to the rules and importance of confidentiality. Whilst name badges were used 
within the sessions, these were destroyed immediately afterwards, all references made to individuals and 
their comments in the write up and analysis used aliases, and any statements made by the participants 
which could potentially make them identifiable were sanitized. The decision not to record the focus groups 
visually or audibly was also influenced by the need to protect anonymity; in order to abide by ethical 
guidelines, the recording would have needed to be transcribed as soon as practicable afterwards and 
stored securely in the meantime, then deleted. The fact that this was not necessary helped the efficiency 
of the analysis period following the focus group sessions and also alleviated any concerns amongst 
participants regarding their anonymity.  
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Facilitator involvement 
The researcher took on the role of facilitator for the focus groups, and careful consideration was given to 
the level of involvement that the facilitator would have with the group beforehand and during the focus 
group session. It was crucial that the facilitator acted in a way which was engaging enough to create a 
comfortable atmosphere, maintain the focus of discussions and encourage participation. But it was also 
crucial that the facilitator did not act in a way which could influence the group or hinder the validity of the 
results either through being too authoritative or too relaxed. To achieve this balance, an informal 
approach was adopted during each session in an attempt to generate an open and social feeling. The 
help of an assistant was also enlisted for added safety and to help with the facilitation and recording of 
the group. The assistant was fully briefed beforehand on what would be required of them, which was 
ultimately to provide practical support, help to engage with the participants, and help to record the 
information. Given the sensitive nature of the topic area and the focus on fairly serious issues relating to 
policing and government policy, it was important that the participants felt that their opinions would be 
valued and would ultimately feed into positive change, as opposed to being questioned as part of an 
inspection or investigation. Consequently the purpose of the research was made clear at the beginning 
of the process and a range of methodologies to promote positive engagement and gain constructive 
contributions to the research aims were utilised; these included varying the different styles of questioning, 
using visual aids and communication tools throughout the sessions to stimulate involvement and vary the 
type of data produced as recommended in key literature (see Krueger & Casey 2000, Homan 1991). 
 
Encouraging engagement  
In order to improve the chances of positive engagement during the group, the facilitator aimed to build 
up a base relationship with the participants before the session explaining the intentions beforehand. In 
all cases, this began with the initial contact which was made when first requesting their participation. In 
case studies two, three and four, this consisted of telephone calls to a representative from the group, 
whilst in case study one the approach was made via email. The facilitator then met with key 
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representatives to discuss the plan for the focus group where they were able to explain the plan in more 
detail and answer any questions, the representative was then asked to relay this information to their 
group for consideration before confirming whether they were willing to participate. One of the key benefits 
of using pre-established social groups (such as rugby teams, community based clubs etc.) was that 
liaison was only required with one member per group who then helped to organise the session, and who 
were trusted by the other participants. This not only made the process much more efficient, but also 
meant that the participants could discuss whether they wanted to take part, away from the facilitator 
without feeling under pressure to commit. It was also clearly beneficial during the sessions as the 
participants appeared to have some familiarity with the facilitator even though they had not actually met 
before.   
 
Another tactic to promote engagement was to hold the sessions in venues already utilised by the groups 
(Eliot, 2007). Although this did have practical benefits, the main reason was that the participants would 
naturally feel more at ease in a familiar setting. Each location was visited beforehand to ensure that they 
were safe and suitable, this also provided the opportunity to plan the set-up of the group. All of the groups 
were held in private rooms where the participants could feel comfortable speaking openly, and where the 
seating could be rearranged easily to suit the different stages of the session. There were three distinct 
stages of the focus group sessions which will be detailed later, however in brief the group started with 
the participants sitting in a semi-circle in clear view of a flip chart during introductions and opening 
discussions, the group was then split off into pairs at a table where they could write easily, and finally the 
group was brought back into a semi-circle for closing discussions. During the group discussion stages, 
the facilitator also sat down to avoid inadvertently dominating the group, this also ensured that the 
participant’s view would not be obstructed, and made it easier to write notes. When the participants were 
paired off, the facilitator intentionally waited until the participants had begun discussing between 
themselves before circulating between the sub-groups. This was a useful opportunity to talk to each 
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participant in a more private way to discuss their thoughts and encouraged them to raise any issues or 
concerns that they may not want to do in the larger group conversations.  
 
One further consideration when facilitating positive engagement related to language barriers; given the 
diversity of the participants involved it was crucial to ensure that all participants would be able to 
communicate effectively within the group. To do so, the each representative was asked when planning 
the sessions whether there would be anyone with any language or other communication issues. This was 
only evident in two of the focus groups whereby some of the participants were not fluent in English but 
could understand and speak a good level. This was not a significant issue as the representatives from 
both groups were confident that they could act as translators should any participants struggle with the 
language, however to negate the issue further the decision was taken to ensure that each of these 
individuals would be paired up with a good English speaker when working in smaller groups. Moreover, 
all questions were purposely presented in clear and simple language, singular sentences and without 
local idioms or expressions which could cause confusion, similarly when using the flip-board or hand-
outs the facilitator made sure to use a clear and basic font / handwriting. Perhaps the most conscious 
decision made to overcome this issue was the use of different tools during the session such as yes/no 
flags, straw-polling, etc. however these will be outlined later.  
 
Questioning styles 
Throughout the course of the focus groups a combination of different questioning styles were used 
including open and closed questions, straw-polling, complimentary and argumentative submissions, and 
private discussions.  The use of each of these tactics was determined during the planning for the focus 
groups with the understanding that different topics or stages within the agenda would warrant different 
approaches. Whilst it is common practice to use open ended questions in focus groups (Bloor, 2001; 
Gibbs, 1997; Krueger & Casey, 2007) as they encourage more detailed answers and greater opportunity 
for exploration, the language barrier for some participants meant that it was also important to include 
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simple questions included those that can be answered by ‘yes or no’ or with a green or red flag. Each 
session had four key sections to it (in addition to introductions and conclusions), each section was 
dedicated to a particular topic (detailed below), and the most suitable questioning style for each was 
chosen, a summarised copy of the focus group session plan can be found at appendix D. The agenda 
was structured in the following order:  
- Part one: Opening and introductions (setting out the purpose of the group and its boundaries).  
- Part two: Community cohesion (asking how participants feel within their community; series of closed 
questions). 
- Part three: Police relations (asking for opinions and experiences of their local police; asking for three 
positive and three negative statements in pairs).  
- Part four: Perceptions of extremism (asking for participant’s view on extremism in general; group 
exercise with series of statements where they are required to grade on level of agreement).  
- Part five: Role of the local police in preventing extremism (open ended question; answers recorded 
and explored further on flipchart as a group).  
 
The order of these sections was intentionally designed to begin with less controversial topics in order to 
build trust and comfort levels and encourage participation from all, before gradually leading on to topics 
which were linked but perhaps more sensitive. More detail will now be provided as to each of the 
questioning styles and tactics used in these sections.  
 
Implementation  
Opening and introductions  
The session was opened by the facilitator introducing themselves and the assistant, thanking the 
participants for their attendance, and outlining the purpose of the focus group and wider research. The 
facilitator was keen to keep this opening to no more than five minutes to maintain the interest of the group 
and make the most of the time available. Before the main session begun, the facilitator managed the 
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administrative side of the focus groups which included the signing of consent forms and providing a short 
briefing regarding the boundaries of the group, confidentiality expectations and their right to withdraw 
from the research. In addition to serving an administrative purpose, the opening five minutes of the 
session also allowed the facilitator to set a relaxed tone for the rest of the session. A common challenge 
in facilitating focus groups is ensuring that all members of the group have the opportunity to speak and 
are listened to. Knowing that there would be different levels of participation across the groups, attempts 
were made to ensure and encourage more introvert people to take part by asking everybody to say a few 
sentences about themselves at the start of the session. This prompted participants to break their silence 
early on, and improved familiarity between the facilitator and participants. It should be noted that the 
participants were asked at the start of the session if they were comfortable with sharing this information 
and would not have included this stage had any individual declined. Name tags were also used for 
participants to fill in, this was solely to aid more personal interaction between the facilitator and the group.  
 
Throughout the remainder of the session, participants were generally polite and respectful and rarely 
spoke over each other. However, to ensure that more introvert personalities felt comfortable, the facilitator 
paid close attention to body language and employed active listening techniques such as eye contact, 
verbal acknowledgement and reflection. When it was thought that a certain participant wanted to speak, 
encouraging prompts were used such as asking if they had anything to add. In contrast there were some 
participants who were more vocal than others, although this was not at a disruptive or detrimental level, 
it did mean that they needed more management to keep the conversation on track. To combat this, the 
facilitator made sure to summarise frequently, and referred back to the questions, writing down the 
participant’s key points on the flip chart to reinforce that they had made their opinion known and it had 
been captured.  
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Community cohesion 
The first substantial section of the focus groups centred on the area of community cohesion. Poor 
cohesion is recognised as a driving factor in a community’s vulnerability to extremism (Innes & Jones 
2006), as such it was deemed crucial to gather the participant’s perspectives on what cohesion was like 
in their communities and exploring what they thought was aiding or hindering it. Fifteen minutes was 
dedicated to this section, the overarching aim was to understand how participants felt about the 
community in which they live. The facilitator decided to open up the discussions with this topic as it was 
considered the least contentious area, and would therefore ease the participants into open conversation 
before moving on to the more sensitive issues.  
 
To ascertain the participants’ views relating to cohesion in their area, the facilitator opted to ask them five 
questions ranging from a fairly generic “are you happy with where you live?” to a more specific “do you 
think there are any elements of the community which do not integrate well?” The facilitator chose to obtain 
answers to these questions by using a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ voting system utilising small flags each with a green 
yes side and a red no side. There were multiple reasons for this; firstly it was thought that it would help 
to overcome any language issues as mentioned previously particularly with regards to the use of red and 
green colours, secondly limiting the answers to yes or no initially would help to track the results before 
exploring the reasons why afterwards, finally it was intended that using the flags as props would 
encourage active participation as all participants would be putting the flag up for each question, 
furthermore it would limit the chance of embarrassment or pressure compared to a tradition ‘hands-up 
vote’ if only one person wanted to put their hand up to answer yes or no.  
 
Taking this approach meant that the facilitator could quickly and easily ascertain the participant’s opinions 
on each question, and then follow up with more in depth discussion by asking participants to explain the 
reasons for their answers. The facilitator recorded the results by keeping a tally on the flipchart, where 
appropriate, prompts such as “would anybody like to say a bit more on that point?” or “why do you feel 
147 
 
that way?” were used to gather more detailed information which the facilitator and assistant took notes 
on. This strategy worked well and helped to overcome some potential language barriers and eased the 
nerves of some participants.  
 
Police relations 
The second key section of the focus group concentrated on police relations and was separated into two 
halves; the first half focused on the overall perspective of their local police, whilst the second half looked 
at awareness and understanding of Prevent policing. This was structured this way in order to create a 
discussion about police in general before moving on to the potentially more contentious area of Prevent. 
For this part of the session the participants were split into two or three smaller groups (depending on 
size) and asked to come up with three positive things and three negative things about the policing in their 
local area. Steps were taken to ensure that those with weak or little English language or writing skills 
were in groups with those able to translate and scribe to guarantee that all perspectives were obtained.  
 
At this stage the facilitator reiterated that no answers would be attributed to them in any way. In order to 
ensure that all responses were captured, the participants were asked to write down their answers on their 
packs, these would be collected at the end and kept in accordance ethical and legal guidelines. The 
participants were given five minutes to discuss and record their thoughts, during which the facilitator 
walked around the groups to listen to the participants and make notes of any interesting points. Each 
group was then asked to share their statements, and the researcher wrote each one down on a flip chart. 
Where necessary, the participants were asked to elaborate on their answers giving reasons and 
examples for context. Although the discussions would be limited to the presenting group and the 
facilitator, once all groups had provided their answers the conversation was opened up between all 
participants.  
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The facilitator used six additional questions around whether they would feel comfortable talking to the 
police, and if they thought the police treat people with respect. Participants were asked to simply vote 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ for each of the statements again using the green and red flags, however time was allowed 
for discussion in between, notes of which were taken and used in the analysis, along with the participant 
packs, and flipcharts.  
 
The second half of this section aimed to gain the participants views on Prevent. The facilitator intentionally 
chose not to overtly record the participants’ answers to this on the flip chart in order to limit the risk of 
discouraging open conversation on the potentially sensitive issue. Understandably some participants may 
not wish to divulge to the group that they had some involvement with Prevent or had any greater 
understanding of the area than anybody else for fear of incriminating themselves or admitting to 
associating with Prevent officers. For this reason, this section of the focus group was limited to asking 
participants to use the flags to answer if they have heard of Prevent, before asking for willing volunteers 
to explain their understanding of it to the group. In the event that no participant could/would do so, the 
facilitator would then briefly explain what Prevent was from a pre-written (non-leading) definition. In order 
to avoid limiting the discussion to participants who had answered, and to involve more participants, the 
facilitator then asked if anybody had any experience or understanding of wider engagement or community 
cohesion teams within the police. This would ultimately allow the facilitator to probe further into the 
participants’ awareness of police cohesion and engagement work in their areas and may reveal 
interesting comparisons and perceptions even if cannot be directly attributed to Prevent policing.  
 
Repeating the use of the flags worked well as the participants were familiar and comfortable with the 
concept by this point. Splitting off into the smaller groups and asking the participants to work together to 
come up with positive and negative statements about the police was slightly more complex and required 
a deeper level of consideration from the participants. Although there were initially concerns regarding 
potential language barriers, this did not prove to be an issue due to the careful pairing of participants. It 
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was however noted, that if this strategy was employed in future focus groups, more time should be given 
to allow participants to provide well thought out statements, it is also interesting to note that many of the 
groups struggled to provide three negative statements, although on first thoughts this may seem like a 
positive reflection on policing in their local area, it could also be due to a hesitance of the participants to 
openly criticize the police.  
 
Views on extremism  
The penultimate section of the focus groups was dedicated to ascertaining the participants’ views on 
extremism. The reasons for doing so were two-fold; firstly to understand the different opinions on matters 
relating to extremism within these communities and why people may feel this way, and secondly to 
provide context to the final section of the focus group which asks them what they feel their local police 
should be doing about such issues. To do so, the facilitator presented eight predetermined statements 
relating to extremism and asked them to grade these according to their level agreement. Eight of the ten 
statements were related to generic extremism for example “terrorism can sometimes be justified” whilst 
the final two related specifically to the type of extremism which that community had been identified as 
vulnerable too for example “Kurdish resistance groups are justified to use the violence that they do”.  To 
ensure that the participants were given enough time to consider the statements fully, they were also 
included on their packs with a key as to the levels of agreement, i.e. “1 = strongly disagree”, “2 = disagree” 
etc. Using a numerical grading system allowed the facilitator to quantify and compare the responses and 
add a level of quantitative analysis to a methodology which is otherwise quite qualitative. Each statement 
was explained individually and the answers were tallied on the flipchart. The results of these would give 
some indication as to how vulnerable these communities are to extremism and perhaps highlight the 
driving factors.  
 
This was perhaps the most complicated strategy employed throughout the focus group sessions as it 
required some considered calculation of the statements in a numerical way. That said, following a quick 
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explanation of the scoring system, there did not seem to be any issues. For analysis purposes, the 
statements were drafted in a way which indicated that those who strongly disagreed perhaps had more 
resilience to radicalisation, whilst those who agreed were perhaps more vulnerable or sympathetic to this 
rhetoric.  
 
Police role in preventing extremism 
The final section of the focus groups involved asking: “what do you think the police could do to stop 
people becoming terrorists?” This was intentionally left as an open question to avoid leading any of the 
initial responses. After gaining the initial responses and discussing these in some more detail, the 
facilitator then directed conversation around four more specific points:  
- How can the police identify individuals vulnerable to radicalisation?  
- Should the police try to support vulnerable individuals or should they monitor them, or both?  
- How could the police support individuals who are vulnerable to becoming involved in 
radicalisation?  
- Should there be a specialist police team for this sort of support or should all police officers be 
involved?  
 
These questions sought to understand the participants’ perceptions of the wider police role in preventing 
violent extremism within the UK before ascertaining whether they thought that NPTs should be involved 
in Prevent policing. The facilitator felt that it was important to ask the participants what their view on NPT 
involvement was, as it would offer a community perspective to the most fundamental aim of this research. 
Although their level of understanding may not be as strong as the police participants and those informing 
academic literature it is valid nonetheless. With regards to recording the answers to this section, the 
facilitator decided to simply note responses on the flipchart and informally gage the level of support for 
each, this was then later compared with the fuller notes from the assistant. It was felt that this informal 
method of recording would help to maintain momentum at this stage in the session. This section of the 
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session was very much about exploring suggestions for improvements to Prevent and local policing from 
the community perspective and as such it was not deemed necessary to grade or tally the responses 
during the session.    
 
Closing  
Finally the focus groups were drawn to a close with the facilitator thanking everybody for their time and 
contributions. The next stages of the research were explained to the participants and a timeline was given 
as to when the work would be completed and available. The facilitator provided personal contact details 
to those who wanted it along with details of support services to ensure that they felt supported and valued 
as participants for this research.  
 
After each focus group had finished, extra time was factored into the room bookings to ensure that the 
facilitator could remain in the venue at the end of the session opening up the opportunity for participants 
to approach and discuss issues more privately. As highlighted earlier in this chapter, focus groups can 
be beneficial in generating dialogue across groups of interested parties, however the use of ‘one-on-one’ 
engagement can also result in more personal disclosures. It was therefore crucial that participants were 
able to approach the facilitator beyond the structured format of the focus group to allow them to provide 
input into the research which they may feel less comfortable with in group setting or that had not been 
addressed during the session.  
 
Upon finishing the sessions, the facilitator immediately started to write down initial thoughts as soon as 
practicable afterwards to ensure that all early impressions were captured. The form of analysis used for 
these focus groups can be referred to as reflexive as they are largely dependent on the researchers 
interpretation of the events being analysed; “Reflexivity relates to sensitivity to the ways in which the 
researcher and the research process may shape the data collected, including the role of prior 
assumptions and experience” (Birks, et. al. 2014. p.157). Whilst this is not necessarily a disadvantage, it 
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was important to acknowledge that the notes taken by the facilitator were fundamentally based on their 
interpretation of the statements made during the session and thus should be viewed as having a degree 
of subjectivity; “the data described here is inevitably a reinterpretation of the participants' positions, 
including [the facilitator’s] constructions and attributions beyond the participants' own intentions, and they 
may not share [the facilitator’s] interpretation.” (Smithson, 2000, p.117). To minimise the impact that this 
form of reflexive analysis had on the findings, the assistant was also required to initial notes following 
each session, but the two records would be produced in isolation. A fuller write up utilising these notes, 
participant packs, and flipcharts was completed over the course of the following week. Where any points 
of disparity were identified in the two records, the facilitator and assistant met to discuss the instance and 
provide more detail as to their interpretation and either agreed a consensus or noted the difference in 
interpretation for the purpose of analysis.  
 
Analysis and findings 
This section provides an overview of the key results and findings from the four focus groups, the findings 
are deducted from analysis of the content of discussions within the focus groups and is presented 
according to the distinct sections of the sessions.  
 
Community cohesion 
The primary section of the focus groups concentrated on community cohesion; the groups were asked 
five key questions to gage their perspective of their local area and community relations within. The 
participants were asked to provide ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers to each question via a green and red flag. The 
five questions and results are shown below. It is important to note, that due to the small sample sizes, 
whilst comparisons could be made across the case studies, these could not be considered statistically 
significant. 
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The below table shows the percentage of participants who answered positively to each question (‘yes’ to 
questions one, two and five, and ‘no’ to questions three and four), the results have been presented in this 
way to allow for an easier scoring reflection across the questions and case studies with the inference 
being the higher the percentage shown, the stronger the positive response. The percentages provided 
are taken from either a total of seven or eight depending on the group.  
 
Table 8. Focus group results across case studies - community cohesion. 
Questions 
CS One 
Islamic  
CS Two 
Kurdish 
CS Three 
Right Wing 
CS Four 
None 
Total 
1. Are you happy in the area where you live? 
(Yes)  
43% 71% 71% 88% 69% 
2. Do you feel that your community is well 
integrated in your area? (Yes) 
57% 43% 57% 75% 59% 
3. Are there any community tensions in the 
area? (No) 
29% 57% 29% 63% 45% 
4. Do you think that there are any elements 
of the community which do not integrate 
well or are more isolated? (No) 
43% 57% 29% 100% 59% 
5. Are you part of any community groups or 
associations? (Yes) 
14% 29% 0% 13% 14% 
Average  37% 51% 37% 58% 46% 
Sample n.7 n.7 n.7 n.8 n.29 
 
From this, some key themes emerged in relation to each question;  
Q1 Are you happy in the area where you live?  
Fewer participants in case study one (Islamist extremism) felt happy in the area that they lived (43% 
compared to an average of 69% across all focus groups). Case study two and three had the same levels 
of satisfaction, whilst those in case study four (no specific vulnerability to extremism) ranked the happiest 
with 88% (7 out of 8 participants).  
 
When asked why they answered in the way that they did, those who said that they did feel safe, generally 
said it was because “it was a safe place to live” (participant 1B) and “had a good community feel” 
(participant 3A). This was a common theme across all of the focus groups. Of those who said that they 
were not happy in the area that they lived the reasons included “lack of community feel” (participant 3F) 
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to “people do not care about each other” (participant 2F). Interestingly, a common theme across case 
studies one and two related to participant’s comparing their current communities to communities where 
they previously lived in their countries of origin; “I was happier in my homeland” (participant 1E) and “I 
had a better lifestyle in Turkey, I was richer there so I had more friends” (participant 2F). Although this 
comment from participant 2F was said with humour it seemed to have a serious undertone and was 
echoed by others in the group who later said that they feel like;  
 
“2nd class citizens in the UK, because they are poor and refugees” (participant 2A).  
 
This same sentiment was not echoed in any of the other focus groups (perhaps because the majority of 
participants from case studies three and four were UK born, however interestingly in case study three 
(vulnerability to right wing extremism), some participants did also state that they felt like “2nd class citizens 
in their area because white people are the minority” (participant 3G). 
 
Q2 Do you feel that your community is well integrated in your area?  
When asking this question, the facilitator intentionally did not define the term ‘your community’ as 
community can mean different things to different people and it was felt important to allow a level of 
subjectivity when trying to gage the participant’s perspective. Across the four case studies, 59% of 
participants (17 out of 29) answered yes to this question. Interestingly it was case study two (Vulnerable 
to Kurdish extremism) which scored the lowest on this question (43% or 3 out of 7), again case study four 
(no specific vulnerability to extremism) ranked the highest (75%).  
 
Opinions around this question were fairly mixed; the conversations following the vote suggested that even 
though many of the participants did not feel that their community integrated well with other communities 
(community here referred to ethnic/cultural groups), they did feel that they had a good internal community 
feel; “I have a close network of friends but they are all people from my background, they are all Kurdish 
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too” (participant 2C). Similarly this was echoed in case studies one and three; “The Muslim community 
here is strong, but it is quite insular” (participant 1A) and;  
 
“There is the white community at the top of the hill, and the Asian community at 
the bottom, but nothing in between, they are totally separate” (participant 3G).  
 
It is important to note that when asked for examples of what the participants felt was good integration 
across communities, only two examples across all four focus groups could be provided; “there are a lot 
of council projects now that work with youths across communities” (participant 1D) and “when something 
bad happens like the little girl who went missing, everybody works together regardless of race” 
(participant 3B).  
 
Q3 Are there any community tensions in the area? 
The scoring for this question was varied across the case studies. Case studies one and three (Islamic 
and right wing) both scored lowest with 29% (2 out of 7) of participants stating that there were community 
tensions in the area. Case study four (no specific vulnerability to extremism) ranked the highest with 67% 
of participants saying that there were not any community tensions.  
 
Of those that answered ‘yes’ the majority of comments followed on from previous conversations relating 
to people from different cultural groups or backgrounds not getting on together, participants from case 
studies one, two and three provided plenty of examples of tensions relating to ethnic differences in their 
areas. Participants from case study two (vulnerability to Kurdish extremism) talked more of tensions within 
the Kurdish community as oppose to tensions between different groups; participant 2B explained that 
within the Kurdish community there are political tensions between those who are more active and “wish 
to bring the politics from home to Leeds and those who no longer want to be involved in political activism” 
this was not apparent in other sessions. Interestingly in case study four, none of the discussions were in 
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relation to cultural or racial tensions, instead the conversation focused more on tensions between young 
and old, and people of different social classes,  
 
“There is little positive interaction between the young and old in the area if anything 
this is where most of the issues stem from” (participant 4B).  
 
This could be due to the fact that in this case study area there simply was not the level of racial diversity 
found in the other three areas. 
  
Q4 Do you think that there are any elements of the community which do not integrate well or are more 
isolated? 
Of all of the questions in section one, this showed the biggest differences across the case studies. All of 
the participants in case study four answered positively to this question (‘no’) whilst in case study three 
only 2 out of 7 (39%) did so. That said, when prompted discussions in case study four did again allude 
to a lack of integration between the young and old and people of different social classes “there is little 
positive interaction between the young and old in the area” (participant 4F) “affluent streets back on to 
more deprived streets, but have virtually no interaction” (participant 4C). The facilitator got the impression 
that participants in this group considered the term ‘community’ to mean groups of people from the same 
race or culture as oppose to other demographics such as age, class, sexual orientation etc. and as a 
result they did not link what they were saying about young and old or social classes to being a community 
cohesion issue  
 
“There is no cultural diversity and no reason to fall out” (participant 4C).  
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Discussions in each of the other three case studies again focused around racial communities and 
generally followed a theme (albeit to differing extents) that each community “keeps themselves to 
themselves” (participants 1B and 3B).  
 
Q5 Are you part of any community groups or associations? 
This question was asked in order to assess the level of active participation within each focus group. 
Overall, only four participants out of all 29 stated that they were a part of a community group. In case 
study three (vulnerability to right wing extremism), there were no participants who were part of a 
community group or association. The facilitator asked whether the participant’s felt there was a reason 
for this, to which one individual stated; 
 
“all of the groups are set up for the Asian community because apparently they need 
it more than we do” (participant 3B).  
 
This was conveyed with a tone of anger and resentment and prompted others within the groups to support 
the claim, “white people aren’t seen as a community here” (participant 3G). The notion that the white 
working class are often overlooked and thus marginalised with regards to community cohesion is touched 
on by (Burnett, 2012 and Beider, 2011), and it appeared that the sentiment was shared within this group. 
It is interesting to note however that none of the participants in this group or indeed case study four (which 
were both recruited from local rugby teams) considered their rugby team/club to be a community group.   
 
Concluding points 
Overall there were some clear similarities and differences in how participants from each case study 
responded to the questions around community cohesion in their areas. Common themes emerging were 
that where there are diverse communities, different social groups seem to be quite insular on a day to 
day basis, but come together in times of need. It would appear that certain areas have higher levels of 
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community tensions than others, discussions pointed to potential causes for this not necessarily lying in 
the cultural differences themselves but actually resentment in how different communities are treated by 
local authorities. It was interesting to see how this conversation developed with participants as the 
session moved on to police relations.  
 
Police relations  
The first half of this section was focused on policing in general whilst the second half concentrated more 
on Prevent policing. The participants were split into pairs or groups of three and initially asked to provide 
three positive and three negative statements relating to their local police. Interestingly all groups were 
able to provide three positive statements but not all were able to provide three negative. This could be 
because they did not have as much negative points to say, however, it could also suggest that the 
participants were not as comfortable with being vocal in a negative way about the police for various 
reasons. Some of the common themes across the positive statements related to reliability of the police 
as a service, good treatment by officers, and accountability of the police in comparison to other countries 
or organisations.  
 
Positive statements:  
 
Reliability  
With regards to reliability of the police (the most prominent theme), conversations centred around the 
point that the police will be there when needed, and that they are quick and effective; “some people 
complain that the police don’t come when your shed is damaged, but when you need them in the moment, 
in an emergency, they are there very quickly and that is what is important” (Participant 3A). This sentiment 
was reiterated across the focus groups with others stating “the police are quick to respond, and when 
they arrive they get on with what is needed, whether that is arresting somebody, calming the situation, or 
looking after a victim” (Participant 4B). Of the 36 positive statements provided by the focus groups, 16 
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related to the reliability of the police, which was the most common theme. Two statements (from case 
studies one and two), elaborated further and compared the police in the UK to police forces in their 
country of origin;  
 
“the police here are a service and you can rely on them, the police at home are a 
force, they are there for the authorities, they are not there to serve the public” 
(Participant 2C).  
 
It is worth noting, that whilst the reliability of the police was the most common of all the statements made 
(from a positive perspective), there was also one negative statement made which countered these; “we 
can’t rely on the police anymore, when you call they don’t come and if they do come they just want to tick 
the box and go to the next job.” (Participant 2A).  
 
Positive treatment 
The next most common theme across the positive statements was good treatment by police officers. 
These responses generally fell into two categories, fair and respectful treatment and professionalism;  
 
“the police do treat you with respect and are very fair here” (Participant 1D),  
 
“even when they cannot help you in the way that you want, they are professional and 
give you a good service (Participant 4A).  
 
Interestingly each of the focus groups provided statements relating to the positive treatment the same 
number of times, (three times per group) making it the second most common theme raised. From this 
lack of variation it could be inferred that the police in West Yorkshire treat people the same regardless of 
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demographic which is an important driver to public confidence and strong cohesion and therefore 
resilience against extremism. This issue was discussed further during the second part of this section.  
 
Accountability  
The third common theme across the positive statements related to the level of accountability on the police 
in the UK in comparison to other police forces abroad. This was more prominent in case studies one and 
two (Islamic and Kurdish) perhaps due to the fact that the majority of these participants were not born in 
the UK and so naturally compared police here to the police in other countries. “The police at home are a 
law unto themselves, they do what they want and nobody stops them, here they know they can’t get away 
with that so they have much much higher standards” (Participant 2B). The point of accountability was 
also mentioned in case study four (no specific vulnerability) albeit not in comparison to other areas;  
 
“the police are public servants, everything they do is monitored and standards of what 
we can expect are clear, if they step out of line in any way they will be investigated 
and potentially sacked, this is good for the trust of the public” (Participant 4B). 
 
Visible presence 
Visible presence was a common theme across case study one and two (Islamic and Kurdish), but was 
not mentioned at all in case studies three and four (right wing and no specific vulnerability).  
 
“You always see the police walking up and down in the area talking to people” (participant 2A),  
 
“The police are always flying around with the blue lights on” (Participant 1C).  
 
Not only was this not mentioned as a positive in case studies three and four, but the lack of visible 
presence was also actually cited as a negative statement in both;  
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“you never see the police walking the streets anymore, if you’re lucky you’ll see a car 
but that’s it.” (Participant 4A),  
 
“You occasionally see them in the town centre, but they’re not proactive, they don’t 
come up our end unless they’ve been called” (Participant 3C).  
 
This was an interesting point which when discussed further created some debate; in case study three, 
there was a discussion around the reasons for a lack of police presence in their local area. Some 
participants were quite defensive of the police explaining that it was a result of budget cuts “there aren’t 
enough police anymore, the ones that are left are good, but they can’t keep up”, whilst others were more 
critical of the individuals stating that “they don’t care, we see them on the local news, doing family days 
and activities in the Asian community centres, but they don’t care about us, they don’t even try” 
(Participant 3C). The further discussions around this point are outline below, but at this stage it is 
important to note the level of distinction between the focus groups regarding police visibility in their local 
area.  
 
Negative statements:  
Although there were fewer negative statements provided in each session, there were still some common 
themes which related mainly to a lack of police visibility or engagement and the police prioritising their 
efforts in the wrong areas or on the wrong crime types. 
 
Lack of police engagement 
The lack of police engagement was the most common theme and one which was noted in all four sessions 
at least once. Analysis of the statements provided showed that it could be further broken down into two 
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sub-categories; that the police can’t engage and that the police won’t engage, these sentiments were 
each captured in the following statements;  
 
“the police are unable to be visible proactive in community because there aren’t 
enough of them” (Participant 2F); 
 
“They’re not interested in listening to communities and solving problems, they just 
want to get each job done then go to the next.” (Participant 3B); 
 
The fact that discussions around a lack of police engagement was essentially split into two key areas; the 
police can’t engage and the police won’t engage is interesting in itself and provides an indication of public 
confidence in local policing. Although the numbers concerned here mean it is futile to try and draw 
statistical conclusions it is important to note that case study three (vulnerability to right wing extremism) 
was the only focus group to have more participants stating that the police won’t engage rather than can’t. 
Further conversations suggested that many in the local community had lost confidence and felt that their 
local police teams paid little notice of the “white people in their area, and were more bothered about 
keeping the Asian people happy”. (Participant 3C). One participant did try to defend the local NPT, by 
stating that;  
 
“It’s not the police officers fault, they do care, but their bosses at the top are too 
scared of the media, they pander to the minority communities and try and keep 
them onside because they’re too scared of being criticised in the papers.” 
(Participant 3A).  
 
However, whilst this may have been an attempt to defend the local police team it still suggests a lack of 
trust in the police as a whole. There were a few similar statements made other focus groups, particularly 
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case study one (vulnerability to Islamist extremism), whereby participants felt that many police officers 
did care and tried to engage, but some were not interested in working with the public; “you get good and 
bad, mostly good around here, they do try and get to know people, but some don’t care, they just want to 
lock up the baddies and aren’t bothered about the rest of it, that can be worse though because when you 
don’t know where you stand.” (Participant 1E). 
 
It is important to remember that the majority of participants felt that levels of police engagement were low 
because the police cannot engage proactively. This was entirely attributed to cuts to policing and the low 
numbers of police officers left. “There just simply aren’t enough of them” (Participant 1D), “with the best 
will in the world, there aren’t enough police officers to catch the criminals let alone doing visible patrols or 
sitting around chewing the fat with old dears” (Participant 4D). Whilst participants were unanimous in their 
thinking that there should be more police officers, there was some disagreement as to whether the police 
should actually be more visible in communities. Many felt that police visibility was a key driver of public 
confidence and a great way to get intelligence to act upon, but some felt that they should prioritise other 
activities over providing a visible presence:  
 
“If you know your local cop, you’re more likely to speak to him or her, you’re more 
likely to trust them, you’re more likely to share information, and they’re more likely 
to catch the bad guys, so everyone’s a winner” (Participant 1B). 
 
Countered by;  
 
“We don’t need to see a police officer to know that they’re there, we need them to 
be working hard developing intelligence, building cases, and arresting criminals. The 
more time they spend walking up and down the high street the less time they’re 
spending catching paedophiles or burglars” (Participant 4A).  
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These discussions were very interesting and not only related to wider academic debate around the 
benefits of visible policing, but also directly linked to research aims one and three; to investigate the 
significance of community engagement within the Prevent Strategy and to assess whether NPTs should 
and could be utilised more within the delivery of Prevent.  
  
Police prioritisation  
The second most common theme of negative statements provided linked to the prioritisation of police 
resources and attention. Again these statements can be further broken down into two clear categories; 
firstly how police prioritise according to crime type, secondly how they prioritise according to geographical 
area. The first set of statements generally alluded to a perception that the police concentrate on the wrong 
crime types and spend too much time dealing with minor offences; “They need to stop worrying about 
speeding and people using mobile phones, and catch the drug dealers and burglars” (Participant 1D). 
This sentiment was reiterated across all of the sessions, and in many cases developed into a discussion 
around how bad driving is actually more life threatening to more people than drug dealing was. On two 
occasions the facilitator felt that the conversation was starting to veer off topic and so brought it back 
around to the initial question.  
 
The less common statement made but perhaps the most pertinent to this research related to how the 
police prioritise their attention in different areas. This again was more in case study three (vulnerability to 
right wing extremism), but did feature in all case studies aside from case study four (no specific 
vulnerability). 
 
“The police spend too long in the wrong areas; they put all their time into policing 
the Asian community” (Participant 3D) 
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“They are always in the Asian parts, they hardly ever bother with the white areas” 
(Participant 1D).  
 
Interestingly these almost identical statements were made by two different participants (one Asian male 
in case study one and one white male in case study three), but both felt that this was unfair towards their 
community. Participant 1D felt that his community was being targeted by the police, whilst Participant 3D 
felt that his community was being neglected. The facilitator probed this issue further and discussions 
related to the importance of communication between the police and the public so that people can better 
understand the reasons for the police’s actions.  
 
“If they tell us, we’re patrolling in the area because there has been some 
burglaries, we’d feel better than if they were just driving around watching us.” 
(Participant 1B).  
 
It would be fair to suggest that the participants across all focus groups felt that there was a gap in 
communication between the police and the public which has led to mistrust, which in some communities 
has got to the stage of feeling that the police are targeting certain communities. Given that this is one 
of the most prominent criticisms of the Prevent Strategy it is interesting that this became apparent during 
the session when talking about local policing.  
 
Responses to questions 
Once discussions around the positive and negative statements provided had concluded, the facilitator 
asked the group six questions relating to their perception of their local police, again using the yes or no 
flags to tally responses. The questions and the percentage that answered yes for each question. It is 
important to note that these sample sizes are small (either a total of seven or eight depending on the 
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group), so the differences may not be statistically significant however it does still provide a valuable 
comparison.   
Table 9. Focus group results across case study – police relations. 
Question 
Case Study 
One 
Islamic  
Case Study 
Two 
Kurdish 
Case Study 
Three 
Right Wing 
Case Study 
Four 
None 
Total  
% Yes 
1. Would you feel comfortable in 
talking to the police about 
issues important to you? 
71% 86% 86% 100% 86% 
2. Do you think the police treat 
you with respect?  
71% 100% 86% 87% 86% 
3. Have you had any personal 
contact with the police? 
86% 83%* 43% 50% 62% 
4. If so was this positive? 67% 80% 67% 75% 72% 
5. Do you think the police in this 
area treat people the same 
regardless of their ethnicity or 
religion? 
50%* 71% 71% 87% 69% 
6. Do you think that the police 
take the time to learn about 
the cultural issues in their 
area?  
57% 57% 86% 75% 69% 
Average % Yes 67% 79% 74% 80% 75% 
Sample n.7 n.7 n.7 n.8 n.29 
* Not a complete sample; at least one participant chose not to answer.  
 
The table shows the percentage of participants in each group who chose to answer ‘yes’ to the question. 
It is important to note that for question five the percentage is only reflective of those who previously 
answered ‘yes’ to question four. For the purposes of this research a ‘yes’ should be considered as a 
positive response to all questions above at it suggests a level of trust, confidence or engagement with 
the local police depending on the question.  
 
The case study with the highest average percentage of ‘yes’ responses across all questions was case 
study four (no specific vulnerability). Whist this may not be surprising, it is interesting as it suggests that 
local policing is viewed more positively in the community with no additional vulnerability to extremism 
than those with a potential vulnerability. The average positive response rate across all focus groups was 
167 
 
75%, case study two (Kurdish) scored just above this (79%), whilst case study three (Right wing) was in 
line with the average (74%), and case study one (Islamic) fell below averaging just 67%. Incidentally this 
somewhat mirrors the scoring of the tallied questions in the initial part of the focus groups around 
community cohesion.  
 
The results above also show that although 86% of participants across all case studies felt comfortable in 
speaking with the police (question one), only 44% of those who had previously had personal contact with 
the police felt that it was positive. Granted the sample sizes do get particularly small here, but this 
difference in confidence and satisfaction is reflected across wider research and is an issue which may be 
impacting on relationships between communities and their local policing teams.  
 
Discussions around the responses to question two were particularly revealing; all of the participants in 
case study two (Kurdish) felt that the police would treat them with respect, but across the other focus 
groups the responses were much lower (even in case study four which had generally scored better across 
most of the questions). The facilitator asked participants to explain their answer and it could be said that 
the explanations so not give such as positive impression;  
 
“British police are more respectful to the Kurds than the Iraqi police, but only 
because they don’t know what a Kurd is.” (Participant 2B). 
 
“…the police and military in Turkey and Syria can freely persecute Kurdish people 
and other minorities, the police in Britain are much better, they do not care about 
what your race or religion is”. (Participant 2D). 
 
These responses again reflect themes previously identified; firstly that participants in these focus groups 
who were not born in Britain often compare their local police to those in their homeland as a point of 
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context, and secondly that even though it may not be directly stated as often by the participants, there is 
the suggestion that the local police have a lack of understanding around political and cultural issues 
affecting these communities.  
 
This suggestion is supported by the fact that only 69% of participants across the case studies felt that the 
police took the time to get to know about cultural issues in their area (question six). The results from case 
study three appear to have driven this figure up, but again when the reasons for these answers were 
discussed the answers were more discouraging than first thoughts;  
 
“They do get to know about the cultural issues, but they pick and choose which 
cultures, the British culture is overlooked time and time again and the police pander 
to the rest” (Participant 3C). 
 
The fact that the highest positive response rate to this question is perhaps not actually as strong an 
indicator as the numbers would initially suggest is important. The undertone of resentment amongst 
participants in this case study (which was apparent in previous sections of the focus group) was crucial 
to acknowledge; for this reason the facilitator was careful that every significant question/response was 
followed up with a conversation to ensure that the true sentiment of the groups were being captured. 
Another interesting viewpoint which was expressed in conversations around this question (in all groups 
to varying degrees) was that the local police should not actually need to get to know the cultural issues 
in any great detail;  
 
“I don’t think the police should be expected to have conversations about religion and 
politics, (and) that should be left to the community leaders and councillors” 
(Participant 1C). 
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This is an important finding as it plays directly into discussions around ‘what the role of NPTs should be 
within the delivery of the Prevent Strategy’. The suggestion that actually participants “didn’t ever need or 
want to have any deep discussions with the police about things like that” (Participant 3F), implies that the 
local policing teams should not concern themselves too much with the sensitive issues around religion, 
politics, terrorism and other topics which would be useful to the delivery of Prevent. Whilst there was 
some difference in opinion across the case studies around the ways in which a police officer should 
engage and get to know their communities, the overall consensus was that the local police should have 
a basic understanding of their communities to enable them to respond and act accordingly, but nothing 
more. The public perspective on this issue provided by these focus groups was invaluable to this area of 
research and was developed further in the final stage of the focus group.  
 
Another noteworthy point is that only half of the participants who answered question five in case study 
one (Islamic vulnerability) felt that the police would treat everyone the same regardless of ethnicity or 
religion. One participant chose not to answer this question which means the total sample for this group 
was just six, nevertheless the level of positive response was considerably lower than other focus groups. 
The same trend was seen with the answers to question two in that less participants in case study one felt 
that the police would treat them with respect. Whilst trend appears to point to a logical assumption that 
participants in this focus group have less confidence in their local police to treat themselves or others 
fairly the same pattern is not seen in case study two (Kurdish vulnerability). All of the respondents in this 
group felt that the police treated them with respect but only 57% (four out of seven) felt that they would 
treat people the same regardless of ethnicity or religion. This was explored further with the group who 
explained that;  
 
“The police do sometimes look at people differently and maybe stop them in cars 
more depending on their appearance, but this isn’t just to Kurdish people.” (Participant 
2D) 
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Further discussions around this question suggested that although none of the participants (in any group) 
openly stated that they felt the police in their local area were racist or would actively treat people differently 
due to their race or religion, there was an suggestion that sometimes people who appear to be from a 
black or minority ethnic background are more likely to receive a different or increased level of attention 
from their local police.  
 
“Sometimes the police do treat people differently based on how they look, this isn’t 
always a bad thing though, sometimes it’s that they genuinely want to try harder to 
talk to minority people. Other times though it’s because they think we look shady in 
our nice cars and they assume it’s through drugs or dodgy money.” (Participant 1B) 
 
Another participant responded to this claim: 
 
“That’s not necessarily because of your skin colour though, it could be because 
you’re 19 and driving a £40,000 car. I’m sure if they saw a white lad the same age, 
in the same car, in the same rough area, they’d stop him too”. (Participant 1F) 
 
These conversations were enlightening as they not only resulted in participants challenging each other’s 
viewpoints but also seem to conclude that personal experience of the local police was not necessarily 
affected by their race or religion even if there are perceived differences in how the police treat people 
more widely.  
 
In general, this section of the focus group allowed the facilitator to explore perceptions of the local police 
in detail. This enabled a level of understanding of the drivers behind these perceptions (both positive and 
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negative) which would inform the different discussions linked to this research, particularly, what the role 
of local policing is and should be in delivering Prevent.  
 
Knowledge of Prevent 
Before the session moved on to perceptions of extremism, the facilitator thought it was crucial to note the 
level of knowledge of Prevent in each of the groups. This served two purposes; to assess any 
similarities/differences in the knowledge level across case studies for context, and also to ensure that the 
participants understood the concept of Prevent before moving on to the final stages of the focus group.  
 
To assess this, the facilitator simply asked the groups to put their hand up if they had heard of the Prevent 
Strategy. The facilitator did not openly make a tally of answers but did note down the response rate. A 
comparison of these numbers across the case studies should be considered under the caveat that not all 
members would have wanted to answer ‘yes’ for fear of ‘incriminating’ themselves, secondly some may 
have put their hand up even if they didn’t know as they didn’t want participants to think they didn’t know 
the answer. That said, roughly half of participants across all case studies said that they did know what 
Prevent was, with the exception of case study four (no specific vulnerability) where there was only two 
participants who put their hands up equating to a quarter of the overall group.   
 
The second question asked of the groups was if anybody minded explaining to the rest of the group what 
the Prevent Strategy was. In each of the groups there was at least one willing volunteer and although 
there were some slightly different interpretations of the strategy across explanations offered they did all 
generally fit with what would be an accepted definition of the Prevent Strategy. 
 
The discussions around this revealed that although some participants had heard of Prevent and could 
provide a basic explanation, in general the awareness and knowledge of Prevent was low. Of those that 
offered to explain Prevent to the rest of the groups three out of four stated that their knowledge was based 
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on experiences through employment (in schools, a youth group and the NHS), and were not based on 
personal experience of Prevent as a general member of the public. The facilitator provided an explanation 
of what Prevent is (taken from the Prevent Strategy), and asked for thoughts around this and whether it 
now seemed familiar to the groups. Many of the responses were quite revealing in that the participants 
assumed that something like Prevent did exist but had no personal experience;  
 
“It makes sense that in this day and age there would be something like this but I 
didn’t ever really think about it.” (Participant 4F)    
 
“Oh actually I have heard about these people, they’re police officers who wear plain 
clothes and mingle in with people to identify the terrorists” (Participant 3B).  
 
This second statement is interesting as although it is not technically wrong, the participant did go on to 
state that actually he was basing his knowledge on the TV programme Spooks which depicts MI5 
operatives and not police Prevent Engagement Officers, further highlighting a lack of understanding 
around local Prevent policing. 
 
Overall, although this was only a small element of the focus groups it did reveal some quite damning 
findings regarding the levels of Prevent awareness in these case studies particularly when it is 
considered that the local Prevent Officers were in theory working within these communities on a regular 
basis.  
 
Perceptions of extremism 
This section of the focus group was potentially the most contentious as it essentially required the 
participants to think about their level of agreement to the hypothetical use of violence and terrorism. The 
facilitator was careful to script the statements in a way which would not result in any of the participants 
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inadvertently declaring their support for terrorism as a tactic or any terrorist organisations. Nevertheless, 
there was a clear change in tone as certain participants became less willing to divulge the reasons for 
their answers, although all participants provided answers to all statements. The below table shows the 
proportion of respondents who either ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with the statements. It is important to 
note that the options were; ‘strongly agree, agree, unsure, disagree, strongly disagree’. The deeper 
analysis provides greater detail into the breakdown across all categories including the proportion of 
‘unsure’ responses for context.  
 
Table 10. Focus group results across case studies – perceptions of extremism. 
Statement 
Case 
Study 
One 
Islamic 
Case 
Study 
Two 
Kurdish 
Case 
Study 
Three 
Right 
Wing 
Case 
Study 
Four 
None 
Total 
% 
Agree 
1. One man’s terrorist is another man’s 
freedom-fighter.   
43% 29% 29% 25% 31% 
2. Terrorism can sometimes be justified. 71% 57% 43% 50% 55% 
3. Violence can sometimes be a good 
way to further your cause. 
86% 86% 71% 75% 79% 
4. The media portrays a one-sided 
perspective of extremism.  
71% 43% 43% 50% 52% 
5. There is little difference between 
armies dropping bombs and terrorists 
dropping bombs.   
43% 57% 71% 50% 55% 
6. People join extremist organizations for 
the ideology more than the excitement.  
57% 43% 43% 38% 45% 
7. Violence against governments is better 
than violence against civilians. 
43% 57% 43% 25% 42% 
8. Terrorism is legitimized if there are no 
other means to further the cause. 
71% 14% 29% 38% 38% 
Average  61% 48% 46% 44% 50% 
Sample n.7 n.7 n.7 n.8 n.29 
 
Whilst this data could be interpreted to identify the groups who may have more vulnerability or sympathy 
with terrorism or terrorist means by their level of agreement with the statements, it is important to note 
that this is not the purpose of this research. Instead the data above can give useful insights into the 
perceptions of extremism across the case studies and thus be useful in guiding discussions on the topics 
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and provide context for the later open conversation around what the role of policing should be in 
countering extremism, and importantly why. 
 
On average, case study one (vulnerability to Islamist extremism) had a higher level of agreement with the 
statements than any other group. This is particularly notable with regards to the statements around how 
extremism is perceived by the media and the public “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom-fighter” 
and “the media portrays a one-sided perspective of extremism”. The most prominent theme from this part 
of the session related to the feeling of unfairness and in some cases resentment in how Islamist extremism 
is perceived as a bigger threat than any other form of extremism: 
 
“Any and all terrorism is bad, a bomb is a bomb and it kills people regardless of who 
detonates it, but all you ever hear about is how bad Islamist extremism is.” 
(Participant 1D).  
 
Many of the participants in this groups (and others) agreed with this statement with some adding that this 
causes further isolation and resentment across the Muslim community who denounce so-called Islamist 
extremism.  
 
“Muslims have no more to do with Al Qaeda, Al Shabab, or Islamic State than any 
other person in Britain, yet we’re expected to apologise on behalf of these people 
every time there is an attack. If you’re Muslim and you don’t openly condemn the 
terrorists people think you support them.” (Participant 1C)  
 
This was added to further: 
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“I do think there is a one-sided view of terrorism in the media and I do think that 
people define terrorism according to what the government tells them to. The prime 
minister says that Muslim terrorists are the big bad guys, so all of a sudden they’re 
the only big bad guys that people care about. Prevent is a perfect example of this”. 
(Participant 1D).  
 
The sentiment of an unfair focus on Islamist extremism was touched on in the other groups although 
perhaps not to the same extent and in some cases unintentionally. The facilitator did not mention any 
specific form of terrorism in any other the focus groups yet in all sessions conversations centred on 
Islamist extremism. Interestingly the participants in case study two (vulnerability to Kurdish extremism) 
did not consider proscribed Kurdish groups such as the PKK to be terrorist organisations, and 
discussions in this group centred almost entirely on extremist organisations such as Al-Qaeda and 
Islamic State. In case study three, there was again a heavy focus on Islamist groups but with the 
occasional comparison to more extreme right wing terrorism and although no specific organisations 
were named discussions did refer to neo-nazis and far right ideologies. Similarly in case study four (no 
specific vulnerability), the conversation was almost entirely focus on Islamist extremism until one 
participant mentioned the troubles in Northern Ireland and made reference to the terrorist groups 
involved there, but this was towards the end of the discussion which quickly moved back to Islamist 
extremism.  
 
This focus on Islamist extremism is interesting; there is a wealth of debate around Prevent and counter-
terrorism policing having a disproportionate focus on Islamist extremism (as covered in the literature 
review) but there is less discussion around the imbalance portrayed by the media and thus felt in 
communities. Those such as Thompson (2012) and Spencer (2012) have more recently sought to draw 
attention to this issue, and it is of note that the findings from these focus groups appear to support the 
argument that there is a perception amongst many that terrorism is predominately an Islamic issue. 
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Discussions within the focus groups went further with participants deliberating whether the focus on 
Islamic extremism is justified because the threat is bigger so the government, media and public focus 
on this, or because the government, media and public focus on this we feel that Islamist extremism is 
the bigger threat. This again was echoed in the focus groups: 
 
“It’s like the chicken and the egg, are the police worried more about Islamic 
extremism because we know we need to, or do we know more about Islamic 
extremism because we police it more?” (Participant 4E) 
 
The police role in preventing extremism 
The fact that the discussions in this part of the sessions already began to include references to the 
policing response to terrorism and extremism was encouraging and led on nicely to the final section of 
the focus group which was a discussion structured around an open ended question “what do you think 
the role of the police should be in preventing extremism.” The facilitator felt that it was important to not 
restrict this dialogue by using voting tallies or pre-written statements and instead simply jotted down key 
points on a flipchart to reassure the participants that their opinions were being considered.  
 
A wealth of suggestions were offered around what role the police should play in preventing extremism 
with some healthy differences in opinion. Perhaps the most interesting point to make was although there 
were some clearly opposing viewpoints shared from across the group, these viewpoints could not be 
aligned by case study with participants from each group offering challenge to their fellow group 
members. The two key debates which arose were pertinent to the research aims and centred around 
whether the police should be the lead agency and whether Prevent should be a specialist role. There 
was however, one suggestion which almost every participant agreed with; that the police should work 
more closely with young people to improve their engagement not only around radicalisation but other 
issues too.  
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Police as the lead agency  
The participants across all focus groups offered some very specific suggestions as to the appropriate 
activities of the police in preventing extremism including carrying out schedule seven stops at ports 
under counter terrorism legislation and increased engagement in schools. Each of these discussions 
(without any prompting from the facilitator) developed into a debate around the level of involvement the 
police should have within preventing extremism. Some believed that the police need to do more with 
regards to community engagement and intelligence development to achieve this objective, whilst others 
felt strongly that this was not the responsibility of the police or that it would be more appropriate for other 
agencies to take the lead, and that the police should only become involved at the Pursue stage.  
 
“We’ve seen for ourselves how the police can’t do the level of engagement that 
they used to do, or the level that they need to do if they are to successfully stop 
somebody becoming a terrorists. They need to be in communities and part of the 
community but there is too few of them and they are too busy now.” (Participant 
2F).  
 
This was immediately countered by another member of the group who felt that it wasn’t the responsibility 
of the police to prevent somebody from falling into extremism it was down to the community: 
 
“The police should be able to get on with catching criminals and keeping people 
safe from crime. We should be the ones who are identifying somebody who is 
going down the wrong path, we should be the people to steer them the right way. 
Every terrorist has a mother and father, friends and a community who failed to do 
their job, before the police failed theirs.” (Participant 2A)  
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Similar debates occurred throughout the other sessions with some participants feeling strongly that the 
police should do more whilst others thought they should do less. One interesting take on the issue was 
that the police should take responsibility for the lower level Prevent cases whilst other agencies such 
as the security services should deal with the more serious cases. This was based on the logic that the 
lower end cases of potential radicalisation or vulnerability could probably be dealt with through effective 
community policing and so should be. However, another participant expressed concern about this 
approach suggesting that a vulnerable youth for example, would be more likely to speak to a friend, 
school teacher or youth worker than a police officer. One differing take on this perspective was put 
forward in case study one (Islamist extremism), by a participant who felt that there were ethical issues 
surrounding police involvement in Prevent: 
“The police shouldn’t be involved unless a crime has been committed. There are 
plenty of other organisations such as schools, colleges and social services who 
should be trying to stop people being radicalised, but the police shouldn’t be 
involved until somebody has actually done something wrong.” (Participant 1G).  
 
This point links back to the debate noted in the literature review around Prevent operating in the pre-crime 
space and the ethical and legal issues related to this. Whilst it is a valid concern other participants did 
feel that prevention of any sort (whether it is preventing burglary or preventing terrorism) is the 
responsibility of the police in their task to maintain the safety of the public. Nevertheless it is crucial to 
consider the impact that police involvement can have with any individual who is potentially on the edge 
of criminality or being radicalised as it could potentially become a trigger towards offending behaviour.  
 
Another ethical issue with police involvement in Prevent was proposed by participant 1C who felt that 
“religion and politics are at the root of radicalisation and the police shouldn’t be going anywhere near 
these two topics.”  
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Prevent as a specialist role  
The second key theme of discussions alluded more to the roles within the police when it comes to 
preventing extremism. This again links directly to the research aims as it offers depth to the debate around 
whether neighbourhood policing should play more of a part in delivering Prevent or whether it should be 
left to the ‘expert’ Prevent teams.  
 
Again there was no clear correlation between participants from certain case studies and their perspective 
on this issue but the two main arguments across the groups can be illustrated through the statements 
made in case study four: 
 
“Local police officers already need to know almost everything about every crime; 
they deal with burglaries, speeding, missing children, you name it. I think it’s a 
bit unrealistic to also expect them to know about radicalisation and all the religion 
and politics that comes with it.” (Participant 4F) 
 
This was countered by participant 4B: 
 
“Surely the only way that the police can identify the small number of people who 
are radicalised is if every police officer is looking” (Participant 4B) 
 
This not only plays into the debate around what the ideal role of neighbourhood policing teams should 
be in delivering Prevent but also what the logistical issues around training and enabling a much wider 
number of police officers and PCSOs to deliver Prevent in addition to their other responsibilities.  
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Youth engagement 
This was the only suggested police activity which was put forward in each group and which gained a 
common consensus. It generally came towards the end of the discussions when the facilitator asked; 
“what could the police do to help Prevent radicalisation?”  Participants generally felt that there was a link 
between radicalisation and racism, which if addressed early enough, could be avoided.  
 
“If people were more tolerant of differences there wouldn’t be terrorism…if we 
could nip it in the bud through working with children then a lot of the problem would 
be solved” (Participant 4B).  
 
Many of the participants offered personal experiences of dealing with young people who had “inherited 
their parents racist views” (Participant 3D), resulting in them holding the same views, and potentially 
becoming vulnerable to radicalisation later on in life. Others relayed experiences of police officers coming 
into their schools when they were younger and the positive effect that this had on them, suggesting it 
should continue now. All of the points made were in line with the wider government guidance on improving 
community cohesion and as outlined in the literature review, there are strong links between this agenda 
and the Prevent Strategy. Some participants did however note that concentrating solely on children will 
not necessarily work, which developed into a conversation about how the police should provide work 
place training and awareness raising initiatives around Prevent, which again fits in closely with the 
strategy.  
 
Summary  
In summary, the planning and preparation which went into the focus groups helped to ensure that they 
ran smoothly, stayed on plan, and provided meaningful data for this research. The combination of a 
facilitator and an assistant worked well and provided the opportunity to capture more data in a less 
intrusive way. The use of existing social groups also suited the topics area well as it offered participants 
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a level of familiarity that helped to put them at ease and encouraged open conversations. Whilst there 
were a range of sometimes opposing viewpoints being offered throughout the sessions, all participants 
acted respectfully of each other and there were no issues whereby the facilitator felt the need to step in 
and manage the conversation.  
 
Community cohesion 
The majority of participants felt happy living in their local area however there were varying degrees of 
satisfaction with the levels of community cohesion. A number of participants from each group felt that 
there were fractions of communities (or entire communities) which do not integrate well (some even citing 
their own), and that this insular approach was not healthy or conducive to good community cohesion. 
Some participants also felt that the local authorities treated different communities in their local area 
differently and that this bread feelings of resentment which were not easy to overcome. 
 
Police relations  
On the surface the results from these sessions painted a positive picture of police relations across the 
case studies with many participants being able to name their local police officer or at least having a 
positive experience of them. Strengths were noted in relation to the reliability of their local police, the level 
of accountability of the police service in Britain, and positive treatment by police officers. However, it was 
also apparent that the level of engagement and visible presence provided by the local police was not to 
the standard that the participants would like. There were also criticisms in relation to how the police 
prioritised their time and again a feeling of inequality with regards to which communities the police spend 
most time and effort in. There was however an acknowledgement across all of the case studies that the 
local police officers and PCSOs are hard-working and want the best for their communities, however, 
constraints placed on them either by government cuts to policing or by their senior commanders make it 
almost impossible for them to maintain strong and positive relations within their communities.  
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Knowledge of Prevent   
The level of knowledge, awareness and understanding of Prevent across the case studies was low. This 
is perhaps a concern for those delivering Prevent in these areas as three out of the four case studies 
have been specifically identified due to their potential vulnerability to radicalisation and so should have 
been engaged with. This is however something that could be investigated further as discussions alluded 
to an indirect knowledge of Prevent in that many participants knew of their local Prevent Engagement 
Officer, but perhaps didn’t know more detail on the Prevent Strategy.  
 
Perceptions of extremism  
This part of the focus groups was the most difficult to facilitate, as the sensitive nature of the topic hindered 
the willingness of some participants to talk openly. Nevertheless, there was a wealth of information 
provided particularly around the perceptions of extremism within the media and public. There was again 
a sentiment of inequality around the portrayal of extremism as an Islamic issue and some interesting 
discussions around who determines which organisations are terrorists and which are freedom fighters. It 
was clear from these conversations that the perception of extremism and the factors which influence this 
also play a direct role in how terrorism is police and consequently how vulnerable communities view the 
police.  
 
Police role in preventing extremism 
This was the most divisive part of the sessions in that all of the case studies appeared to break off into 
the same debates around the level of involvement that the police should have and the level of expertise 
that NPTs should be expected to have. In short, the groups did not reach any agreements about the ideal 
role that police should play in preventing extremism which is enlightening in itself, and supports the 
argument that community policing (and Prevent policing) should be tailored to suit the needs of the 
individual communities. The discussions did however allude to practical and ethical issues related to 
police involvement in Prevent which again mirror much of the academic debate as summarised in the 
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literature review. The only point of agreement across the groups, was that assuming the police did play 
an active role in the delivery of Prevent, they should focus their efforts on working with vulnerable young 
people to steer them away from negative influences early on. Interestingly, the specific suggestions made 
by the group for future police activity such as awareness raising, training and workshops are all things 
that the current Prevent Strategy lists as examples of good Prevent work.  
 
Consensus between case study groups 
Whilst there were clear themes across the focus group sessions it is important to note differences (and 
similarities) across the case study groups. Many of the differences in opinions related to the topic of 
cohesion in their local areas and how well different communities integrated with each other. The results 
from case study four (no specific vulnerability) were generally more positive than the other three case 
study groups (which incidentally were all chosen because they were potentially vulnerable to extremism). 
The only consensus noted across all groups in relation to cohesion was that where there was a feeling of 
low cohesion, it was generally agreed that this was due to inequalities in how different groups were treated 
by the authorities, which in turn created resentment.  
 
There were also differences in relation to how the different case studies responded to the questions 
around police relations. Less participants from case study one (vulnerability to Islamist extremism) felt 
that the police in their local area treated people the same regardless of their religion or ethnicity than in 
any other case study group. Whilst this sentiment was echoed in some of the other case study discussions 
it was clearly more prominent in case study one.  
 
Perhaps the clearest difference across the case studies related to what the role of the police should be 
in delivering the Prevent Strategy. Whilst there was diversity in opinions within each case study group, 
the general consensus across case studies two and four (vulnerability to Kurdish extremism and no 
specific vulnerability), was that the police should be more involved in the delivery of Prevent, whilst there 
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was overall agreement in case studies one and three (Islamist extremism and right wing extremism), that 
the police should not be involved and it should be the responsibility of other agencies. Incidentally this 
ties in with the level of positivity around police relations across the four case studies.  
 
There were also some notable similarities across case study groups; participants from all groups agreed 
that there was a lack of visible presence from their local police and that they should prioritise their limited 
resources differently. Whilst the reasons behind these assertions varied, the lack of engagement 
remained an overall consensus.  
 
The low knowledge of Prevent was also clear across all case study groups with very little divergence. 
Interestingly there was no clear difference in how participants from case study four (no specific 
vulnerability) answered this question in comparison to the other ‘vulnerable’ case studies.  
 
One final clear consensus across the case study groups related to the need for increased youth 
engagement from the police for the purposes of preventing violent extremism. Whilst the case study 
groups differed on the level of involvement the police should have within Prevent, every group did 
conclude that increased police engagement with young people would be beneficial for general crime 
reduction, good cohesion, and preventing radicalisation, even if this is not done under the banner of 
‘Prevent’.  
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Chapter five 
Participant activity reports 
 
Participant diaries or activity reports are often used as part of a mixed methodological approach to provide 
an insight into the perceptions and activities of individuals which can be used to better understand the 
findings of supporting research methods such as interviews or observations. “Diaries and interviews are 
well-established methods for collecting data in the field of health and social research” (Jacelon & Imperio, 
2005, p.994). Participants are required to complete a diary entry or activity report at set times (determined 
by the researcher), providing detail of their movements, behaviours and reflections in relation to a set 
topic. These records are then analysed thematically against the research aims to compare and contrast 
responses from different participants and over a period of time.  
 
The use of diaries as part of a research plan can be beneficial not only for the researcher but also for the 
participants. They typically require a low level of resource and time to fill in, and can be completed at a 
time and place which suits the participant - unlike focus groups or interviews which need to be scheduled 
in advance. Similarly, completing a diary entry can be easier for the participant than taking part in focus 
groups or interviews as they are not required to remember detail from the past; “they can provide a rich 
source of meaningful data and can avoid the difficulties of participants trying to precisely recall events 
after some time has elapsed.” (Thomas, 2014, p.25). Depending on the needs of the research they can 
also be completed over a set period of time, for a week, a month, or even a year. This allows the 
researcher to analyse the data over time, in a way that would not be possible through interviews unless 
follow up interviews were scheduled. Whilst there are challenges for the researcher in relation to 
compliance rates, sanitising and standardising the information provided, other concerns such as 
interviewer bias or influence from other participants (in focus groups) are not as relevant with this method 
of data collection.  
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The aims of this research centre around the current activities of NPTs and how this could potentially fit 
into the delivery of the Prevent Strategy, for this reason, activity reports of Tier One participants (NPTs 
and PEOs) were chosen as a suitable tool for data collection. Activity reports as used in this research 
differ slightly from a standard participant diary in that they are more structured and involve specific 
questions. Within qualitative research, the use of participant diaries is flexible and can be designed to 
suit the needs of the research. For some, the use of one open-ended question is reasonable, with very 
few boundaries placed on the type of information provided in the participant diary. Alternatively, some 
participant diaries follow a set structure or involve a pre-determined template for the participants to fill in 
to ensure that particular information is captured. For this research, the purpose of this method was to 
generate data relating to the activities of NPT and PEO participants during their shifts, with a particular 
focus on their interactions with communities. Given the broad nature of the work of an NPT team, it was 
decided that set questions would be useful in keeping the input on topic (focused on community policing 
work). It was however crucial to note that asking only about set activities would not provide a holistic 
overview of entire shift, so consideration was needed as to how the report would capture the relevant 
activity in the context of wider participant activity. These considerations are outlined later in this chapter, 
with a copy of the template provided to participants, but in summary the activity report required the 
participants to provide estimations on the time spent on different activities (included community 
engagement), details of the areas worked in, and any community issues which may have arisen during 
their shift. These data would then be coded and analysed thematically across job roles, case study areas 
and over time to provide the deeper level of detail around the activities of participants.  
 
Planning 
To ensure that the use of these activity reports would meet the purpose of this research in an ethical 
manner, consideration was given to a number of factors including the participants involved, the number 
of activity reports required, the duration of the collection period, and the level of structure included in the 
templates.  
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Participant selection 
The main aims of this research were to better understand the significance of community engagement, 
and the current role of neighbourhood policing within the Prevent Strategy - to inform discussions around 
whether NPTs should or could be utilised more. For this reason, more detail into the daily duties and 
activities of NPT and Prevent staff was sought, and it was decided that the Tier One participants would 
be the most suitable subjects for the activity reports. It was also decided that all of the Tier One 
participants should be required to provide activity reports as this would not only provide a wealth of data 
across roles in the different case studies, but would also provide a level of resilience, should any of the 
participants drop out during the fieldwork period. Whilst it was deemed that enough data could be 
generated by choosing a sample from the Tier One participants, it was not considered to be excessive to 
ask all participants given that for those who were not interviewed, this would provide them with the 
opportunity to contribute to the research in a meaningful way. The researcher was aware that this decision 
would result in 19 participants filling out activity reports throughout the fieldwork period, generating a 
significant amount of data which would need to be managed in accordance with legal and ethical 
guidelines. The time required to administrate this was factored into the wider research plan in a way that 
did not detract from the capacity of the researcher to fulfil the other responsibilities. These considerations 
did impact on the decisions around frequency of the activity reports and the duration of the fieldwork 
period.   
 
Frequency and duration  
It was important that the content of the activity reports covered all types of shift worked by the participants, 
as the nature of policing means that often very different issues will arise on different shifts. The tasks 
assigned to a PC, PCSO or PEO during mid-week day shifts (referred to as earlies) are likely to vary 
considerably to the demands placed on them on a weekend late shift (evenings). Although PEOs don’t 
typically work the same shift patterns as the NPT participants, the duties they carry out will still vary 
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across the days, weeks and season. It was important that the activity reports captured the full range of 
duties covered by the participants.  
 
To determine the most suitable method of completion for the activity reports, prior consultation with the 
participants was carried out. The participants were given sight of the proposed template and asked if they 
would prefer to fill out the form at the end of each shift, or at the end of each set of shifts (seven 
consecutive days). The preferable choice for the research was for participants to complete one activity 
report at the end of each shift to minimise the risk of details being forgotten. However, it was also 
acknowledged that the more efficient process could be to fill out one activity report at the end of each set 
of shifts, covering all of the shifts within it. This was likely to help with compliance rates, as the nature of 
policing means that often staff do not finish their shift on time, or have very little time at the end of each 
shift to do any additional administrative work. Participants felt that they would find it easier to set aside 
more time at the end of each set of shifts than at the end of each shift. Furthermore, all PCs, PCSOs and 
PEOs are required by law to keep a record of their activity in their Pocket Note Books for reference and 
evidential submissions. This would also help them to recall information about their activities on the 
previous week, reducing concerns about accuracy and missing information. This approach also helped 
to monitor the submissions of participants in a more manageable way, than if 19 reports were submitted 
every shift.  
 
Once it was decided that the participants would fill out one activity report per set of shifts, consideration 
was given to the duration of this element of the fieldwork. In the same way that the activities of police can 
vary from day to night, they can also vary according to season. Summer months may see more public 
events and require proactive engagement, whereas winter months can often see an increased focus on 
burglaries and crimes committed through the darker evenings. It was therefore deemed crucial that these 
activity reports were completed over the course of a 12 month period (April 2014 to March 2015) to 
capture the full range of policing activity. However, requesting the participants to submit an activity report 
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for every set over the course of a year, was not deemed proportionate or necessary. It was important to 
remember that the participants would be serving members of the police and so the impact on their work 
must be kept as minimal as possible, it was also thought that participants were more likely to lose interest 
if they were expected to fill out the reports for a full year, furthermore this would potentially create more 
data than could be meaningfully used for the research. For these reasons, it was decided that the 
participants would be required to complete activity reports every other month. This essentially meant that 
there would be six months’ worth of data, covering the full 12 month period. This would generate enough 
data, across the appropriate time frame, whilst minimising the impact on the participant and maintaining 
interest in the research.  
 
Template design  
Once the participants had been identified and the duration and frequency of the reports determined, the 
template could be designed. As mentioned above, consideration was given to the level of structure 
required for the activity reports. Whilst one open-ended question such as ‘what have you done during this 
set?’ was not deemed to be specific enough, it was also important that the template was not too 
prescriptive in what it required and so did not limit the participant in the degree of information that they 
wanted to provide. It was important that the activity reports were not too onerous to complete and 
presented in a way which did not put off the participants from filling them in. For this reason, the template 
was designed to be between one and two sides of A4. Once some space had been allocated for recording 
the administrative details, there remained space for between five and eight questions. This was in keeping 
with academic guidance on designing a participant diary (Corti, 1993) and was also considered to be 
suitable for the needs of this research.  
 
Much of the academic guidance around designing questioning styles which were noted in the interviews 
and focus group chapters were also relevant when drafting the specific questions for the activity report. 
It was therefore important to consider questioning styles, influence and simplicity, and ensure that they 
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would encourage responses which were pertinent to the purpose of the research (for fuller discussion 
please refer to chapters three and four). One element of question design which required a slightly different 
approach for this methodology related to the level of detail provided. In the focus groups and semi-
structured interviews it was important that the questions were open ended and not too prescriptive, to 
encourage full and detailed responses. The purpose of the activity reports were to provide data pertaining 
to the day to day duties of the Tier One participants and so did not require the same level of detail or 
opinion as was sought in the interviews or focus groups. For this reason it was decided that the questions 
would be relatively more structured but would still require free text answers. Consideration was given to 
providing multiple choice options but it was decided that this would be too limiting, and could inadvertently 
result in the participants rushing through the template when busy without giving as much thought to their 
responses.  
 
The purpose of the activity report was to quickly capture details of participant activities linked to the 
research aims. For this reason, questions were focused largely on the community engagement activities, 
other demands which could hinder the participant’s ability to carry out community policing duties, and 
their awareness of any cohesion issues in their community. To capture this information, the participants 
were required to provide estimates of the amount of time that they had spent conducting a certain task 
or policing in a certain area. They were then asked to record any issues relating to community cohesion 
or extremism that had come to light during their shifts. Finally, they were asked about any engagement 
or intelligence tasking that had been allocated to them and whether there were any other points they felt 
were pertinent to this research. Once the initial template had been drafted, participants were consulted 
on and a few minor changes were made. The final template was as follows:  
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Participant Activity Report 
Participant    
NPT and Team  
Dates of shifts covered  
Date of report  
 
Which geographical areas have you spent most of your time in during this set? Please provide basic 
time estimates and reasons i.e. burglary patrols, ASB, community engagement, etc.  
 
Approximately how much of your time have you spent dealing with station duties i.e. paper work, 
custody, submitting intelligence etc.  
  
Approximately what proportion of your time have you been able to dedicate solely to engagement with 
the public and/or partners? Please provide details of times, agencies / community contacts and 
reasons for engagement.  
 
Are you aware of any issues relating to community disharmony or tensions which have arisen during 
this set? Please provide basic details of the issue and steps taken. 
 
Have any individuals, communities, or groups come to your attention during this set for reasons relating 
to extremism? Please provide basic details (not including personal information). If so what steps did 
you take, i.e. intelligence report, referral, arrest, etc. 
 
Have you been tasked with any community engagement or intelligence gathering this set? Please 
provide detail including who the task came from, what did it entail and whether you managed to 
achieve it? 
 
Are there any other points which you would like to raise in relation to this research?  
 
 
The response boxes could be expanded for the participant to fill as much or as little detail as they would 
like, however an example activity report was provided beforehand to give an indication as to the ideal 
level of information. The participants were all briefed on how to fill in the activity reports, in person, before 
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the fieldwork began. During this session a hard copy of the template was presented and the participants 
worked through an example activity report as a group to demonstrate what level of information was 
required.  
 
Ethical considerations 
Beyond the overarching ethical considerations outlined in the methodology section of chapter two, there 
were some additional considerations specific to the activity reports.   
 
Recording 
The main consideration was whether the participants would fill out the activity reports electronically. This 
was preferable as it meant that they could be easily emailed to the researcher across the secure West 
Yorkshire Police system and stored accordingly. Although the participants were advised not to include 
any confidential details, the information within the reports would be considered ‘restricted’ until sanitised. 
This was discussed with the participants during the planning stages and the majority were happy to type 
the information directly on to the template on Microsoft Word. However, some felt it would be more 
beneficial if they filled out a paper copy by hand. These participants were asked to scan the paper copy 
on to the computer so that it could then be emailed across the secure network in the same way, before 
shredding the paper copy. It was important that all activity reports were sent and kept on the secure 
system not only for data protection purposes, but also for consistency to assist with the monitoring of 
compliance.  
 
Automated systems were considered such as the use of online survey sites, whereby the participants 
could each log in to the site and input their activity report. However, it was decided that the process of 
manually emailing the report to the researcher would maintain a channel of communication throughout 
the fieldwork period which would encourage further discussion if needed. The security risks associated 
with using external sites were also considered to be slightly higher, given the sensitivities of the potential 
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content of the activity reports it was decided that using the secure West Yorkshire Police systems was 
the most appropriate choice.  
 
Implementation 
In some ways the activity reports were more problematic than the other methodologies used, as there 
was a level of responsibility placed on the participants to ensure that they were regularly completed. This 
was not the case with the interviews and focus groups as the participants simply had to attend a pre-
determined location for a short amount of time, similarly the observations (detailed in chapter six), did not 
require any additional effort from the participants to their normal shift.  
 
Compliance rates of participant’s filling in the activity reports was the biggest challenge. The agreement 
to let participants fill in the activity reports on a weekly basis (rather than daily) undoubtedly helped with 
compliance rates and also helped the researcher monitor the submissions and send out prompt 
reminders for any outstanding reports. Each time an activity report was received, it was saved in the 
relevant folder and recorded on a register so that any missing reports could be identified and requested 
with ease. This system worked particularly well and compliance improved with time as the participants 
got into the habit of filling them in and being chased if they had failed to do so. By the end of the fieldwork 
period there were only two missing records out of a maximum of 360, providing a compliance rate of 
99.5%. The two missing entries were due to a participant leaving the role of PCSO to become a PC. It 
was expected that over the course of 12 months some participants may need to leave the fieldwork for 
various reasons and therefore a contingency plan was put in place for this scenario. The initial participant 
was still happy for their input to be included in the research, and a different PCSO agreed to take their 
place. The interim period of three weeks for the participant to be identified and inducted into the research 
resulted in a gap of two activity reports. Incidentally the two participants were of similar demographic, 
worked the same area, and had a similar amount of experience within that role, so it was not thought that 
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the impact on the results would be that significant. However, all analysis took this change into account 
and this set of activity reports was scrutinised closely with the date of change being noted.  
 
Using the West Yorkshire Police email system to submit the activity reports proved to be a good decision. 
It not only provided a level of security that would not be found on a standard email network but also 
opened up a channel of communication between the participants and the researcher. This was used on 
multiple occasions as the participants would often send over their activity report as an attachment but 
then provide additional information or open up a discussion via the email. Examples of this included their 
thoughts on a task that they had been given or suggestions as to how they thought their activity or role 
could have been improved. With permission from the participants, some of this additional detail has been 
included in the analysis in order to provide context or explore an issue in more detail.  
 
The choice of question style also worked well for the purpose of this research. Asking participants to 
provide estimates of the amount of time they had spent in a certain area or on a certain task helped the 
participants complete the reports relatively easily: “it was actually easier to work out how much time I’d 
spent than I thought it would. It’s not precise but I think it would be pretty accurate if somebody was to 
time it with a clock”. (Participant PC3). Although a degree of approximation was required for the 
participants to provide an answer, this was not considered a limitation as the research did not require 
absolute figures on how much time was being spent in each area, as there were many other factors which 
would hinder the statistical comparisons of these responses across the case studies and roles in any 
case. What was needed were estimated time spent (in hours) on different activities, this would allow 
reasonable analysis of trends over the one year fieldwork period and also (to a lesser but still valid extent) 
comparisons across the participants in different roles and case studies. The non-participant observations 
(see chapter six) also provided a level of verification of these responses which confirmed that the 
estimations of time appeared to be accurate. One minor issue encountered during the implementation of 
this methodology related to the questioning styles chosen, was that the participants did not record their 
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time in the same consistent format. For example, some would provide their results in minutes, whilst 
others would provide it in hours, i.e. 90 minutes, or 1.5 hours. Whilst this was not a significant problem it 
did mean that additional time was needed to standardise all of the responses prior to analysis.  
 
Results and findings  
In total there were 358 activity reports produced as part of this fieldwork. The PCs and PCSOs worked 
on a three week cycle meaning that for every calendar month, each participant would work three sets of 
seven shifts. This meant that they would produce three activity reports (one for each set of shifts). 
Participants were required to fill in reports every other month (six months of the year), which resulted in 
each NPT participant filling in 18 activity reports through the fieldwork period. There were eight PCs and 
eight PCSOs taking part in the research across the four case studies and so this equated to 286 activity 
reports from NPT participants; 144 from PCs and 142 from PCSOs (two were missing as noted above). 
The PEOs worked to a Monday to Friday shift pattern and so for every active month they would provide 
four activity reports (one per week), there were three PEOs taking part in this research which meant that 
there were 72 activity reports received from Prevent participants. The differences in sample sizes across 
the roles was taken into consideration during the descriptive analysis in calculating proportions. The 
table below illustrates how the sample of activity reports was broken down.  
 
Table 11. Activity Reports – volume of submissions. 
Sample Calculation Total activity 
reports 
NPT 8 PCs fill in 3 activity reports each month over 6 months: 8x3x6=144. 144 
8 PCSOs fill in 3 activity reports each month over 6 months: 8x3x6=144. 142* 
Prevent 3 PEOs fill in 4 activity reports each month over 6 months: 3x4x6=72 72 
Total  144+142+72 = 358 358 
* 2 activity reports were missing as noted above, bringing the total of PCSO reports to 142.  
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It was important to note the smaller sample sizes for the PEOs. However, the volume of activity reports 
received was still considered substantial enough to draw valid comparisons from. After time had been 
spent standardising the responses received, it was decided that a mix of qualitative and quantitative 
analysis would be used. The first three questions were more suitable for statistical analysis of the time 
spent in certain areas or doing certain tasks, whilst the latter three allowed for some quantitative analysis 
but also provided information that would be suitable for qualitative thematic analysis.  
 
Geographical areas 
The first question asked participants to name the geographical areas which they have spent the majority 
of their time in during the set of shifts, and to provide the reason(s). The geographical areas recorded 
on the activity reports were sanitized in order to protect the identity of the participants and community 
members, instead identifying numbers were given. The purpose of this question was not to calculate 
which area was given the ‘most’ attention from the police but whether this engagement differed in 
vulnerable communities. Due to the size differences of the areas covered by each NPT, a straightforward 
comparison would not have provided a reliable indication as to the areas which were receiving the ‘most’ 
attention from the police anyway as the size of the patrol areas varied significantly across the case 
studies. For example, the NPT area covered by case study one was geographically much larger than 
that covered by case study three. This meant that case study three participants were afforded more 
patrol time in each ‘community’, so a like for like comparison based solely on time would not be possible. 
Instead the analysis was focused more on determining what proportion of the participants’ time was 
spent in areas considered to have vulnerable communities.  
 
In case study one (vulnerable to Islamic extremism) all of the participants declared that the majority of 
their time was spent in the same two areas (44% of the estimated time was spent in area 101, whilst 
36% was spent in area 102). The same pattern emerged in the analysis of the case study three activity 
reports (vulnerable to right wing extremism) where 52% of estimated time was spent in area 301 whilst 
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34% of time was spent in area 302. Perhaps the most notable point to make here is that all of these 
areas were deemed to be vulnerable to extremism based on the criteria previously outlined in this 
research, but this was not seen in case study two (vulnerable to Kurdish extremism). Participants in this 
case study estimated that the majority of their time was spent in area 201, which does have any known 
additional vulnerability to extremism than the average community in West Yorkshire, the second highest 
area for time spent (202), did however meet the criteria for vulnerability but only 22% of time was spent 
here across all case study two participants. Case study four (no specific vulnerability) could not be 
analysed in this way due to its lack of vulnerable communities. However it should be noted that there 
was less synergy in the responses across the four participants; their time was spent relatively evenly 
across eight areas within their NPT, in each of the other case studies no more than five areas were 
named throughout all of the activity reports.  
 
Two interesting points can be deduced from this; firstly that participants from case studies which police 
vulnerable communities appear to focus their attention on fewer areas, whilst participants from case 
study four (which does not cover a specific vulnerable community) appears to spread their focus much 
more widely across their area. Secondly, case studies one and three appear to align their resources 
towards policing the communities which are vulnerable to extremism, whilst case study three does not. 
In isolation, these data cannot explain the reasons for these points, further exploration is needed and it 
is important to understand the many factors which can lead to an area receiving a high police presence. 
Aside from this analysis, the key reasons for increased police attention on a specific area are; a higher 
police to population ratio, higher levels of demand such as crime, and higher levels of vulnerability (not 
just to extremism). When the areas provided in the activity reports were compared against these three 
criteria (using open source data on police staff numbers, census data, and recorded crime levels), it 
became clear that the focus of case study one and three on the communities vulnerable to extremism 
could simply be due to coincidence in that these were also the areas with a higher police to population 
ratio and higher crime levels. Similarly area 201 which received the most attention from participants in 
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case study two (but was not considered vulnerable) did have the highest crime rates than anywhere 
else in their area. This suggests that although participants from these case studies were generally 
spending a higher proportion of their time policing the vulnerable areas than the non-vulnerable areas, 
this may not be due to intentional tasking in relation to the vulnerability and is related to general policing 
demands. The fact that participants in case study four (no specific vulnerability) named more areas in 
their activity reports than those in the other case studies could also be due to the same reasons. This 
case study area is of a similar size with regards to population to case study two, but is spread over a 
wider geographical area, the police to population ratio is also much lower in case study four meaning 
that the participants simply cannot focus their efforts more on certain areas and must spread themselves 
more widely. The recorded crime levels also contribute to this in that there are not clear crime hotspots 
in this case study to the same extent than is seen across the other three areas. This again compounds 
the conclusion that although efforts seem to be focused on communities of vulnerability, the vulnerability 
itself is not the driving factor for this.  
 
Another element of the analysis was to compare the time spent in each area across the roles of the 
participants in each case study area. This analysis could only be carried out across case studies one, 
two and three, as case study four did not have a PEO working within it, however two key findings 
emerged.  
 
Firstly, PEOs spend a higher proportion of their time in areas considered to be vulnerable than PCs and 
PCSOs. Although this would be a logical assumption based on the fact that PEOs are specialist roles 
for the purpose of engagement within communities vulnerable to extremism whereas PCs and PCSOs 
have much more general role profiles and are required to respond to a varied range of police duties 
across all communities. Crucially, the analysis of these data supported the assumption, in that the 
average time that PEOs spent in the areas of vulnerability was considerably higher than their NPT 
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counter parts; with an average of 150 minutes per shift for PEOs compared to an average of 80 minutes 
for PCs and PCSOs.  
 
Secondly, there was a higher level of consistency in responses from PEOs pointing to a more structured 
approach to ‘patrol based engagement’. Although all participants named the same areas in their case 
studies when asked where they spent the majority of their time, this was much more constant across 
the PEO participants than the PCs and PCSOs. This was calculated by taking the most common 
geographical area noted for each role in each case study and identifying the range (in minutes) that they 
spent there per shift across the year.  Throughout the 12 month fieldwork period, the PEOs responses 
for the area that they spent the most time in only fluctuated by 25 minutes per shift, from an average 
range of between 140 and 165 minutes. Alternatively the average time that PCs and PCSOs spent in 
their most commonly patrolled area ranged from 35 to 150 minutes, a fluctuation of 115 minutes. Further 
information provided by the participants suggested that this was largely due to the fact that PEOs are 
able to plan their engagement and patrols out more proactively than NPT participants who are often 
required to respond to incidents and calls as they occur. Interestingly these averages were analysed in 
a time series across the 12 month period and showed that there was no clear pattern or 
increasing/decreasing trend of statistical significance. Importantly, this was apparent for the amount of 
time spent in the different geographical areas, but not for the amount of time spent engaging with 
communities. Analysis of question three which asked how much time was dedicated solely to 
engagement (discussed later), showed that there was a decreasing trend over the 12 month period 
across all roles. This apparent contradiction in results showed that although the amount of time 
participants spent in the specific geographical areas of need did not seem to reduce, the amount spent 
solely on engagement within these areas did. This suggested that the NPT participants were less able 
to be proactive as the year went on, due to the increasing need to respond to calls and general policing 
demands, whilst the change to PEOs activity was less visible.   
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Activities and duties 
The second and third question in the activity reports alluded to differences according to role and case 
study area, but also showed clear changes over time. Question two asked participants to approximate 
how much of their time had been spent dealing with station duties i.e. paper work, custody, submitting 
intelligence etc. For clarity, this was simplified through the examples and briefing sessions, by firstly 
asking how much time had been spent in the police station per shift, followed by estimates as to what 
this time was spent doing. A basic comparison across roles showed that PCs spent on average more 
time in the police station than their PCSO and PEO counter parts; PCs averaged 150 minutes per shift 
in the police station, whilst PEOs averaged 110 minutes, and PCSOs averaged 95 minutes. The vast 
majority of PCs’ ‘station time’ was spent recording crimes onto the police systems. It was suggested by 
multiple participants that this process was too time consuming and detracted them from being out in the 
community: “We spend far too much time sat at a computer putting crimes on, obviously this is important 
but it’s not what the public want to see us spending our time doing” (Participant 1B). Whilst West 
Yorkshire Police has made changes to how crimes are recorded since this fieldwork to make the process 
more efficient (as discussed later), it was clearly a factor in why PCs spent less time out in communities 
than colleagues in other roles. Whilst PEOs and PCSOs would be required to record crimes in the same 
way as PCs, the nature of their roles meant that this was a less frequent occurrence. Of the time that 
PEOs and PCSOs in the station, the majority of this time was spent submitting intelligence reports and 
searching the police systems for information. The similarity in daily activities of these two roles was clear 
from the analysis of the activity reports, thematic analysis also suggested that PCSOs and PEOs carried 
out more proactive functions than PCs. Whilst both were tasked to complete various duties throughout 
their shifts, these often related to problem solving, engagement and intelligence building, whilst the 
activities carried out by the PCs were focused much more on reacting to calls for service, or following 
up on enquiries from previous shifts. The differing tasking processes between the NPT and Prevent 
roles clearly has an impact on the level and style of engagement that different participants are able to 
carry out within communities, suggesting that if NPTs were to become more involved in the delivery of 
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Prevent, fundamental changes would need to be made to the way in which the two roles are utilised by 
West Yorkshire Police.  
 
Interestingly, the participants in case studies one and two (regardless of role) spent a higher proportion 
of their time within the police station than participants in case studies three and four. This difference in 
time was significant for the PCSOs, but not for the PEOs or PCs. There are numerous potential reasons 
for this difference across areas; the type of crime and community safety issues in each case study, the 
ratio of police staff to members of the public, the tasking priorities of the supervising staff all could be 
considered factors. However, further investigation alluded to a much more straightforward reason; the 
location of the police station. In case study one and two the police station was located quite centrally to 
the entire ‘beat area’, whilst in three and four it was further away from the main patrol areas. This 
essentially meant that it was more convenient for participants from case study one and two to travel 
back to the police station from their patrol areas, and as a result the time that they spent there increased.  
 
Another factor which could have contributed in a similar way was that these two case studies also had 
a higher vehicle to staff ratio meaning that they could travel back to the station quicker and easier than 
their colleagues in other areas who would have had to walk or arrange lifts. Of course, this ease of 
transport also meant that the participants in case studies one and two could have also travelled out to 
their beat area easier thus spending less time in the police station. However, further exploration (and 
observations) showed that in practice, these participants would make numerous shorter trips to the 
police station throughout their shifts, whereas their colleagues in case studies three and four would 
spend a longer period of time in the station at the start and end of their shifts, and would try and avoid 
returning where possible. The impact of this on the time spent engaging with communities across the 
case studies was assessed through question three.  
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Question three asked participants to estimate the amount of time that had been dedicated solely to 
engagement, (and asked for basic details to be provided). The results from this question affirm what 
was found above in that PCSOs and PEOs on average spent more time carrying out engagement 
activities than PCs. On average PEOs claimed to spend 205 minutes per shift dedicated solely to 
engaging with the public or partners, whilst PCSOs spent around 140, and PCs averaged just 35 minutes 
per shift. The difference across the roles is quite stark and provided the most varied time ranges from 
the analysis of all of the questions. It is important to note though, that although the PCs declared that 
they only spent around 35 minutes per shift dedicated solely to engagement, the time that they spent in 
contact with members of the public and partners was higher. It was important that the time spent in 
contact with the public for general policing reasons, i.e. enquiries, arrests, crime prevention patrols, was 
differentiated from the time spent intentionally engaging with communities but can have a positive impact 
on community cohesion nonetheless.  
 
As previously noted, case studies one and two had more centrally located police stations which 
contributed to the participants from these areas spending more time in the police station. It was 
interesting to note that participants in these areas also spent less time engaging with the public on 
average. Although this difference was not deemed significant it is still an important finding. It would 
appear that the more frequent trips back and forth between the police station left them with shorter 
blocks of time to dedicate to other tasks such as engagement. This was perhaps made unintentionally 
evident by the way that these participants provided their estimates; participants from case studies one 
and two, clearly recorded their time entries on the activity reports in multiple sections, whilst those in 
case studies three and four generally made only one or two entries for the whole shift, as demonstrated 
below: 
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Extract answer from participant 2D (PCSO):  
Approximately what proportion of your time have you been able to dedicate solely to engagement with 
the public and/or partners? Please provide details of times, agencies / community contacts and reasons 
for engagement.  
15 minutes with takeaway owner in *location* regarding previous ASB and hate crimes.  
10 minutes at sheltered housing.  
40 minutes at *named* primary school.  
30 in market hall 
 
Extract answer from participant 4C (PCSO):  
Approximately what proportion of your time have you been able to dedicate solely to engagement with 
the public and/or partners? Please provide details of times, agencies / community contacts and reasons 
for engagement.  
90 minutes at *named* high school – spent time in assembly, then patrolled outside talking to parents/students.  
45 minutes at *named* youth boxing club.  
 
This could of course be due to the styles of writing across individuals or the briefing provided to the 
participants beforehand. However, the examples given in the briefing and throughout the fieldwork were 
consistent for all participants, and discussions in the initial briefing were very similar, suggesting that 
this could be more than just coincidence. Although this cannot be confirmed, it adds weight to the 
suggestion that the location of the police station impacted on the styles of engagement across these 
case study areas. It would appear that participants in case studies one and two engaged more widely 
but for shorter periods of time than those in case studies three and four. 
 
Another pertinent finding from the analysis of this question was that in all roles across all case study 
areas, the average time spent engaging with the public or partners decreased over time. The fieldwork 
spanned a 12 month period from April 2014 to March 2015 with participants providing activity reports 
every other month. The first month of activity reports was May 2014 (April was left free for interviews to 
take place), and the last month of activity reports was March 2015 when these are compared the 
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difference is notable. The average time spent engaging across all roles for all case studies in May 2014 
was 115 minutes per shift, in March 2015 this was just 70 minutes, averaging a daily reduction of 45 
minutes of engagement per participant, with the largest reductions being seen in the NPT roles. To 
ensure that this change was not simply due to an anomaly on either of the two months in question or 
seasonal changes, the average time spent engaging each month throughout the year was calculated 
and broken down into a time series, the total from the first six months was then compared with the last 
six month, the deviation was then calculated. The results from this further analysis confirmed a 
decreasing trend over the 12 month fieldwork period with regards to the time that participants spent 
engaging with the public or partners. Although the data provided through the activity reports cannot 
provide the reasons for this trend, this finding does support the claims of the participants who were 
interviewed, all of whom alluded to increasing pressures being placed on them which is limiting the time 
available for proactive engagement. To further support this, there was a notable increase in the number 
of statements made by participants in the activity reports regarding their lack of time spent on 
engagement as the year went on;  
“Not enough time, only about 20 minutes each day at best.” (Participant PC1) 
 
“…This totals about an hour a day, I’m supposed to be a community support officer, this is 
nothing compared to when I started in the job” (Participant PCSO3).  
 
Although the research did not initially set out to discuss the impacts of changing policing pressures on 
its ability to engage with communities it is a theme which has occurred through every element of 
fieldwork and one that has an impact on two of the three of the research aims. Research question two 
asks what the current function of NPTs within the Prevent Strategy is, and question three seeks to 
understand whether NPTs should or could be utilised more within the delivery of Prevent. It is clear that 
the function of NPTs within community engagement alone, let alone Prevent based engagement, 
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changed markedly even during the fieldwork period, to the point that it would be more challenging for 
West Yorkshire Police to utilise NPTs more within the delivery of Prevent if it decided to do so.  
 
Cohesion and extremism 
The fourth and fifth question of the activity reports asked participants to describe any incidents relating 
to community disharmony or extremism that have occurred during their shifts. It was important that these 
questions captured more than just incidents or events that the participant was directly involved in, and 
included any information that they had become aware of. This would give a broader understanding of 
what their role was in such scenarios in comparison to their colleagues, even if this role was minor.  
 
Question four focused on community disharmony and tensions and asks the participant to not only 
describe the issue, but what steps were taken to resolve it. There were two clear differences in the 
responses between PEOs and NPT staff to this question. Firstly, that the PEO responses were much 
more detailed than those provided by PCs and PCSOs in that they not only included more examples of 
community disharmony but also provided more context and detail of the incident suggesting a higher 
level of understanding of the issue at hand. The three extracts below are fairly typical of the wider 
responses and illustrate this disparity with the extract from the PC participant consisting of basic details 
and totalling just 50 words compared to the PEO’s much fuller account of around 400 words and much 
greater context.  
 
Participant PC1A 
Are you aware of any issues relating to community disharmony or tensions which have arisen during 
this set? Please provide basic details of the issue and steps taken. 
Not really, there’s been some falling out amongst the Bangladeshi community at **location** and I know that 
**named PCSO** was dealing with it. I couldn’t tell you what the problem was without asking but I think they’re 
having a PACT meeting (Police And Communities Together) with the Sergeant next week.  
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Participant PCSO2C 
Are you aware of any issues relating to community disharmony or tensions which have arisen during 
this set? Please provide basic details of the issue and steps taken. 
We’re getting quite a lot of problems on **named street** because the council keep housing people with drink 
and drug problems in the flats there but it’s right opposite some sheltered housing with elderly residents and 
vulnerable people. Last week a vulnerable guy (I think he has mental health problems) from the sheltered 
housing went over and put a brick through one of the flat windows because they were being too loud. Council 
are aware of it but haven’t been able to do anything yet, we can keep trying to mediate but until people get 
moved it isn’t going to fix it.  
 
PEO 3 
Are you aware of any issues relating to community disharmony or tensions which have arisen during 
this set? Please provide basic details of the issue and steps taken. 
On Monday I visited **named Mosque,** at the weekend, somebody had drawn anti-Islamic graffiti on two 
Mosques in **location (not in case study area)** and they were worried about the same happening here. Some 
of the younger men were riled up about it and the elders had been trying to stop them from retaliating. Things 
are quite tense at the moment, I reassured them that I would get an update from the officers dealing with **other 
Mosque** to see if they’ve made any progress. We talked a bit about crime prevention but we were more 
concentrating on trying to build bridges between the youths in different communities.  
 
Wednesday, I attended the high school. The schools liaison officer asked me to go up because they’ve had 
some fights between white and Asian students recently. I spoke with the Deputy Head for a while to get an idea 
of the problem. It seems more like boys being boys just wanting an excuse to fight more than anything, but 
they’re using race as a way of picking sides and it’s clearly escalating. Deputy said the school wanted to come 
down hard on the kids involved, (two had already been expelled), but this could be making it worse as the two 
expelled were both white. We discussed some other options and I offered to either talk to the classes myself or 
we could get an IP (Intervention Provider) to come in. We decided that the Deputy would keep expelling any 
student who was violent as a bit of a zero tolerance policy, but that they would organise a football tournament for 
the kids where the teams had to be mixed race. We did this in a school in **other area** once and it worked 
really well.  
 
There’s also worries amongst some of the Asian population that the EDL are coming to **town centre** to do a 
march. Some people are scared but most just don’t want their kids getting involved and going down to fight. I 
made some enquiries and the march isn’t confirmed yet, but we discussed options for diverting youths away 
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from the town on that day to keep them out of trouble. We did this last year and the Mosque took a big group of 
kids to a cricket match on the same day which took them out of the equation.  
 
These are just three extracts from the activity reports but give an indication as to the type of responses 
being received. To demonstrate this further, the number of issues raised in each response was counted 
and averaged out across the participants in each role. On average PCs raised 0.7 issues per activity 
report (this covers 7 days), PCSOs averaged 2.2 per activity report, and PEOs averaged 3.6 issues per 
five day shift set. Out of the 144 activity reports completed by PCs, 82 were either blank for this question 
or contained a ‘null’ answer such as the below examples, whilst only 22 of the PCSO reports were blank 
and none of the PEOs were.  
Examples of ‘null’ answers:  
“Nothing that I know of, but sure there are.” (Participant PC1B) 
“Not aware of any specific incidents.” (Participant PC4A) 
“Most probably but I’ve hardly been on patrol this week as dealing with workload 
enquiries.” (Participant PC2A).  
 
Table 12. Activity reports results – community cohesions issues.  
Participant 
role 
Average number of issues 
raised per report 
Number of blank 
responses 
PC 0.7 82 of 144 
PCSO 2.2 22 of 142 
PEO 3.6 0 of 72 
 
The number of null answers for PCs were compared across the case studies. There was a higher 
proportion of null answers for PCs in case study two (vulnerable to Kurdish extremism) than any other, 
but although it was an outlier, the difference was not quite significant. 
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The second clear difference noted across these activity reports in relation to role was that the responses 
from the PEOs had a heavy focus on cohesion issues related to race and religion, whereas the 
responses given by NPT staff were broader. All of the issues recorded in the activity reports were coded 
and later analysed, with categories including race related, religious, age related, economic/class, sub-
culture, etc. Across all responses, race and religious cohesion were the most common issues, however 
the proportion of responses from PEOs which fell into this category was significantly higher than in the 
PCs and PCSO responses; 82% compared to 65% and 69% respectively. This could simply be that 
PEOs are a specialist role intended to work closely with communities vulnerable to extremism and the 
case studies in question have a focus on religious or race based extremism, making it likely that they 
would, in turn, be focused on these community issues. It is however important to note the differences in 
samples for these responses, there were less activity reports provided by the PEOs (as there were only 
three PEO participants), however the PEOs raised more issues than the NPT staff which increased the 
sample size for issues raised in these responses. This essentially allowed for a more equal comparison 
of sample volumes, but it remains that all the issues raised by the PEOs were made by only three 
participants. This is important as it could also be a factor in why there was a level of synergy across the 
PEO responses (with regards to a focus on race and religious cohesion) that was not seen across the 
NPT responses.  
 
The fifth question of this activity reports is worded in a similar way to question four but asks participants 
to describe whether any communities, individuals or groups had come to their attention for reasons 
relating to extremism. Similar trends were seen in the way that this question was answered across the 
roles as noted above, in that PEOs were clearly more aware of issues relating to extremism than their 
NPT counter parts. Perhaps more interestingly though, was the difference across the case study areas. 
Whilst there was no apparent difference in how PEOs across case study areas responded, there 
appeared to be a higher level of awareness of extremism across NPT staff in case study two than any 
other area. The answers from PCs and PCSOs to this question were markedly more informed, with 
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details being provided of a variety of extremism related issues. NPT participants’ responses from this 
case study more closely mirrored the sort of information provided in the PEO’s responses. Interestingly, 
this does support one of the findings from the interviews which was that there are inconsistent integration 
practices across the case studies between Prevent and NPT staff. Furthermore, when asked (during the 
interview) how many times PEOs attend NPT briefings, case study two gave the highest frequency, 
stating that they tried to attend around three a week. This was not as high in other case study areas with 
the others only attending once or twice a month. This could be one reason for the more informed 
responses from NPT staff as they will be receiving more regular information from their PEOs in relation 
to extremist issues in their local area, consequently, the NPT staff were more aware and comfortable in 
dealing with issues when they arose. It should however be noted that although responses from case 
study two were better informed with regards to the threats and vulnerability of extremism in their local 
area, there were only three references to Kurdish extremism out of 72 activity reports completed by NPT 
participants from this area, and all of these came from the same participant PCSO2C. Given that there 
was a clear and identifiable vulnerability to Kurdish extremism in that area it is noteworthy that the 
awareness of this vulnerability across NPT participants was so low, for comparison, the PEO participant 
responses mentioned Kurdish extremism in their responses nine times (in 24 activity reports) illustrating 
that the knowledge and awareness of this vulnerability was there, but it was maybe not reaching the 
NPT participants.  
 
One consistent theme in how the participants responded to this question across the case study areas 
related to the actions taken. Where participants had said that they had been aware of something relating 
to extremism, they were asked to briefly outline the steps they took. Some form of action was taken in 
response to 82% of the issues raised by NPT staff, including making a referral, submitting intelligence 
reports, asking for advice, personally resolving the issue for example. Regardless of case study area, 
the most common action taken by NPT participants in relation to extremist related tasks was to submit 
an intelligence report. This accounted for 65% of the actions taken (averaging 3.4 intelligence reports 
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being submitted by NPT participants per shift set). This did not differ substantially across case studies 
with the maximum range of variation being just 4%. Interestingly the second most common action taken 
was to seek advice from a PEO or the Counter Terrorism Unit, via phone call, in person, or email, 
however this only accounted for 11% of the total number of actions taken. On occasion, participants 
offered their rationale for taking said action; although this was ad-hoc and could not be analysed in a 
statistically significant way, the statements made did point to a higher level of confidence and comfort 
amongst the NPT participants in submitting an intelligence report via the police systems than making a 
seeking out an individual to ask for advice. This fits into suggestions made by participants during the 
interviews around the need for better training for NPT staff to improve understanding and confidence 
should they be required to take a greater role in the delivery of the Prevent Strategy.  
 
The final point to make in relation to how the participants responded to question five was the clear 
change at a point in time. The responses to this question were also counted and coded, then plotted on 
a graph over time. There was a clear increase in the volume of information provided from September 
2014 onwards. In the months before this, the overall number of ‘incidents’ recorded by participants 
across all four case studies averaged at 18.2 per shift set, September’s volume jumped to 31.0, and the 
following months averaged at 27.5. This was explored further and a range of contributing factors were 
considered, including: training programmes, change in policy, events in the media, to name a few. It 
became apparent that the most likely reason for this increase from September onwards was the change 
in the UK terrorism threat level which increased from SUBSTANTIAL to SEVERE on August 29 th in 
response to international events, the Syrian war, and the rise of the group then commonly known as IS 
(Anderson, 2015). Whilst the change in threat level alone was likely to have an impact on participants’ 
awareness and focus on extremism, it is important to acknowledge the response from the wider West 
Yorkshire Police organisation. West Yorkshire Police increased their internal communications messages 
in relation to the threat level and what was expected of officers and staff across by way of force-wide 
emails, intranet adverts and posters across police buildings. This was particularly prominent in the 
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weeks immediately after the threat level was changed, but has continued since. Incidentally, West 
Yorkshire Police also made changes to their training programme to include more information on 
extremism, however, only two of the participants received this additional training during the fieldwork 
period. There was a clear rise in the volume of information included in their activity reports following this 
training, however, the samples were too small to draw any statistically sound conclusions.  
 
The sixth and last main question of the activity reports asked participants whether they been tasked with 
any community engagement or intelligence gathering this set, if so by whom, and what was the task. 
The main purpose of this question was to understand any differences in the tasking processes between 
PEOs and NPT staff. PEOs were established to be the integral link between neighbourhood and Prevent 
policing teams and are described as being Prevent staff which are embedded within NPTs. Preliminary 
enquiries for this research alluded to potential confusion and conflict in the way that PEOs were tasked. 
The suggestion was that PEOs had two chains of command, the first stemming from the NECTU and 
via their CCO (Community Contact Officer), and the second being the Sergeant of the NPT in which 
they are embedded.  
 
The responses to this question appeared to support this claim. The vast majority (87%) of tasking given 
to the NPT participants came directly from their Sergeant or local policing tasking (which has overall 
sight of NPT and patrol tasking in each district), whereas the tasking given to the PEOs came from 
multiple sources including NPT lines and the NECTU. Perhaps owing to their differing roles, only a very 
small proportion of the engagement or intelligence tasking given to NPT participants appeared to be 
related to extremism (although it was much harder to differentiate this with community engagement 
tasking than intelligence tasking). Alternatively, the majority of the PEO tasking related to identifying or 
engaging with community members who could be vulnerable to extremism. This in itself is not particularly 
noteworthy but when the tasking of the PEOs is looked at in more detail, there are some interesting 
findings. Generally speaking the PEOs would be tasked with developing intelligence on a particular 
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subject of interest to NECTU via their CCO, or engaging with a community group or individual for the 
purposes of building relations and thus resilience. On average the PEOs recorded six such tasks per 
activity report, and throughout the 12 months fieldwork period 58% of the tasks given were from ‘Prevent 
lines’, 22% were tasked through ‘local policing lines’. Coding of the responses also provided three more 
categories; other department (such as safeguarding, or serious organised crime 3%), origin not 
disclosed 3%, and duplicate tasking 14%. This last category is perhaps the most relevant to this 
research; these tasks were ones that had been given to the PEO by both prevent lines, and local policing 
lines. This duplication of tasking, whilst not particularly problematic for the PEO, does pose questions 
about the efficiency and integration of the two chains of command. PEOs would often make comments 
relating to this alluding to a lack of communication between their respective line managers;  
 
“I was tasked to attend **named community group**, by **CCO** to understand 
tensions there and establish names of organisers. I was tasked the next day by the 
**NPT Sergeant**, to do the exact same, wording was identical too. They have both 
clearly been sent the same task and have both just passed straight to me.” (Participant 
PEO1).  
 
14% of the tasks given to PEOs over the course of the 12 month fieldwork were categorised as duplicate 
tasks. This in itself is not an issue, however, it would suggest that checks need to be put in place to ensure 
that the management of the wider enquiries that these tasks relate to is clear, if not there is a very real 
risk that two teams are working in isolation on the same ‘operation’ but potentially to different ends. This 
showed that there is a level of commitment within West Yorkshire Police to integrate the work of Prevent 
teams with Neighbourhood policing, but that in practice the boundaries of shared responsibility may not 
be clear. If NPTs were to become more involved in the delivery of Prevent, this ‘separation’ or indeed 
assimilation of roles would need be clearly addressed, starting with the coordination of tasking and the 
chain of command. 
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Another issue which became apparent pertaining to the command lines of the PEOs, was that often some 
of the tasks given by the NPT lines and Prevent lines contradicted. There were two potential levels of 
contradiction noted in the thematic analysis of responses, firstly an inadvertent conflict based on demand, 
secondly a direct contradiction around specific tasks. The first is perhaps less concerning and could be 
resolved in a similar way to the majority of resourcing and demand issues placed on West Yorkshire 
Police; it relates to when a PEO has been tasked to carry out and enquiry by the Prevent lines but has 
then been diverted away by the NPT Sergeant who needs them to respond to a more ‘urgent’ general 
policing duty. Whilst it is difficult to ascertain reliable figures on how often this happened from the activity 
reports, it was a relatively common statement made by the PEO participants: 
 
“I was tasked to attend **named community centre** to give out safety information around 
cyber-crime, but was diverted away on each occasion to support NPT colleagues as 
officers have been single crewed this week due to staff sickness.” (Participant PEO2). 
 
Preliminary enquiries for this research made with senior members of West Yorkshire Police suggested 
that this sort of abstraction of PEO staff to NPT functions should not happen, as they are principally there 
as Prevent embed to improve integration and not as an additional NPT officer. However discussions with 
the Sergeants and Inspectors of the case study area, indicated that whilst they understood this to be the 
ideal scenario, it was not a reasonable ambition given the pressures placed on NPTs at present.  
 
“PEOs are specialist officers, with a very specific purpose, but like every other officer with 
a warrant card, first and foremost they are a police officer. If I need an extra officer to help 
out at an incident and they’re the only one around, I’m going to have to send them.” 
(Participant 5D, NPT Sergeant)  
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The reasons for this inadvertent contradiction in tasking appear to be clear and seem to be an 
organisation wide issue and not just limited to PEOs. This does though play in to earlier findings that 
pressures placed on West Yorkshire Police to manage demand are hindering their ability to engage with 
communities.  
 
The second potentially more serious problem is that on multiple occasions PEOs were given two 
opposing tasks. Whist this was less frequent, statements were made by PEOs regarding this conflict 
which poses real issues in relation to the chain of command.  
 
“Sergeant, asked me to attend **named pub** to find out details about recent disorder, 
(had been reports of right-wing meets there which have ended in violence following football 
matches being shown there). I mentioned this in passing to CCO, who told me not to go 
there as sensitive enquiries are ongoing.” (Participant PEO3).  
 
Whilst this may have simply been resolved by a conversation between the parties involved, perhaps the 
most concerning element is that the PEO appeared to only find out there was a potential conflict through 
a casual conversation with the CCO. Had they not have had this discussion, the PEO could have 
interrupted wider work simply by following orders from their supervisor. This level of conflict did not appear 
frequently in the activity reports but is important to note nonetheless. It points to a potential lack of 
communication between two chains of command. It suggests that either changes need to be made to 
clarify the tasking and supervision of PEOs to just one line, or that there needs to be stronger joint 
oversight of the existing system of tasking.  
 
Summary  
The activity reports provided a vast amount of data relevant to the research aims, this chapter simply 
picks out the most pertinent findings. The volume and style of the information provided allowed for both 
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qualitative and quantitative analysis on a scale which was not available from the other methodologies. 
The findings above provide an overview of the information provided against each of the questions in the 
activity report. Wider thematic analysis showed that the findings can be categorised into two broad 
themes; engagement within communities, and the practicalities of delivering Prevent across different 
roles. 
 
Engagement within communities 
Analysis of the 358 activity reports completed showed that whilst engagement levels did not differ 
significantly across the case study areas, they did across roles. PCs generally had very little time to 
engage with communities in comparison to PCSOs and PEOs. This was largely due to the broad range 
of responsibilities placed on PCs which resulted in them spending more time in police stations and 
carrying out non-public facing duties. PCSOs often commented that they too did not get to spend as much 
time within communities as they would like or have done in previous years. This points to the earlier 
finding of this research, that neighbourhood policing is becoming increasingly reactive due to increasing 
demands being placed on them. Interestingly although levels of engagement did not vary across case 
study area, the engagement practices did. This was thought to be a consequence of the location of the 
police station with participants based in centrally located police stations engaging with a wider range of 
communities but for shorter lengths of time, than participants who were based in non-central police 
stations. Whilst this research cannot conclusively point to which is the better practice, the police station 
location clearly has an impact on how communities are engaged with, whether this is for general 
engagement purposes or for Prevent related engagement.  
 
Delivery of Prevent across roles 
A key finding from these activity reports was that NPT participants were not well informed of the cohesion 
issues or matters relating to extremism in their local areas. Whilst there was some variation in this across 
the case study areas pointing to the benefits of more regular briefings between PEOs and NPTs, as a 
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whole the level of awareness appeared to be low. On a similar note, the vast majority of actions taken by 
NPT participants in relation to Prevent matters was to submit an intelligence report. Whilst this is not 
necessarily an issue and could in fact be what this wider research concludes is the ideal role for NPT staff 
within the delivery of Prevent, it does suggest a lack of confidence, capability or capacity amongst NPT 
participants to deal with such issues personally. The activity reports did show a clear spike in awareness 
and focus following the increase in UK threat level from international terrorism on August 29th 2014. This 
is interesting and would be worthy of further exploration to confirm whether the efforts put into improving 
communications and training by West Yorkshire Police around the threat level change was the driving 
factor in this increase. The final and perhaps most concerning finding presented in this chapter related to 
the dual chain of command over PEOs. Analysis of the activity reports showed that whilst the theory 
behind the embedding of PEOs in NPTs may be strong, in practice it poses numerous problems for the 
tasking and coordination of the PEO work. At best it results in inefficiencies between two teams but at 
worst it could lead to conflicting work streams which could have a very real impact on the delivery of 
Prevent and local policing in these vulnerable communities. This inherent conflict between the differing 
policing roles would need to be addressed should West Yorkshire Police choose to further integrate 
Prevent policing within NPTs or increase the involvement that NPTs have within the delivery of the 
Prevent Strategy.  
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Chapter six  
Observations of participants 
 
The final method of data collection used in this thesis was observation of the Tier One participants (PCs, 
PCSOs and PEOs) as they conducted their roles. Whilst the semi-structured interviews and activity 
reports provided a wealth of data regarding the role and experiences of the Tier One participants, it was 
important to verify this information first hand. Observations are often used in social research to gather 
information around how subjects behave in a set environment: “…observation methods attempt to study 
individuals without interfering with their behaviour if possible. The focus is upon what can be learnt from 
individuals in their own habitat acting normally" (Brewer, 2008, p.4). It was decided that observing the 
Tier One participants on a typical shift would help to supplement the existing findings around the research 
aims, particularly the exploration of the current role of NPTs within the delivery of Prevent, and the 
strengths and weaknesses of that delivery. It is important to note that whilst observations were chosen 
as part of this mixed methodological approach to help verify earlier findings and provide greater depth of 
understanding, they were not used to gather any additional data sets for quantitative analysis.  
 
Despite not being used to produce primary data, there are multiple benefits of using observation as part 
of a mixed methodological approach. The focus groups, interviews and activity reports used in this 
research generated a wealth of information to inform discussions around the three main research aims. 
However it was felt that observation of the Tier One participants would add further value and insight which 
could not have been gained without seeing the participants on duty as PCs, PCSOs and PEOs. 
“Observation fosters an in depth and rich understanding of a phenomenon, situation and/or setting and 
the behaviour of the participants in that setting, it is an essential part of gaining an understanding of 
naturalistic settings and its members' ways of seeing.” (Crabtree & Cohen, 2008, p.2).  
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The use of observations also compliments other methods; unlike interviews and activity reports, which 
ask clear questions within boundaries determined by the information that the researcher is seeking, the 
activity witnessed within the observation session is not controlled by the researcher in the same manner 
and, therefore, can result in a broader understanding of the issues that the researcher may not have 
expected: “…it provides opportunities for viewing or participating in unscheduled events”. (DeWalt & 
DeWalt, 2002, p.8). It was decided that including observations as part of the mixed methodological 
approach to this research would provide the additional opportunity for the researcher to ascertain further 
information which may be useful to the discussion.    
 
Crucially, observations allow the researcher to witness activities and events first hand as opposed to 
many other methodologies which rely on the accounts of others. “A key advantage of conducting 
observations is that you can observe what people actually do or say, rather than what they say they do” 
(Sadik, 2013, p.1). There are many reasons why a participant’s account of an event may differ from the 
reality: intentional dishonesty, perception, failing memory, to name a few.  Observations allow the 
researcher the opportunity to view a situation in real time and keep a record based on their own 
interpretation. This could be considered a benefit of this methodology, however the researcher must 
always be aware of the influence that their subjective interpretation can have on the findings. 
 
An additional advantage of observations in social research is that they do not rely on the willingness of 
participants to offer information. In questionnaires or interviews, the data captured is limited by the level 
of information that the participant wants to (or is able) to provide.  
“Often some respondents do not like to speak about themselves to an outsider. Some 
people do not have time or required skill to provide important information to the 
researcher. Although observation cannot always overcome such problems, still 
relatively speaking it requires less active co-operation and willingness of respondents.” 
(Choudhary, 2017, p.8).  
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The topic of this research (radicalisation and policing of vulnerable communities) is somewhat sensitive, 
for this reason it is possible that the participants’ willingness to offer full and honest information could be 
hindered by the fear of repercussion or judgement, even though their identity will remain anonymous. 
Specifically in relation to police, Spano noted in his research on police culture that often police officers 
and staff are cautious of the judgement of others and thus do not always answer openly; “police are 
suspicious of outsiders and are not accustomed to getting their decisions scrutinized” (Spano, 2007, 
p.453). Assuming this is correct, it suggests limitations in the level of information that would be provided 
by the Tier One participants through formal interviews and to a lesser extent observations. Consequently, 
efforts were made during the preparation stage of the fieldwork to build up trust between the researcher 
and participants. Due largely to the more informal and passive style of observations, it was decided that 
they would enable the researcher to capture information beyond what the participants were prepared to 
offer in the interviews.  
 
Whilst there are many advantages to utilising observations within this research (some of which have been 
highlighted above), there are also disadvantages which the researcher had to consider when planning 
the fieldwork. Perhaps the most significant limitation of observations for this type of study is that the 
findings are susceptible to observer bias. As with any testimony or account of an event, there are factors 
which can cause variations or inaccuracies. Ultimately, the record of an observation session is 
determined by the observer and what they have interpreted, making it a subjective account. There are 
steps that can be taken to minimise this, often referred to as ‘impression management’, however, it is 
important to acknowledge that the record is no more than the observers perception of what happened 
when assessing the validity of any findings.  
 
Another key consideration for researchers carrying out observations is the impact that being observed 
has on the behaviour of those being observed. This is commonly known as the Hawthorne effect, first 
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coined by French (1953) in his study of social experiments. The fundamental principle is that people act 
differently when they know that they are being watched: “The term is often used to suggest that individuals 
may change their behaviour due to the attention they are receiving from researchers rather than because 
of any manipulation of independent variables” (Cherry, 2017, p.1). Although the legitimacy of the 
Hawthorne Effect has been challenged (see Yunker, 1993), it is crucial for any researcher to take into 
consideration the potential impact that their research has on the topic matter or participants being studied. 
 
One disadvantage of observations, which is pertinent to this research, is that the observation does not 
always help build an understanding of why certain behaviours occur. Observations can provide a full 
description of an event or situation but rarely provide the opportunity for the observer to explore an issue 
further or identify causal factors which emanate outside of the scenario being observed. With other 
methods available - such as interviews or focus groups, the researcher can react to an event and ask 
follow up questions to explore answers in more detail. This sort of interaction with the participant during 
an observation session would likely alter the situation and thus could hinder the validity of the findings. 
There are various approaches available which allow for different levels of observer involvement 
(discussed later), however, generally speaking it would not be appropriate to interfere or direct the 
situation being observed around the needs of the research. As the main purpose of the observations for 
this research was to validate previous findings, rather than generate primary data, this was not perceived 
to be a significant weakness, but was something that was considered when the methods were being 
chosen for the fieldwork.  
 
Format of observations  
Observations can take many forms, the first task was to decide on the most suitable format for this 
element of the research. Three defining features of observations are: whether they include participant 
involvement, whether they are overt or covert, and whether they are structured or unstructured. This 
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chapter outlines the decisions made, planning and ethical considerations and the outcome of their 
implementation.   
 
Participant or non-participant observation 
Observations for the purpose of social research are often split into two distinct categories, participant 
observations and non-participant observations, for a wider discussion of the distinction between 
observation and participant observation see Savage (2000). Participant observations are defined by 
DeWalt and DeWalt as: “the process enabling researchers to learn about the activities of the people 
under study in the natural setting through observing and participating in those activities” (2002, p.7). The 
key defining feature of participant observation is the active involvement of the researcher in the scenario. 
In this type of fieldwork, the researcher would become an active member within the social group that they 
are studying, taking part in activities in the same way as any other participant, whilst observing the actions 
of the others. Alternatively, non-participant observation is based on the premise that the researcher will 
not play an active role in the social group or situation they are observing, and will not intentionally 
influence the actions of the participants in anyway: “When the observer observes the group passively 
from a distance without participating in the group activities, it is known as non-participant observation” 
(Choudhary, 2017, p.1). Whilst there are advantages and disadvantages for both, it was decided that 
non-participant observations would be more suitable for this research, the reasons for this decision are 
explored below.  
 
As Tier One participants are operational police officers and PCSOs it would not have been practical for 
the researcher to assume an active role in the scenarios being observed. The researcher was at the time 
a fully warranted Special Constable within West Yorkshire Police, so legally would have been able to 
work alongside the participants on a shift. After careful consideration however, it was decided that this 
option would have had too much of an impact on the situation to provide a valid basis for observations. 
The purpose of the observations was to gain an insight into a typical shift for the participants; a typical 
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shift for most of these participants would not involve working alongside a Special Constable. This could 
have affected the calls that the participants were deployed to and their behaviour at these calls, as the 
participants would potentially be sent to different calls as a ‘double-crew’ as oppose to if they were ‘single-
crewed’ and would also have more options available to them at the calls for example when dealing with 
violence or multiple parties. It was, therefore, decided that non-participant observations would provide a 
more accurate account of a typical shift for the participants, as their deployment to calls would not be 
impacted nor would their options for dealing with said calls on arrival. 
 
Although the use of non-participant observations minimised the risk of direct influence over the 
participants’ activities and behaviours, there would still be the potential for inadvertent influence 
(Hawthorne effect). This will be explored in more detail when the options of covert and overt observations 
are discussed, but it was still an important consideration at this early stage of planning. It is crucial that 
the observer is aware of and able to determine the impact that their presence has on the situation being 
observed, even when carrying out non-participant observations. For this research, it was likely that the 
presence of an observer would not only have an impact on the participants, but also the members of the 
public that they would come into contact with during the observation session. It was also important to 
consider the moral and legal duties placed on the researcher as a warranted Special Constable; should 
one of the participants need assistance or be put in danger during the observations the researcher would 
have a duty to help. This would effectively invalidate the findings of the session as the main boundaries 
of the methodology would have been broken through the active involvement. Following discussions with 
senior members of West Yorkshire Police and supervision team, it was agreed that the impact of being 
observed would be less during non-participant observations than with participant observations, and the 
schedule of observations could factor in time to carry out additional sessions should any of them be 
invalidated. With this in mind the format of non-participant observations was chosen as the most suitable 
method for this research.  
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Overt or covert 
It was crucial to decide whether the observations would be overt or covert. Overt observations are where 
the participants are aware that they are being observed for the purposes of the research, covert 
observations take place without the participants’ knowledge:  
“Overt observations refer to the researcher being open about their intentions in the 
field and ensuring all members of the social group are aware of what is happening. 
Covert observations involve the researcher not informing members of the group the 
reason for their presence; keeping their true intentions secret.” (Bandura, 1961, 
p.575).  
 
There were practical and ethical considerations in relation to both of these options which were taken 
into account during the planning of the observations.  
 
Practically, it would have been very difficult to carry out covert observations of the Tier One participants 
whilst they were on duty given the mobile nature of their work: “Access to organizational settings may be 
influenced by the researcher's choice to adopt overt or covert research” (Grills, 1998, p.55). Whilst 
technology can provide options to enable some fieldwork to be carried out covertly i.e. through the use 
of recording devices, this was not feasible for this research. The observer would also need to make 
themselves known to the participants prior to the research to enable them to observe them within police 
buildings or to travel with them during the shift. There are also ethical challenges in using covert 
observations which are not an issue with the overt approach. As the participants would not be aware that 
they are being observed, there would be no opportunity to gain full consent. Furthermore, once the 
observations had been completed, the observer/researcher would have to make themselves known to 
the participant and declare the covert observation activity, this could lead to distrust and potentially 
jeopardise any further fieldwork. Covert observations can also fail ethical standards regarding the right 
to privacy:  
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“Covert observation contravenes two important ethical believes that it does not 
provide participants with the opportunity for 'informed consent' and thus it involves 
deception and lack of trust. It can also be taken to be a violation or invasion of the 
principle of privacy” (Norris, 2003, p.128).   
 
It was decided that overt observations would be the better choice for this research, as it would be more 
practical and would not create the same level of ethical challenge that covert methods would. All 
participants to this research were willing volunteers who had very little to gain from acting in a certain 
way, it was therefore not deemed proportionate to carry out covert observations, particularly given that 
this element of the fieldwork would not be used to generate any primary data.  
 
Structured or unstructured 
Observations for the purpose of social research are often separated into two categories, structured and 
unstructured. Structured observations are focused on certain elements of the scenario being observed 
and are often used to provide specific data to prove or disprove a hypothesis. Unstructured observations 
look at the scenario as a whole without focus on a particular element or point of interest. (Spradley, 2016). 
 
Structured observations often require more planning as consideration must be given to the specific 
elements or behaviours being targeted and the sampling methods to target them. Three main sampling 
methods used are time sampling, event sampling and point sampling (McLeod, (2015). Each of these 
methods reduce the amount of time spent actively observing the participants but the selection is based 
on different rules. Time sampling follows the same principles of systematic sampling and often follows 
one simple rule such as observing participants for 10 minutes, every hour. This can be beneficial to 
research where limited resources are available or where convenience is a priority, but findings can be 
limited as the observations may miss brief or infrequent behaviours which may still be significant to the 
research. Event sampling is used to focus on a specific behaviour, for example recording of the 
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observation will only take place when a certain behaviour or scenario is happening. This can be useful to 
study the behaviour in question and the subsequent reaction, but can also result in findings being limited 
to certain elements of the study meaning that wider context or potentially opposing evidence is missed: 
“…it is possible to miss a certain amount or selectively concentrate on the more "interested" aspects. 
This is observer bias, and challenges the reliability of the observation” (Brewer, 2008, p.9). Point sampling 
focuses on observing the behaviour of specific participants as oppose to the wider group. This can be a 
useful way of minimising the resource required to observe larger homogenous groups, but again findings 
are limited solely to the behaviours of the chosen individuals and the presumption that they are reflective 
of the wider group: “…this is an example of ‘chance response tendencies’. The behaviour observed is 
not representative of the behaviour generally.” (Dunnette, 1996, p.9).  
 
Unstructured observations are used when the researcher aims to observe as much of a situation as 
possible and is not focused on one specific element or behaviour. The main benefit of unstructured 
observation is that it provides a holistic overview of the situation being observed and does not exclude 
unexpected behaviours or occurrences. The information provided is generally narrative, though at it is 
difficult to gain valid statistical data through unstructured observations. However, the qualitative 
information it does offer can be richer than that generated through structured observations. The main 
disadvantages of unstructured observations are generally associated with the recording and analysis of 
the sessions. The researcher would typically be required to record their observations throughout the 
entire session as opposed to pre-defined sections or elements of it. Not only can this generate a much 
larger record for analysis, it can mean that much of the observation record is of little significance to the 
research aims. Carrying out systematic analysis of these records can be challenging as they may differ 
substantially from each other, depending on the activity of the situation being observed, making it difficult 
to identify valid themes. For this reason, unstructured observations are often avoided if data (qualitative 
or quantitative) are sought, but are useful at the beginning or end of a research project to inform future 
fieldwork or verify earlier findings.  
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It was decided that unstructured observations would suit the purposes of this research better than 
structured observations, given that the aim of this fieldwork was not to generate new data but to verify 
findings from the interviews and activity reports provided by Tier One participants. It was determined that 
unstructured observations, which study the shifts in their entirety, would allow the researcher to draw 
more valid conclusions and comparisons of data generated by the different methodologies used.  
 
To summarise, the researcher decided to carry out unstructured, overt, non-participant involvement 
observations of the Tier One participants. It was felt that this would provide the most effective opportunity 
to observe participants on a typical shift, minimise the risk of inadvertent influence of the situations being 
observed, and crucially, allow for valid conclusions to be made regarding the verification of previous data 
sets and findings.   
 
Planning  
Once the type of observation had been determined, the researcher could plan the sessions in more detail. 
Decisions were made regarding how many observations would take place, how long they would last, 
when they would take place and which participants would be involved.  
 
Number of observations  
There were 19 Tier One participants taking part in this research across the four case study teams. By the 
end of the fieldwork period, each of the participants had provided activity reports spanning the 12 months. 
Given that the key purpose of the observations was to verify this data, it was deemed necessary to 
observe all of the Tier One participants. These participants could be defined by role: PC, PCSO and PEO, 
and consideration was given to observing a smaller sample of each of these role groups. However, it was 
felt that observing 19 participants over the course of a year was a reasonable undertaking. Covering all 
participants also strengthened the validity of any findings relating to the comparison between activity 
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report and interview datasets. All of the participants gave consent to be observed, as did their line 
managers and the overall organisation (West Yorkshire Police).  
 
Frequency and duration of observation sessions 
The aim of this methodology was to observe the participants on a typical shift to understand what the 
PCs, PCSOs and PEOs did during their time on duty and crucially whether this was accurately reflected 
in the activity reports. Given that there were two PCs and two PCSOs in each case study, it was not 
deemed necessary to observe every participant for the full length of a shift. It was decided that each NPT 
observation session should be split in half, with the first half observing a PC and the second half observing 
a PCSO. This would then be repeated to observe the other two NPT participants in each case study, 
meaning that all four participants could be observed in just two shifts. One final observation session for 
each of the PEOs would then be scheduled in to ensure that their shifts could be observed too. This 
approach meant that the full duration of a typical shift for each of the roles could be captured, whilst 
reducing the amount of time and resource required, from 19 sessions to just 11. The below table 
demonstrates this schedule.  
Table 13. Observations – planning time table. 
Session Case Study First half Second Half 
1 1 PC1A PCSO1A 
2 1 PCSO1B PC1B 
3 1 PEO1 
4 2 PC2A PCSO2A 
5 2 PCSO2B PC2B 
6 2 PEO2 
7 3 PC3A PCSO3A 
8 3 PCSO3B PC3B 
9 3 PEO3 
10 4 PC4A PCSO4A 
11 4 PCSO4B PC4B 
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The table shows that of the two ‘NPT’ sessions for each case study, the participants were scheduled 
according to role, with the first half of the first session spent observing a PC, and the first half of the 
second session observing a PCSO. This was intentionally conducted to avoid any inadvertent bias in 
what activity the participants were involved in through different times in the shift. It is common for an NPT, 
PC or PCSO to carry out different activities in the first part of their shift than the second due to changing 
demands on them. This could be due to the type of calls that they get deployed to, i.e. calls later in the 
evening could be more closely linked to alcohol related crime, and similarly the first half of the shift may 
be the better time to make enquiries with members of the public. Ensuring that each role was observed 
across both halves of the shift would minimise the risk of only observing certain time periods of their 
typical shift. For similar reasons it was also decided that the observations of PCs and PCSOs would be 
evenly split into one early shift and one late shift, for each case study area. This would ensure that any 
differences in typical activity between an early shift and a late shift were accounted for.  
 
Span of observation schedule 
Another element of the observation schedule which required planning and consideration was the time 
frame over which the observations would be carried out. The wider fieldwork period for this research took 
place over 12 months, with activity reports being filled in on alternate months. It was also deemed 
important that the observations took place across the 12 month fieldwork period to ensure the information 
captured was reflective of the entire period and not simply a point in time which could be influenced by 
seasons, policy changes, or significant events.  
 
As the main aim of the observations was to verify the data in the activity reports it was logical for the 
observations to be carried out on the same months that they were filled out. Moreover, the interviews 
were scheduled for the alternate months and required more resource from the researcher, so for capacity 
reasons, it was considered more practical for the observations to be scheduled for the same months as 
the activity reports. This meant that two observations sessions were scheduled in during each of the 
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‘active’ months, (leaving an additional session as a contingency). The researcher started by selecting the 
12 appropriate shifts to observe by accessing the participant’s team shift planners, ensuring a mix of early 
shifts, late shifts, weekday and weekend shifts. The next step was to schedule in the three PEO sessions, 
at the start, middle and end of the 12 month fieldwork period. Finally, the sessions (as shown on the table 
above) were randomly aligned to one of the 12 scheduled shifts. This was felt to be a robust way of 
ensuring a stratified sample for observations which would give strength to any findings. It was also 
important to note that whilst the participants were aware that they would be observed in the conditions 
outlined above, they were not informed of when this would take place. This minimised the risk of them 
intentionally planning to focus on certain tasks or activities beforehand, the reasons for this are detailed 
in the next section.  
 
Ethical considerations  
Once the overarching plan for the observations had been finalised with regards to when they would be 
carried out and how long they would last, consideration turned to the more general issues related to 
carrying out observations for research, for example how anonymity would be maintained, observer 
security, the recording of results etc. 
 
Anonymity  
In order to secure the anonymity of participants throughout the fieldwork, each participant was given an 
alias and the NPT that they were attached to was referred to only in general terms i.e. NPT 1. Whilst the 
nature of this research and their roles meant that their identity could not be guaranteed, steps were taken 
to maintain it where possible and all participants were aware of the risk and gave consent to take part. 
However, carrying out observations of the participants whilst they were on duty also meant that they 
would likely interact with members of the public who had not consented to taking part in this research, 
bringing with it further challenges relating to anonymity. For this reason, the record kept of the 
observations would not refer to any defining features of these individuals, and would simply refer to them 
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as subject A, subject B etc. Crucially, the focus of the observation was the participant not those that they 
are engaging with. Where it was necessary or relevant to the research, the record kept could refer to key 
characteristics such as their ethnicity, reason for interaction, or behaviour, but would not include any 
specific details by which they could be identified, for example: “PC1A engaged arrested subject A for 
burglary, a white male who was hostile and aggressive”. No further details were captured and any 
information published was anonymised as far as possible, similarly the time, dates and location of the 
observation remained confidential and were deleted at the first opportunity. This ensured that no 
individual or incident referred to in this research could be cross referenced against court records or other 
publicly available resources. These steps were deemed reasonable and proportionate to protecting the 
anonymity of individuals who may have been noted in the observation record.  
Safety and security 
The safety and security of the observer and participants was paramount. Unlike clinical research, these 
observations took place in the natural setting of the participants’ shift, ultimately meaning that the majority 
took place in public. The nature of a typical shift meant that the observer had very little control over where 
the observations would take place or the scenarios which would be observed. This meant that planning 
security and safety measures was slightly more challenging than with other methods used in the 
fieldwork.  
 
The researcher did ensure that the research supervisors and an acquaintance knew when an observation 
session was planned and which police station it would be starting from, and contact was made before 
and after each session. Key benefits were that the participants being observed were aware that they were 
being observed, had consented, and perhaps more crucially were serving police officers and PCSOs who 
were trained to maintain the safety and security of themselves, their teams and the public. The key 
concern, however, was that the participants (and thus the observer) could be required to enter situations 
which could be dangerous as part of their shift. Whilst the participants had varied levels of protective 
equipment on them - including stab vests, batons, CS spray, handcuffs and airwave radios, it was decided 
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that the observer would only have a stab vest. As a serving Special Constable, there was the option for 
the observer to take more equipment, but after a risk assessment with a senior West Yorkshire Police 
officer was carried out, it was deemed unnecessary and could perhaps cause more problems and blur 
the lines between observer and on duty officer. Prior to the observations taking place, the observer made 
sure that the participants were aware of the observer’s intentions and that if the participant felt at any 
time that the observer was hindering their safety, they could end the session. Similarly the observer made 
it clear that they would not enter a situation that they were not comfortable with and stressed that safety 
was more important that any research findings.  
 
Record of sessions 
When planning to record the observation sessions a number of decisions had to be made about what 
would be recorded and how. Unstructured observations are generally less prescriptive with regards to 
the information that is gathered - the intention is to observe the situation in its entirety as oppose to 
focusing on specific elements.  With structured observations is it usual practice to have predetermined 
questions regarding the behaviour or activity to prompt the observer into recording relevant information 
which can later be coded. This practice is less common with unstructured observations to minimise the 
risk of excluding valid information. However, because the primary purpose of these observations was to 
verify the information provided in activity reports (and to a lesser extent, interviews) it was decided that 
the observer should seek to record information which would allow them to fill out an activity report for 
comparative purposes at the end of the session. Steps were taken to ensure that the information recorded 
was not limited to this activity report though and the observer sought to capture full descriptions of all 
activity that took place during the sessions regardless of whether this would be captured in the report. 
There would also be an emphasis on the interpretation of the activity and behaviour of the participants 
based on the observer’s opinion as part of the record of the sessions to ensure a wholesome view of the 
sessions.  
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Capturing this level of information would require the observer to either digitally record the sessions (using 
audio or video) or write notes of the observations during or after the sessions. It was felt that the use of 
digital devices could feel too intrusive for participants, affecting their natural behaviour (for an overview 
of the potential impact of recording devices see Bowman, 1994), furthermore any members of the public 
may see the digital recording device and consequently act differently or become agitated thus altering 
the natural situation that this research is seeking to observe. Digitally recording these sessions would 
also create additional risks for data security and anonymity of the participants, which would be heightened 
by the fact that the observation sessions would be taking place in public. It was felt that the safest and 
least disruptive option would be to avoid the use of digital recording devices and instead notes would be 
taken. It was decided that written notes would be taken during the session with additional writing up time 
scheduled for immediately afterwards. Given the potentially sensitive nature of some of the scenarios 
that would be observed, it was felt that the note taking should be done in a subtle way to avoid provocation 
or altered behaviours. Whilst it would be possible to wait until the end of each session to write down notes 
to avoid this, it was decided that the risk of the observer forgetting important details or not capturing a full 
record was too high with this approach. Instead the decision was made to equip the observer with a small 
notebook to keep a written record of pertinent notes during the session. This notebook included blank 
pages at the front for open note taking as well as prompts relating to the questions in the activity report, 
in addition to this, the observer also filled out a blank activity report following the guidance given to the 
participants for comparison during the analysis stage.  The notebook would be small enough to put away 
in the pocket of the stab vest if it did not feel suitable to openly take notes at any time during the session 
much like a police pocket note book. Using a small notebook as oppose to an A4 clipboard would be 
more suitable and feel less recognisable as an observation tool, thus, having less of an impact on the 
participants and the individuals that they may come into contact with. It is important to note that, if the 
observer was questioned by any individual about their purpose and presence, the observer would be 
open and honest about the fieldwork and would provide an information card regarding the research, 
reassuring them, that their identity would be protected, it would also have the contact information for the 
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senior West Yorkshire Police officer who authorised the research. Once the sessions had finished, time 
was set aside to finish writing up the notes and filling out the activity report following the same guidance 
given to the participants, this would ensure a full and holistic record of the observation which included, 
but was note solely focused on comparing the activity reports.  
 
Implementation  
Overall the observations went well and provided enough good quality information to draw valid 
conclusions relating to the information provided in the activity reports and interviews. Opting to choose 
unstructured observations was perhaps the most beneficial choice for this fieldwork as it enabled a full 
record to be captured of sessions which were vastly varied. Had the observer been restricted to recording 
activity related only to predetermined issues or only at set stages through the shift it is highly likely that 
important information would have been missed. Enabling the observer to take notes throughout the 
session meant that information was captured relating to the roles and activities of the Tier One 
participants that had not been found through the earlier stages of fieldwork. In particular the differing 
levels of supervision across the case studies became apparent during the observation sessions, although 
this was based on only 11 sessions and so would benefit from further validation, it appeared that the 
Sergeant’s involvement with the PCs and PCSOs in each of the case study areas was very different. 
Some Sergeants were very ‘hands-on’ with the PCs and PCSOs going out on patrol and assisting at 
calls, however in some of the other case studies the Sergeant appeared to spend the majority of their 
time in the station. The relevance of this finding in relation to earlier analysis of the interviews will be 
discussed in the following section.  
 
The decision to mix the NPT sessions between observing PCs and PCSOs also proved to be beneficial. 
On average each NPT observation session lasted around four hours, meaning that for each case study 
around eight hours was spent observing the PCs and eight hours observing the PCSOs, given that the 
average PEO shift is also eight hours it provided a balance to the analysis of the observations. Spending 
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eight hours with each role in each case study provided ample opportunity to capture information relevant 
to this research, given the purpose of these observation was not to produce any further data it was felt 
that this was proportionate to the needs of the research. Although there were some slight logistical 
problems associated with switching between the participants mid-shift, due to their locations and ongoing 
tasks, this was not considered to be significant and did not hinder the research.  
 
A key planning issue for the observation related to whether the observer (as a serving Special Constable) 
could be a non-participant observer or whether they would be required to put themselves ‘on-duty’ during 
the session. No situation occurred during any of the sessions where the observer felt that they would 
have to take a more active role and assist the participant, thus ending the session. This was not only 
beneficial for the research, as it resulted in uninterrupted observation sessions, but also meant that there 
was no additional risk to the safety of the observer or the participants. Furthermore, at no point during 
the sessions did the observer feel that they were in danger or that the research should be suspended.  
 
One final point to make regarding the implementation of the observation sessions, was that the overt 
nature of the sessions also helped to build relations with the participants. On multiple occasions during 
‘down-time’ on the shifts, the participants took the opportunity to discuss the research in more detail and 
offered their opinions in relation to the research aims. Each of these were captured and featured as part 
of the qualitative analysis of the observation sessions. Should a covert approach have been taken, such 
statements would not have been made or captured.  
 
Findings 
The analysis of the observation records included a comparison of the activity reports filled out by the 
observer and the participants (as detailed in chapter five), and a wider thematic review of the observation 
notes from the sessions.  
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Generally speaking, the activity reports completed by the observer reflected the ‘average’ report filled out 
by the participants. Though these comparisons must be considered in the context of very different sample 
sizes, the similarities were interesting nonetheless.  
 
Comparison of participant activity reports and observer activity reports 
Geographical areas 
With regards to the geographical areas which the participants spent most of their time; the observations 
found that, during the sessions spent with the PEOs, all of the areas commonly noted in their activity 
reports were visited during the observation session. The familiarity with members of the community in 
these areas was apparent, leading the observer to note during one session that: “this did not seem 
manufactured at all, in one of the community group meetings they were expecting the PEO as they do on 
a weekly basis” (Observation session 3-3). The observation sessions spent with the NPTs showed a 
similar picture but in some cases it appeared that the participant was making an additional effort to patrol 
some of the ‘vulnerable areas’ noted in their activity reports. Although this could not be confirmed, 
statements were made such as: “If we get chance later, we’ll try and head down to **named area**” 
(Participant PCSO2A). This statement could be interpreted as a general effort to patrol different areas 
against competing demands, but did leave the observer feeling slightly uncertain as to whether this was 
for the benefit of the research. On the whole, the activity reports filled out by the observer did substantiate 
the type of activity described in the activity reports filled out by the NPT participants with regards to the 
geographical area that they spent most of their time, thus going some way to verifying the earlier findings.  
 
Activities recorded 
With regards to the activities that the participants carried out on a typical shift, the observations showed 
a striking similarity between what was declared on the activity reports and what was witnessed during the 
observations across all roles and case studies. Perhaps what was most interesting was the frustrations 
of the participants noted by the observer which reflected the sentiments shared during the interviews. In 
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every observation session carried out, the participant referred to a desire to do more than what they had 
capacity for: “It would be good to arrest somebody and not spend the rest of the shift in custody” 
(Participant PC4A): “I’ve stopped writing to-do lists now, because you never get chance to even look at 
it, let alone actually tick anything off” (Participant PC2A). Although this was less prominent with the PEOs, 
it was still reflective of the findings in the activity reports and interviews. During two of the NPT observation 
sessions the observer spent the vast majority of the shift within the police station, only leaving the building 
for approximately 90 minutes, the rest was spent watching the PCs and PCSOs in briefings, filling out 
paper work, inputting crimes and intelligence reports on to the computer, making telephone enquires or 
interviewing subjects.  
 
Community cohesion 
The activity reports also required the participants to disclose any community disharmony that had come 
to their attention during their shift. The initial findings from the activity reports showed varying levels of 
understanding across roles with PEOs providing more detailed and informed responses to this than their 
NPT counterparts, and likewise PCSOs showing a higher understanding of local issues than PCs. 
However, the activity reports filled out by the observer could not fully verify this finding due to lack of 
sufficient data. In total there were 11 observation sessions carried out, (eight with the NPT participants 
and three with the PEOs), during these sessions there were only two instances where ‘new’ information 
about community issues came to light, both of which occurred during the PEO observations. Although 
there were numerous discussions with community members regarding disharmony and cultural issues, 
these were mainly during the PEO observations and were the product of follow up engagement from 
previous community work. The fact that none of this information, new or otherwise, was brought to the 
attention of the PCs is interesting and does go some way to supporting the finding that PCs are less 
engaged with their local communities than PEOs - but in itself it could not be considered full corroboration. 
Although the observer found no reason to doubt the earlier findings from the activity reports and interviews 
on this topic through observation, there was also not enough evidence to verify it either.  
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Thematic review of observation notes 
The general notes from the observations also provided insights into the roles and opinions of NPT staff 
that had not been apparent through the earlier fieldwork stages.  
 
Influence of supervisors 
Perhaps the most interesting was the varying involvement of the NPT Sergeants with their teams which 
was referred to earlier. In two of the case studies, the Sergeant was particularly engaged with the activities 
of their team and on multiple occasions would attend calls with the PCs and PCSOs in question, whereas 
on the other two case studies, the Sergeant would remain predominantly in their police station. Whilst this 
variation is interesting in itself, perhaps the more pertinent point to note was the effect that the Sergeant’s 
presence had on the rest of the team. The participants from the two case studies which had a more 
‘hands-on’ Sergeant appeared less focused on the community engagement element of their role than 
participants from the other case studies. This is somewhat mirrored in the activity reports through the 
times spent dedicated to proactive patrol and engagement, however the reason was not necessarily 
known. The observer noted this on multiple occasions throughout the various sessions, stating: “…this 
team as a whole seems more concerned with ticking off tasks that the Sergeant gives them, than spending 
additional time in communities,” (Observation session 2B), followed in a separate session by: “…as soon 
as the Sergeant arrives at the scene, there seems to be an urgency to get the job done and get to the 
outstanding log” (Observation session 4A). The observations would suggest that the Sergeant’s presence 
added pressure (intentional or otherwise) to the PCs and PCSOs to be as productive as possible with 
regards to meeting the multiple demands placed on the team. This could have been at the detriment of 
proactive community engagement. It is important to note, however, that this is based solely on the 
observer’s interpretation of the situation and could not, without further exploration, be evidenced in a 
quantifiable way.  
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Opinions of Prevent 
A further point that was noted across many of the sessions was that when the participants had the 
opportunity to chat with the observer, for example during car journeys to calls or on meal breaks, it 
seemed that those who had some knowledge of Prevent felt that it needed review. It should be noted that 
this was only discussed with five of the participants (three PEOs, one PC and one PCSO), and they were 
all supportive of Prevent and the need for such a strategy, however they all felt that it had been marred 
by its history.  
 
“When Prevent first came about, it targeted Muslims, there’s no denying that, but it’s 
not the same strategy now. We’ve come a long way as a service since then, and 
Prevent has changed for the better too. Maybe it needs re-branding, but then again that 
might not help build trust either, it needs looking at to keep the public happy, but I 
honestly don’t know what you’d do to make it better”. (Participant PEO1). 
 
This was echoed by a different PEO who felt that Prevent should be regularly reviewed in the same 
manner as any policy or practice, but that there is an unease around the strategy which inhibits the 
willingness of authorities to do so:  
 
“We’re a public service and we want to do the best for the public, to do that we need to 
keep reviewing what we’re doing and making it better. Prevent is no different to that, 
but it’s such a touchy subject, no government is going to be the one to stop Prevent 
unless they can come up with something else to put in its place sharpish.” (Participant 
PEO3). 
 
A PCSO also noted the need for a review of Prevent in light of current pressures on the police service, 
stating that the strategy would only work with additional police resources:  
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“Prevent is all well and good and the principle works: community policing prevents 
terrorism. We all know this, we know community policing is the cornerstone of counter 
terrorism, but they’ve taken away community policing and are still expecting to counter 
terrorism. They either need to put the beat bobbies back, or pick a new strategy 
because we can’t do it with the numbers we’ve got”. (Participant PCSO2B) 
 
The participants who offered these opinions all appeared to be very passionate and to some extent angry 
when they did so, which is interesting in itself as the same degree of emotion or strength of opinion did 
not come through on the earlier interviews with these participants when they were asked their thoughts 
on the matter. This is perhaps due to the more informal setting provided during the observations, than in 
the interviews, combined with the fact that the interviews took place at the start of the fieldwork period 
before any real rapport had been built with the participants. The observer interpreted these as genuine 
concerns and beliefs of the participants, it appeared that not only did the participants in question feel that 
Prevent should be reviewed to improve it, but that Prevent is fundamentally a good strategy which has 
been hindered by the austerity cuts to policing.   
 
Summary  
In summary, the decision to use overt, unstructured, non-participant observations to verify the findings of 
the activity reports and interview aspects of the fieldwork proved beneficial. The implementation of the 
observation sessions was smooth and did not require a vast amount of time or resource from the 
researcher, and the data provided was useful not only in verifying the earlier findings but also to further 
inform discussion around the research aims. Although not all of the earlier findings could be corroborated 
due to the boundaries of the data produced by the observation sessions, the researcher found no reason 
to doubt the declarations made by the Tier One participants during the interviews or activity reports 
detailed in previous chapters. Key findings generally related to the pressures that the participants felt 
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under in completing their daily duties. The participants’ concerns around their lack of capacity and 
capability to fully engage with communities were apparent, and the prioritisation of other policing tasks 
over community engagement was evident in the tasks allocated to the participants during the observation 
sessions. The findings from the observations echo earlier judgments that NPTs are continually struggling 
to maintain levels of engagement with their communities for general policing purposes and the challenge 
is even greater when engagement for the purpose of Prevent is added to their duties.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
241 
 
Chapter Seven 
Discussion 
 
This research aimed to ascertain the extent to which strong community cohesion was linked to preventing 
extremism, what the current role of NPTs were in the Prevent strategy, and to ultimately inform debate 
around whether they should or could be utilised differently. It has considered a wealth of literature 
regarding theory, policies and practice around community policing and preventing extremism to explore 
the current situation and potential avenues for change. The mixed methods approach to fieldwork 
generated substantial datasets which have informed discussion around the key research aims and 
provided an evidence base for suggestions around the use of NPTs in the delivery of the Prevent strategy 
going forward.  
 
The significance of community engagement within the Prevent Strategy 
Existing literature has raised a wide range of debates relating to the proposed links between community 
policing and community cohesion, and similarly the links between poor community cohesion and 
vulnerability to extremism (Innes & Jones, 2006). Whilst there is wide discord amongst academics 
regarding the causes of radicalisation and the appropriateness of the Government’s response to it 
through the Prevent strategy, there is a level of agreement that poor community cohesion could be a 
contributing factor to radicalisation (see Innes & Jones 2002; Crenshaw, 1981; Backes, 2007). The 
literature review provided an overview of the key debates around the concept of radicalisation and 
showed a consensus amongst key models which each rely on social or external factors as well as 
psychological causes. Whilst termed differently across the varying models, they all refer to community 
cohesion as one such social factor.  
 
The premise that poor community cohesion can contribute to a social setting where extremist influences 
can thrive, was supported by the findings of the focus groups held with community members in each case 
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study area. On the topic of preventing extremism, discussions frequently concluded on the point that 
stronger communities would prevent extremism earlier; “If people were more tolerant of differences there 
wouldn’t be terrorism” (FG Participant 4B). This essentially supports the principles which the Prevent 
Strategy was built upon, that by working with communities the police and partners can help Prevent 
people being drawn into extremism. Interestingly many focus group participants felt that the duty of 
preventing terrorism sat with communities first; “Every terrorist has a mother and father, friends and a 
community who failed to do their job, before the police failed theirs.” (FG Participant 2A). Again, whilst 
there were many topics debated within the focus group sessions, the role that good community cohesion 
played within preventing extremism was an area of agreement.  
 
Whilst some would challenge the link between poor cohesion and radicalisation, the opposition is 
generally based on the argument that not all radicalised individuals come from areas of poor cohesion, 
and thus it is not an absolute causal factor. This is a logical premise and one that this research did not 
seek to refute, however the literature review and results from the focus groups combined, did show that 
poor community cohesion could be a contributing factor to radicalisation.  
 
This however is not enough to meet the first aim of this research; to understand the significance of 
community engagement in the Prevent strategy. The research aim is focused on police engagement with 
communities, and specifically how this contributes to community cohesion, not simply strong community 
cohesion in isolation. Again existing literature has explored the theories, context, policies and practices 
relating to police engagement with communities through the concept of ‘community policing’. Whilst there 
have been failings in certain community policing policies and practices throughout the years (see 
Thomas, 2011), the research has showed how the theory that ‘good community policing helps to improve 
community cohesion’ is one that stands up to scrutiny. The literature review outlines the support for this 
premise and the evidence base that has been built up over the years to inform and improve community 
policing practices for the benefit of community cohesion; “whilst there is only weak evidence of community 
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engagement reducing crime…there is fairly strong positive evidence that it … increases feelings of safety 
and improves police-community relations and perceptions” (NPIA, 2012. p.3). There is very little 
challenge to this concept throughout academia, and again the focus groups held with community 
members from the case study area supported the principle. Discussions in the focus group sessions 
alluded to a link between good police engagement and good community relations; when the police are 
shown to be making efforts across all communities, the cohesion between these communities builds as 
there is less cause for resentment or distrust. Between the literature review and the findings of the focus 
group it was clear that good community policing could lead to improved community cohesion.  
 
When the concept that ‘good community policing can help to improve community cohesion’ is combined 
with the first element discussed in this research that ‘good community cohesion can help to prevent 
extremism’ it is logical to then conclude that ‘good community policing can help to prevent extremism’. 
The support for this hypothesis, as evidenced through the literature review and focus group chapters of 
this thesis, would suggest that the community engagement is significant to the Prevent Strategy. Whilst 
the debates around Prevent continue, this research would suggest that the Government’s decision to 
base the strategy so firmly in community policing principles was entirely rational and justifiable. The 
research then moved towards understanding how this worked in current practice, and whether any 
changes needed to be made.  
 
The current function of NPTs within the Prevent Strategy 
The preliminary enquiries carried out in preparation for this research pointed to a potential disparity 
between the use of community policing in the theories behind Prevent as a strategy and Prevent in 
practice. The data generated from the interviews, activity reports and observations did confirm that whilst 
there was a heavy focus on community policing principles in the wording of the Prevent Strategy 
documents (as noted in the literature review), there was little integration of community policing within its 
day to day delivery.  
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Fourteen interviews were held with participants; a mix of NPT and Prevent participants were involved in 
semi-structured interviews which sought to understand their knowledge, experiences, and opinions on 
the delivery of community policing and the Prevent strategy in their areas. The quality and breadth of 
data gained from these sessions was invaluable to understanding the current function that NPTs play 
within delivering the strategy and not only alluded to the level of involvement that NPTs have, but also 
the reasons for such. Findings from the interviews pointed to a minimal knowledge of Prevent across 
NPT participants. When asked to explain what they knew of Prevent, the vast majority could provide only 
very basic information and with very little confidence in their answers. Encouragingly they did all know 
how to seek further information or advice if needed, and there were examples of good interactions 
between NPT staff and PEOs but this was by no means to a standard which could be described as fully 
integrated. As noted above, the Prevent Strategy was clearly drafted around the intention that NPTs 
would be at the forefront of its delivery, however the fact that NPT participants in this research had such 
low levels of knowledge and understanding around the Prevent Strategy clearly showed that this was not 
happening in practice.  
 
Within West Yorkshire Police, PEOs are ‘embedded’ within set NPTs to improve integration, information 
sharing and joint working. However the results from the interviews showed that a lack of central 
systematic guidance on how the Prevent teams and NPTs should integrate has caused varied practices 
across the case study areas. Some PEOs were clearly more active within their NPTs than others, but this 
appeared to be due to individual personalities and subjective interpretations of what their role should be, 
as oppose to clear guidance from West Yorkshire Police or indeed the Home Office. Consequently, there 
was no standard practice around when NPTs should be involved in Prevent work and when it should be 
left to the PEOs. The only commonality across case studies appeared to be that the PEO would make 
the NPT Sergeant aware of key pieces of their work, however even then, the willingness of the NPT 
Sergeant in integrating members of their team with this work appeared to be entirely subjective. The 
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interviews did also provide evidence that many of the NPT staff were cautious of asking the Prevent staff 
too much due to their association with the traditionally secretive world of counter terrorism. Whilst this 
was only mentioned specifically on a few occasions, a corresponding theme emerged during interviews 
with Prevent participants who were at times cautious of sharing information about certain activities with 
their NPT teams for fear of unwanted interference. Perhaps what is most significant is that on each 
occasion the NPT participants would have been vetted to the necessary level and able to access the 
information themselves, if they knew to where look on the police systems. Whilst this does not directly 
indicate what the current role of NPTs is within Prevent, it does to some extent show a clear boundary in 
the level of involvement and integration that NPTs do not yet currently cross.  
 
The interviews did show that whilst there was little integration between NPTs and PEOs in practice, there 
was an acknowledgement across most of the participants, that the work carried out by each team was 
very similar. Participants clearly recognised the importance of community engagement in all of their roles 
and their responsibility to work towards strong community cohesion. This would suggest that there is 
some potential for increased integration between the two areas of working based solely on common 
objectives alone.  
 
The results from the interviews however, also pointed to increasing separation between the roles due to 
challenges being placed on the police as a service. This will be discussed in greater detail under 
discussions around the final research aim (could NPTs be used differently), however it is important to 
note that the interviews showed how the current roles of NPTs and PEOs have changed significantly in 
the years prior to this research taking place. A common theme in the interview transcriptions was that the 
financial cuts to the police service nationally during the past ten years have meant that the police have 
had to re-prioritise their reducing resources into areas of greatest need. Many police forces (West 
Yorkshire Police included) have opted to do so by focusing on high-harm incidents and protecting the 
most vulnerable in society though safeguarding (Burns-Williamson, 2016). According to the majority of 
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participants taking part in this research, this has resulted in NPTs having less capacity to carry out 
traditional neighbourhood policing duties including proactive engagement, as they are constantly 
responding to incidents which take immediate priority. On the contrary, the shift towards safeguarding 
appears to have had some benefits for Prevent; participants have noted that Prevent has gradually been 
able to move away from negative perceptions of ‘spying’ and labels of it being a ‘toxic brand’ (Kundnani, 
Thomas), and towards it being recognised as a legitimate form of safeguarding. As the term safeguarding 
has become more common in policing (and public) language, Prevent teams have been able to capitalise 
to some extent, with practitioners (and advocates) often comparing the grooming of people vulnerable to 
CSE by gangs, to the grooming of people vulnerable to radicalisation by extremist groups, in order to ‘sell 
itself’ as a strategy to the public. In addition to this, whilst none of the participants referred to any increase 
in the Prevent budget, resources or capacity, it was noted that they had not been hit as hard as NPTs (or 
other areas of policing), perhaps because the level of risk associated with protecting vulnerable people 
from extremism is easily recognised and fits in with the wider safeguarding agenda. This shift in the roles 
of NPTs and Prevent teams in wider policing is perhaps one of the most crucial findings of this research; 
it not only helps to clarify the current function of NPTs in Prevent, but also points to the decreasing ability 
for NPTs to carry out standard community engagement, begging the question should they be expected 
to play an active role in Prevent and could they do so in the current climate?   
 
The activity reports (corroborated by the observations) also appeared to substantiate many of the findings 
of the interviews, and showed clear differences in how the NPTs participants and PEOs spent their time. 
Whilst this was expected to some extent, as they are fundamentally different roles, it was invaluable in 
quantifying the current function of NPTs in the delivery of Prevent. In summary, PCs spent less time 
engaging with communities than PEOs, spent less time in vulnerable communities, more time in the police 
station, and showed lower levels of understanding of ongoing community issues than PEOs. PCSOs 
generally fell somewhere between the two on each measure. Deeper analysis of the activity reports 
suggests that the majority of this is due to the broader range of duties that NPT staff were required to 
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undertake in comparison to Prevent teams. NPT PCs spent a significant amount of time in the police 
station recording crimes or taking statements, whilst PCSOs noted that a high proportion of their time 
was spent travelling from one ‘beat area’ to another. Prevent staff did spend some time carrying out 
station duties, filling in paperwork and travelling from area to area, but crucially had less paperwork to 
carry out (as they rarely recorded crimes or carried out investigations), invariably had access to a vehicle 
for travel, and focused their work in specific communities thus generally covered less geographical space. 
This ultimately meant that PEOs were able to maintain engagement as a fundamental element of their 
role, whilst the activity reports showed that this element of the NPT participant’s role had been eroded.  
 
The activity reports also reiterated findings from the interviews relating to the change over time of the 
roles of NPT and Prevent participants. The volume of time that each role dedicated to engagement within 
communities (for general or Prevent purposes) decreased over the 12 month fieldwork period in every 
case study. During the observations, multiple participants commented on this (as well as in their 
interviews), stating that they simply have more tasks to get through in an average shift than they used to, 
and consequently proactive engagement was generally one of the first tasks to slip. This could point to a 
more significant cultural challenge for the police service, in that engagement (and traditional community 
policing principles), were often referred to (during the observations) as a luxury, or nice-to-do, and so 
often put to the bottom of the list of priorities. Whilst this could be understandable when deciding 
prioritisation of short-term risks such as attendance at a domestic abuse incident compared to proactive 
engagement in a school, advocates of community policing and early intervention principles would stress 
the impact that this has on the police’s ability to address long-term risks such as radicalisation. 
Regardless of whether the function of NPTs within Prevent should change, the police as a service needs 
to ensure that NPTs and Prevent teams are able to fully engage with communities in their current role.  
 
The activity reports enabled the research to quantify what NPT participants actually contributed with 
regards to the delivery of the Prevent Strategy on a day to basis. Although they did not capture the entirety 
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of what an NPT PC or PCSO does on every shift, they provided a strong estimation of the time taken 
dealing with Prevent related issues, and the actions that they took as a result. Analysis of the 286 activity 
reports completed by NPT participants showed that 65% of actions taken by them in relation to a ‘Prevent 
related issue’ consisted of them filling in an intelligence report and nothing more. On occasion participants 
explained their rationale for doing so and in every instance it related to; Prevent staff being the ‘specialists’ 
who would then deal with it accordingly, a lack of confidence in themselves to progress the action in any 
other way, and fear around intruding on a secret operation. This points to a wider theme from the research 
(noted specifically during the interviews), relating to what the current role of NPTs is. The majority of 
participants explained that the role of NPTs was to capture any relevant information that comes to light 
during their daily duty and feed it back to the Prevent department and nothing more. Whilst many of the 
results from this research corroborate this, the finding from the activity reports goes further and points to 
a reason why; because Prevent staff are the specialists and NPT staff are not. This was also captured 
quite concisely in an interview with a Prevent Detective Inspector: 
 
“NPT officers are the GPs of policing, they need to know enough about everything to 
get the job done, but Prevent teams are the specialists who focus on this one very 
niche area of policing” (Participant DI5).  
 
Again, whether this is right or wrong is almost irrelevant at this stage, however it is crucial to understand 
that if NPTs were to be used differently to their current function (to pass on intelligence), this distinction 
of roles would have to be adjusted first in order for it to happen.  
 
To summarise, the interviews, activity reports, and observations provided valuable insight into the current 
role of NPTs within the delivery of Prevent and pointed to some of the reasons for this. The current role 
of NPTs within the delivery of the Prevent Strategy is to capture and pass on intelligence which may be 
of interest to Prevent staff. They assist with ‘lower levels’ of ‘Prevent related’ engagement and work 
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alongside Prevent officers on occasion, but there is no systematic guidance regarding when or how this 
would take place. Whilst all participants recognised the similarities in roles particularly with relation to 
community engagement, there has been a change in how NPTs are used by the police force in general, 
which has resulted in decreased capacity to engage with local communities. The workloads on both 
teams have increased significantly in recent years, and there was concern amongst those in all roles, 
that they were less in touch with the communities they serve and thus could not fulfil their duties to the 
extent that they would like. Prevent continued to be seen as a specialist area of policing (although there 
has been a shift away from traditional counter terrorism and towards more mainstream safeguarding). 
Whilst NPTs also have a duty to safeguard the most vulnerable, currently the structures and culture within 
the police force means that their time is predominantly taken up by reactive duties as oppose to 
proactively engaging with communities or safeguarding vulnerable people against extremism. This 
research has shown that the current role of NPTs within the delivery of the Prevent Strategy does not 
resemble the intention set out by Government when the Prevent Strategy was drafted.  
 
Should and could NPTs be utilised differently within the delivery of the Prevent Strategy  
The ultimate aim of this research was to ascertain whether NPTs should be used differently within the 
delivery of the Prevent Strategy, and if so, how this could be done in practice. This research has reviewed 
the theories behind the Prevent Strategy, the principles of community policing and preventing extremism, 
the current practices in both areas of policing, and has considered the views and experiences of 
practitioners and community members affected by the Prevent Strategy.  
 
This research has concluded that NPTs should be utilised more by the police service to deliver the 
strategy. Whilst there are multiple rationales for this conclusion it has essentially been informed by the 
findings of the first two research aims in that the research found;  
1. That the focus on community policing within the Prevent Strategy was justified.  
However;  
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2. In reality, the current contribution of NPTs in the delivery of the strategy is minimal with NPTs 
playing no more than a ‘supporting role’.  
 
Essentially, the research has provided an evidence base to support existing arguments around the link 
between good community policing and good community cohesion and subsequently the link between 
good community cohesion and resilience to extremism. However it also found that whilst many would 
agree with this hypothesis, the current function of NPTs within Prevent does not match up to this theory, 
therefore, changes should be made so that NPTs play an increased role in the delivery of Prevent.  
 
In addition to the findings around the fundamental research aims, this research also alluded to additional 
justifications for the increased utilisation of NPTs. The analysis of the interview transcriptions pointed to 
the ongoing transition from Prevent being a ‘pure counter terrorism’ strategy, to it being an area of 
safeguarding. Whilst the research did not set out to explore this dynamic, it is one that has proved to be 
significant in understanding the current and natural role of NPTs in Prevent. All police officers and staff 
have a duty to safeguard vulnerable people in society, this is an absolute duty regardless of what team 
or department they are aligned to, therefore NPT staff who are unable to recognise or respond to a 
vulnerability (be it exploitation, modern slavery, domestic abuse, or in this case radicalisation), would be 
failing in their duty. Whilst this does not necessarily mean that NPT staff must know everything about 
these risks and how to respond, the research has shown that the minimal levels of knowledge and 
understanding found in the NPT case studies may not be sufficient for them to effectively safeguard a 
person vulnerable to extremism, therefore the role must be enhanced to allow them to do so.  
 
Another rationale for the increased involvement of NPTs in the delivery of the Prevent Strategy stemmed 
from the findings of the focus groups. In general the focus group participants had a greater familiarity with 
their local NPT PCs and PCSOs, than they did their PEOs. The reason for this can quite simply be put 
down to the fact that there are more NPT staff than there are PEOs, however this in itself can be used as 
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a justification for their increased involvement in Prevent. There were 915 NPT staff in West Yorkshire in 
2016/17, but less than 20 PEOs. In contrast the population of West Yorkshire stood at approximately 2.3 
million. Whilst no organisation could ever expect to fully engage with every member of its community, 
logic would suggest that the more members of staff involved, the more members of the public would be 
reached. As noted in one of the interviews with a PCSO participant; “we’re already in the communities 
engaging on a range of issues, why wouldn’t we engage on radicalisation too?” (Participant PCSO2). 
This supports the argument that NPTs should be utilised more in the delivery of Prevent, as both teams 
are fundamentally responsible for community engagement, but are simply engaging on different topics.  
Suggesting that NPTs should be more involved in the delivery of the Prevent Strategy was perhaps the 
simplest of all of the conclusions to be drawn from this research, as it was based on an existing logical 
hypothesis, was clearly supported by the evidence, and was only challenged on the grounds of capacity 
and capability of NPTs each of which could be addressed. However, this research could not simply 
conclude that NPTs should be utilised more, without deducing how this should be done, what elements 
they would be responsible for, and where the distinction in roles should fall.   
 
The interviews and focus groups found a healthy variety of perspectives regarding how NPTs should be 
used by Prevent; which generally fell into three options;  
1. NPTs should only be responsible for feeding in intelligence and ensuring immediate safeguarding 
risks could be responded to if needed.  
2. NPTs should be better informed and trained to support the PEOs in their tasking and 
engagement. 
3. NPTs should tasked with Prevent related engagement in the same way that PEOs currently are. 
 
This links back to the debate around whether Prevent is an area which is so sensitive it should be the 
responsibility only of specially trained staff. This research was not able to conclude as to which 
perspective was correct, however it did provide an evidence base to suggest which approach would be 
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most suitable in today’s policing landscape. The Prevent Duty established that all named organisations 
(including the police), have a legal responsibility to ensure that Prevent is mainstreamed across all of its 
departments (HM Government, 2015). Whilst it provides no further definition of what ‘mainstreamed’ 
means, the reference to ‘all of its departments’ clearly means that NPTs should be included in Prevent. 
This essentially would rule out option one, as this perspective does not require NPTs to develop the 
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding to meet the obligations in the Prevent Duty. Moreover, 
an intelligence structure which relies on information being generated by approximately 1,000 NPT staff, 
but only acted upon by around 20 PEOs would do little more than create pressure points further up the 
chain in Prevent. Whilst the successful delivery of Prevent is reliant on the successful generation of 
community intelligence, there must be a responsible and realistic approach for acting upon the growing 
reams of intelligence that would be generated, this cannot feasibly be left to such a small number of 
officers regardless of how expertly trained they are.  
 
This leads on to option two; it was the opinion of some of the participants that ‘low level’ Prevent related 
intelligence identified by NPTs, should still be fed into the Prevent systems, but should remain the 
responsibility of the NPT officer to generate or develop through further engagement. Whilst there would 
inevitably be intelligence reports which require a more comprehensive approach from the wider Prevent 
team due to the level of sensitivity, the activity reports showed that the vast majority of intelligence reports 
submitted by NPT officers and PCSOs in relation to Prevent, were actually more closely related to issues 
of community cohesion rather than extremism. It could be argued that these actually should fall in the 
remit of the NPT staff as part of their general community engagement, perhaps with the advice and 
guidance of the Prevent team. This would not only have benefits for the wider police service in that the 
Prevent teams will have increased capacity to focus on the higher risk information and the NPTs would 
gradually build confidence and understanding through ownership, but would also be beneficial for 
communities who would see more engagement (even if it is reactive, rather than proactive) from their 
local officers and PCSOs. The clear disadvantage of this however is that NPTs currently have little 
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capability to deal with such issues, the potential solutions to this will be presented later in this chapter, in 
relation to whether NPTs could be utilised more.  
 
Option three perhaps suggests the most drastic change to what role NPTs currently play within the 
delivery of Prevent and what role they should play. Discussions with participants in favour of this option 
leant towards greater integration of role responsibilities in addition to physical integration. It was proposed 
that NPTs should be allocated the community engagement work that currently sits with PEOs, whilst 
PEOs take a more supervisory role over how the NPTs do so. In essence, PEOs would be responsible 
for the coordination of all Prevent related engagement through NPTs, and this engagement would be 
carried out by NPT officers and PCSOs. Whilst theoretically, this would help Prevent be ‘delivered’ to a 
greater number of people, and perhaps in a more coordinated way, the issue of capacity and capability 
of NPT staff remains, as does the issue of conflicting chains of command. There is a variation of this 
option which would see PCSOs take on the engagement responsibilities which currently sit with PEOs 
leaving PCs to continue with the responding to more immediate risks which is also worth consideration. 
If either variation of this approach was adopted, careful consideration would have to be given to how 
PEOs interact with NPT Sergeants, who are currently responsible for coordinating the work of the NPTs.  
 
In summary, this research has provided evidence to support the call for increased used of NPTs in the 
delivery of the Prevent Strategy based on a number of rationales. It has considered three key options for 
what the role of NPTs should be in Prevent; it has concluded that the first option would not sufficiently 
meet the requirements placed on NPTs through the Prevent duty, and whilst options two and three appear 
to be possible in theory, changes would need to be made in practice to accommodate. The final section 
of this chapter, will look at whether or not NPTs could be utilised more in the delivery of Prevent, by 
assessing what would need to be done to implement the two remaining options noted above.  
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This research has concluded that NPTs should be utilised more in the delivery of the Prevent Strategy, 
and has proposed two options for increasing their function based on the evidence generated through this 
research.  
1. NPTs should be better informed and trained to support the PEOs in their tasking and 
engagement. 
2. NPTs should tasked with Prevent related engagement in the same way that PEOs currently are. 
 
This section will now look at what changes would have to be made to make these options a practical 
possibility, and based on this, which would be the most suitable option for the increased use of NPTs in 
the delivery of Prevent. Although option one would perhaps require less change than the second, and in 
many ways points to the role that NPTs were intended to play when the Prevent Strategy was first drafted, 
its implementation would still require some significant adjustments to the current NPT role. The research 
has repeatedly shown that for NPTs to increase their role in the delivery of Prevent in any way, the police 
would need to develop their capability and capacity to do so.  
 
Capability  
Developing the capability of NPT staff to deliver Prevent is perhaps more straight forward to achieve 
than increasing capacity in times of shrinking resources. The findings from the interviews has shown 
that NPT officers do not feel able to contribute more fully to the delivery of Prevent, because they lack 
the knowledge, understanding, and confidence to engage on such topics.  
 
The research found a mixed picture with regards to the level of Prevent training that NPT participants 
had received during their service and when participants were asked during interview ‘Do you think 
anything would have to change for NPTs to become more involved in Prevent?” all of the responses 
provided, noted the need for additional training. It would be logical to conclude that the Prevent training 
programme for NPT staff needs to be enhanced to equip them with a base level of understanding of the 
255 
 
Strategy, its purposes, and their role within it. The level of detail that this programme covered would be 
dependent on which option was chosen; if NPT staff were to take on the current engagement 
responsibilities of PEOs (option two), the training would need to be more detailed. The findings of the 
research did point to some challenges in developing the training programme for NPT staff; many NPT 
participants did not feel that they would have the capacity to attend a training session given their current 
workloads, furthermore the topic of extremism and Prevent is fast changing therefore training would 
need to be seen as an ongoing commitment. This suggests that a one-off physical training session would 
not suffice. Encouragingly, West Yorkshire Police have implemented many changes since the fieldwork 
for this research completed; the use of online briefings, mobile handheld devices, and virtual forums are 
all developments which could all be exploited to increase the knowledge and understanding of NPTs. 
As police forces move into a position where recruitment of new officers and staff is now a possibility 
again, the option of attachments with Prevent departments could be built into the initial probationary 
period training for all new officers and staff; similar processes are in place for other areas of policing 
including safeguarding and custody and have been successful in providing an understanding of different 
areas of policing which is grounded in practice. In addition to traditional training sessions for all NPT 
staff, there is also potential for the Prevent teams to develop dynamic briefings for their local NPTs to 
view on their handheld mobile devices. These could be tailored in a way that each PEO, could provide 
further information on local issues which would help the NPT staff build up knowledge and understanding 
of the issues they may be required to engage on. These briefings could also have aide memoir style 
guidance, links to more detailed information, and the contact information for their local PEOs for advice 
or general communication. Establishing a system where busy NPT officers could access information 
and training they require to engage with, and safeguard, vulnerable people at their convenience would 
undoubtedly help to increase confidence and capability to play a more active role in the delivery of 
Prevent. For an overview of how technology is being utilised more within policing to good effect see 
College of Policing, (2013). 
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Another element of developing capability relates to information sharing between Prevent and NPT teams. 
Whilst the proposed online briefing system suggested above could go some way to improving this, the 
research found fundamental issues with how information was shared between Prevent and NPT staff 
which would need a procedural solution. Currently the information flow for Prevent related tasks, comes 
from communities (often by NPTs or PEOs), directly into the Counter Terrorism Unit where it is assessed 
and then allocated accordingly, some of this information will then be passed down to PEOs for action 
through CCOs (who are the link between CTU and PEOs). Any information stemming from the action will 
subsequently be fed back into the cycle. Currently, the only way in which this information is passed to 
NPTs is if the PEOs (or somebody else in CTU) subjectively decides that they should be made aware. 
Given that much of the intelligence or information concerned is not considered SECRET, there is often 
no reason why NPTs should not have access to it. The research noted the distinction between PEOs 
being part of counter terrorism and not part of NPTs in which they are supposedly embedded in, it could 
be said that this has resulted in a cultural barrier between the sharing of information which ‘belongs’ to 
counter terrorism as opposed to the wider policing family. The literature review discussed the need for 
information to be shared across partner agencies and the challenges in doing so, however this research 
has since shown that similar barriers also exist within the police service itself. The overview of information 
sharing and the culture of ownership within the police service by Glomseth, et.al., (2007) appears to be 
particularly relevant to this issue. If either option one or two was to be successfully implemented, this 
would have to be overcome, and there would need to be a formalised information sharing process 
established between CTU and NPTs for information which is appropriate and necessary for NPTs to know 
in order to allow them to fulfil their role delivering the Prevent Strategy, NPTs would have to be considered 
a trusted party.  
 
Capacity 
Providing NPTs with the capacity to play more of a role in the delivery of Prevent is perhaps a wider 
challenge. Fundamentally, it would mean adding additional duties onto NPT staff who are already facing 
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significant demands. One of the most common themes from this research was that NPT officers and 
PCSOs were struggling to even carry out general community engagement and that their ability to do so 
was deteriorating over time. Again, West Yorkshire Police have made some significant developments 
since the fieldwork has completed that may have improved their capacity; for example the mobile 
handheld devices mean that officers and PCSOs do not have to spend as much time in the police station 
as they may have previously. There has also been recruitment of new officers in more recent years which 
has allowed NPTs to rebuild some of their numbers, however the volume of demand placed on the police 
and NPTs by default has also continued to increase year on year so it is difficult to estimate the current 
situation. Without fully reviewing the budget, resources and levels of demand placed on the police as an 
organisation, this research is limited in what judgements it can make regarding increasing the capacity 
of NPTs, however the need to do so is clear.  
 
What this research can conclude though, is that the increased capacity needed to implement option one 
appears on first glance to be significantly less than that needed to implement option two. Option one, 
would require NPTs to factor in community engagement as a whole, part of which would be focused on 
following up on Prevent related enquiries which come to their attention. Option two would require more 
time to be solely dedicated to Prevent engagement that currently is carried out by PEOs. That said, it 
should be noted that option two would essentially mean allocating out the engagement work that is 
currently carried out by one PEO over an NPT which could be made up of around eight team members, 
this would theoretically mean that the burden on each NPT individual would be lower. The PEO could 
also benefit by using this time to produce the dynamic briefings suggested previously and coordinating 
the sharing of information across the teams. Implementing option two would require more investment into 
structural changes and training of NPT officers, but could result in a more consistent approach to Prevent 
related engagement which reaches more members of the community through the increased use of NPTs.  
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Changing the role of NPTs in the delivery of the Prevent strategy also means changing the role of Prevent 
teams and the current silo structures. Whilst this does not strictly fall into the categories of developing 
capability of capacity it is still fundamental to this research. As noted earlier, the purpose of PEOs was to 
be embedded within NPTs to better integrate the two areas of policing. Whilst this may be a valid aim, 
the research has shown that the current arrangement means that PEO and NPT level is the first and only 
point in which community policing and Prevent policing come together at a practical level. The dangers 
of this in relation to the dual chain of command have been noted earlier in this thesis, however this has 
greater significance to the delivery of Prevent. To fully embed community policing and Prevent, there 
must be integration at every level of the policing structure. This chapter has noted that much of the 
difficulty in increasing the role NPTs in the delivery of Prevent stems from the merging of responsibilities 
and the addition to workloads. If these conflicts were recognised at an earlier point in demand 
management of the police, then NPT staff may not then feel pressured to continually neglect their 
proactive engagement roles in favour of more immediate risks. For example, the call centre deals with 
calls for service coming into the police which are then allocated out to the relevant team (often NPTs), at 
the same time CTU are dealing with the demands placed on them and are subsequently allocating these 
out to the relevant team (often PEOs). If NPTs were to take on an increased level of Prevent tasking, it 
would need to be managed before it got to an NPT PC or PCSO.   
 
Impact on policy and practice 
This research was carried out with the support of West Yorkshire Police, NECTU and the Police and 
Crime Commissioner, who were keen to better understand Prevent delivery within West Yorkshire Police. 
As such significant findings from the research were shared with them following the completion of the 
fieldwork period. A subsequent working group was set up including representatives from West Yorkshire 
Police, NECTU and the researcher to identify obstacles in the current delivery framework and options for 
improvement. Particular focus was put on increasing the capability of the NPTs within West Yorkshire 
Police through training, awareness raising, and standardising practices across the service. A new training 
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module was established for all new recruits to receive during their initial induction which had an increased 
emphasis on the link between Prevent and safeguarding. All existing PCs and PCSOs were also expected 
to receive this training on a three year cycle, and interim online-learning courses were also drafted. West 
Yorkshire Police also invested in improving and increasing the internal messaging around Prevent and 
radicalisation through posters, computer screensavers and messages on the force intranet, again the 
message had a heavy onus on the duty to safeguard vulnerable people against extremism. Perhaps the 
most significant development was the use of handheld mobile devices for Prevent purposes. West 
Yorkshire Police had already begun to use handheld mobile devices with frontline staff to improve 
efficiency, effectiveness and police visibility. The working group identified the potential to use this new 
technology to share Prevent related information, guidance and briefings with the wider police service. A 
series of interactive aide-memoirs were drafted for NPT PCs and PCSOs to access through the handheld 
devices when on duty, and briefing notes could be sent interactively to staff regarding relevant 
developments in their local area. Whilst this research has not carried out any post-implementation reviews 
on these developments, it is encouraging to note that West Yorkshire Police were actively trying to 
overcome some of the challenges noted through this research.   
 
Whilst the impact on the policies and practices of West Yorkshire Police could be implemented relatively 
easily, this research has also identified issues which would need to be addressed at a national level. The 
research found a clear disparity between what the role of NPTs were supposed to be in the wording of 
the Prevent Strategy, compared to what the role was in practice. The literature review and findings from 
the fieldwork pointed to a lack of consistent guidance to NPTs at both force and national level. Whilst the 
Prevent Duty guidance could be seen as an attempt to do so, it is a brief document with a broad 
partnership audience and does little to explain how individual organisations should actually implement 
Prevent. The interviews and activity reports also pointed to reducing capacities as a reason for this 
growing disparity. Whilst the national counter terrorism budget has been protected by the government 
since 2014 (Williams, 2017), the general policing budget has been cut by £2.2b or 22% between 2010 
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and 2015 (National Audit Office, 2016). This goes against the fundamental principles that the Prevent 
Strategy was built on – that Prevent should be delivered through community policing. It would appear that 
although the Government is keen to stress the links and interdependencies of community policing and 
counter terrorism in its Strategies, it has done little to enable police forces to do this in practice. Whilst 
this research cannot make conclusions relating to the costs and resources required to effectively deliver 
the Prevent Strategy, its findings have pointed to the need for clearer guidance on how the police (and 
partners) should be doing so.  
 
Limitations and further research 
This research systematically looked at whether community engagement was important to the delivery of 
the Prevent Strategy, what the role of NPTs were within this, and whether any changes should or could 
be made. It was in depth and included a range of complimentary methodologies resulting in a vast data 
set, however, it naturally had limitations in its breadth and exploration of related issues.  
 
Fundamentally, this research focused on the role that NPTs played within the delivery of the Prevent 
strategy, however as noted in the literature review, there is also a wider discussion to be had around 
what the role of the police, as a partner, is. Whilst much of the narrative points to the education sector or 
Local Authorities being the ideal lead for Prevent, in reality this has fallen to the Police (see English, 2009; 
Thomas, 2011; Stuart, 2015). Developments have been made since the completion of this fieldwork, 
around the increased involvement of partners within the delivery of Prevent, in Kirklees for example, the 
local authority has taken the lead on Channel Panels through a pilot known as Operation Dovetail 
(Wilkinson, 2016). This pilot was largely deemed a success and steps are in place to see it implemented 
nationally. Whilst the research findings relating to the role of NPT are still massively relevant to the wider 
delivery of Prevent in communities, further research into the changing partnership landscape of Prevent 
and how the police and thus NPTs contribute would be beneficial.  
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The research, like many case study based investigations was also limited in its breadth; although the 
justification for using West Yorkshire Police as a basis for this research was methodologically sound, it is 
important to acknowledge the differences in structures, policies and practices across the 43 police 
services in England and Wales. Whilst the police service is directed nationally by the Home Office, it is 
not a national service; each force has its own Police and Crime Commissioner elected by the local public, 
and its own Chief Constable who fundamentally govern the police force depending on their interpretation 
of the needs and priorities for public safety in their areas. This can result in very different policing 
structures and policies which makes it difficult to draw conclusions on the state of policing practices 
nationally. Whilst there is nothing to suggest that the findings of this research may not still be relevant to 
other police forces, it would not be safe to assume they apply without further exploration.  
 
As the fieldwork for this research took place in 2014, there have been many developments in policing 
and counter terrorism since. The focus on current practices relating to community policing and Prevent 
means that this research is naturally retrospective and thus contributes little to the understanding of future 
demand in relation to the capacity and capability of police forces to counter extremism going forward. 
Whilst the findings are still relevant to developing understanding of the issues facing policing in delivering 
Prevent and options for progression, any changes made to policies or practices to policing need to take 
into consideration predicted demands facing the police and communities in the future. On a similar note, 
this research was focused on the traditional concept of community policing and engagement, wherein 
police officers and PCSOs physical interact with the public in geographical communities. The growth of 
online platforms and social media brings with it new challenges and opportunities for the police in 
engaging with the communities that they serve. Goldsmith (2013), and Harms and Wade (2017) provide 
a useful overview of how the police as a service can adapt in order to engage via cyber space with 
individuals for general policing purposes, and some such as Tucker (2016); Awan & Blakemore, (2016) 
have recognised the need for the police and other authorities to counter the growing online rhetoric’s of 
extremists who seek to recruit individuals through online forums. However further research is needed to 
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bring these two discussions together to better understand how the police and indeed NPTs can prevent 
extremism through online engagement.  
  
Conclusion 
This research has concluded that positive community engagement is a significant factor to the successful 
delivery of the Prevent Strategy and as such community policing principles should be at the forefront of 
preventing extremism. The current role of NPTs within the delivery of the Prevent Strategy was found to 
be well below the intended level; NPTs have limited capacity to carry out engagement within communities 
for general policing purposes, and generally lack the confidence, knowledge and information to 
proactively engage within vulnerable communities on topics relating to extremism. Whilst these 
challenges could be overcome with increased focus on training, information sharing and re-prioritisation 
within West Yorkshire Police, it is clear that the reducing resources and increasing demands placed on 
policing nationally will also need to be addressed. Prevent as a programme has continued to develop at 
a time where neighbourhood policing has diminished, this has resulted in a growing disparity between 
the two policing purposes, despite the interdependencies being clear in the original narrative of the 
Prevent Strategy. This research has shown that West Yorkshire Police have already made good progress 
in delivering the Prevent strategy with the resources available, and have already begun to implement 
changes in response to this research and the wider challenges. The intentional incorporation of Prevent 
into safeguarding has been beneficial not only in reassuring vulnerable communities, but also in changing 
the perceptions of Prevent amongst NPTs. Prevent is still a counter terrorism strategy, but can also be 
considered a safeguarding measure to protect those vulnerable to extremism, making it much more 
relatable to the general duties of an NPT officer or PCSO. Fundamentally, this research concludes that 
NPTs should be utilised more within the delivery of the Prevent Strategy. Both West Yorkshire Police and 
the Home Office and need to overcome a number of challenges to allow them to do so; increasing the 
capacity of NPTs perhaps being the most critical.  
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The threat of extremism is profound and the number of individuals being radicalised within local 
communities in the UK continues to grow. The police as a service must find a way to identify and 
safeguard those who are vulnerable to extremism, and this simply cannot be done unless every PC and 
PCSO is looking. It is the duty of all members of the police service to safeguard vulnerable people against 
extremism; this responsibility is the same whether they work in a Prevent team or a Neighbourhood 
Policing Team and so they must all be equipped and allowed to do so.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A - Interview Schedule 
 
Interview details 
Participant    
Interview Reference  
Date / Location  
Consent (Y/N)  
Schedule provided 
beforehand (Y/N) 
 
 
Neighbourhood policing 
1.1 In your own words please explain what neighbourhood policing is?  
- What do you think the purpose and aims of neighbourhood policing is? 
- What do you think the priorities of neighbourhood policing are?  
1.2 As a PC/PCSO what do you feel your role is within Neighbourhood Policing  
*For PEOs, “do you think you have a role within Neighbourhood Policing?” 
- What role do you feel that NPTs play within communities? 
- Do you feel your role as a PC/PCSO/PEO is important in maintaining community cohesion? 
1.3 Do you have any thoughts as to how neighbourhood policing in your area could be improved 
for the benefit of community cohesion? 
- Are there any aspects of how NPTs currently function that help or hinder you and your colleagues 
in maintaining and improving community relations? 
- Examples; shift patterns, management of workload, delegation of responsibilities, ward areas 
etc.  
 
Prevent  
2.1 What is your current understanding and knowledge level of the Prevent Strategy? 
- If participants states no knowledge; provide brief explanation, and ask if they have had 
experience with this strand of policing?  
- When did you first become aware of the Prevent Strategy i.e. before joining the police, initial 
training, since then etc.? 
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- Have you done anything to build up your knowledge of Prevent since being approached to take 
part, i.e. reading up, speaking to people etc.? 
- Have you ever been given any training regarding the Prevent Strategy? If so by whom, when, 
content, did you find it useful etc.? 
- What is your understanding of the aims of the Prevent Strategy?  
- Do you know how it is put into practice, how does it operate/ what tactics are employed etc.? 
2.2 How well do you think Prevent Policing and Neighbourhood Policing are integrated in your 
area?  
For PCs/PCSOs: 
- Have you ever had any contact or experience of working with the Prevent team? 
- Who would you go to if you had a Prevent related query or issue? 
- Do you know how to contact the Prevent team if needed? 
- Do you know how to ensure that an intelligence report gets to CTU? If so could you briefly outline 
the steps that you would take? 
- How well do you think NPTs interact with other departments in general i.e. HMET, Safeguarding, 
etc. and do you think this is better or worse than with CTU? 
For PEOs:  
- How much contact do you have with your local NPT on a day to day basis?  
- Do you feel that you are embedded within the NPT?  
- How often do NPT colleagues contact you, seek out your help, or involve you in their duties? 
- How well do you think NPTs interact with other departments in general i.e. HMET, Safeguarding, 
etc. and do you think this is better or worse than with CTU? 
2.3 For PCs/PCSOs: Are you aware of any ongoing Prevent work in your NPT area? If so what is 
it?  
- How were you made aware? 
- Are you involved in anyway? 
For PEOs; without going into operational detail, could you give quick overview of the sort of 
ongoing Prevent work in this NPT area? 
- Are the NPT involved in any of this work?  
- Have they been made aware of the ongoing Prevent work, if so how?  
- If they haven’t been made aware or involved, what are the reasons for this?  
 
 
Local community  
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3.1 How well do you think you know your local community and its needs?  
- What do you think these needs are? 
- What makes you think that? i.e. briefings, experience, etc.  
3.2 Do you think that there are any parts of your community which are vulnerable to extremism? 
- What type of extremism? 
- Who / where? 
- What makes you think this, i.e. briefings, experience, etc. 
3.3 Are you aware of any issues in your NPT area which could contribute to a vulnerability to 
extremism, i.e. poverty, racial tensions, community tensions, presence of controversial 
groups? 
- What type of extremism? 
- Which parts of the community? 
- What makes you think this? i.e. briefings, experience, etc. 
3.4 Are there any communities in your area which you feel could be vulnerable to extremism but 
are showing good signs of resilience?  
- If so which community groups? 
- What are they doing right? 
- Is this resilience aided by the police in anyway? 
 
Neighbourhood policing in Prevent 
4.1 What you think the role of NPTs should be within preventing violent extremism in your area? 
- Do you think your team is should be involved more or less with the Prevent team and their work?  
- Do you think that NPT Officers and PCSOs should be dealing with Prevent matters or should 
this be left to the Prevent team.  
- Are there any areas of Prevent policing, i.e. engagement, intelligence, interventions etc. which 
you feel NPTs should be more or less involved in? 
4.2 If NPTs were to become more involved in the delivery of Prevent i.e. through engaging with 
local community members more, gathering community intelligence; how do you think this 
would impact neighbourhood policing in your area? 
- Do you think you would be able to cope with such additions to your workload? 
- Do you think that this would help or hinder the relationship that NPTs have with their 
communities? 
- What do you consider the pros and cons of increased NPT involvement in Prevent being? 
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4.3 Do you think anything would have to change for NPTs to become more involved in Prevent? 
-  i.e. more training, more staff, better information sharing, nothing at all? etc. 
 
Closing 
5.1 Have you got anything else you would like to share?  
**Thanks and closing** 
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Appendix B – Sanitized example of letter requesting permission to study.  
 
[Name] 
PhD Student 
Applied Criminology Centre 
[Address] 
 
 
        16th of February 2014 
Dear [insert name of representative],  
 
My name is [name] and I am a part-time PhD student in Applied Criminology at the University of Huddersfield. I 
am emailing you to request your assistance with a piece of research I am currently undertaking, whereby I wish to 
use West Yorkshire Police as a basis. 
I am studying, part-time, for a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), and also work as a Special Constable within West 
Yorkshire Police. The aim of the PhD is to ascertain the current role that Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs) 
play within the delivery of the Prevent Counter Terrorism Strategy leading on to an assessment of whether or not 
they could and should be utilised more.  
As part of my research I hope to carry out practical field work with four carefully selected NPTs within West 
Yorkshire Police as case studies. I hope to gather the required information by way of interviews, observations, 
focus groups and shift reports, and will require the commitment of approximately 30 members of staff from across 
the force (a more detailed breakdown can be provided). Ultimately the level of commitment will vary depending on 
the participant’s role, however I fully appreciate that this work will not be a key policing priority and have tailored 
my proposal accordingly. I intend that the key participants (PEOs, NPT Officers and PCSOs) would fill in a shift 
report at the end of each set, taking no more than 10 minutes, take part in interviews of less than 45 minutes 
duration, and allow me to observe them on the occasional shift. The involvement of the other participants will be 
limited to occasional interviews and liaison.  
I do not intend to commence my field work until April 2014, however I am currently at the stage where I am able to 
finalise my plans and would like the input of yourself and the proposed participants if possible. I would be most 
grateful if we could arrange to meet which would provide the opportunity to discuss my research in more detail and 
answer any questions that you may have. More importantly I would also like to know whether you as the head 
representative of West Yorkshire Police would consent to my research going ahead. I understand that you are very 
busy and would fully appreciate any time that you could give me, please feel free to contact me on any of the 
mediums provided.  
I look forward to hearing from you soon. 
Yours Faithfully,  
[name] 
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Appendix C – Example of informed consent form 
Informed Consent Form 
 
This research is being conducted by Lauren Wray as part of a doctoral thesis with the aim of ascertaining 
what the current role of Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs) is within the delivery of the Prevent Strategy, 
and whether this could and should be utilised more. 
 
The research methodology will include interviews, observations, focus groups and Police activity reports, and 
will focus on four NPTs within West Yorkshire Police which have been identified prior to the field work taking 
place.  
 
I would like to ask your permission to take part in this field work, which depending on your role or position 
within the community will vary slightly but may include all or one of the methodologies listed above. It is 
important to note that although any information provided by you may be made available to the public, it will 
be sanitised in line with the Government Protective Marking System and will be anonymised so that no 
participant can be identified.  
 
It is also important that you understand the following: 
 Your participation in this research is voluntary. 
 You are free to withdraw from the study at any time. 
 Your responses are completely confidential—your name or identity will not be connected to anything 
you say or do during the field work. 
 Any information that you provide will be sanitized to ensure that no sensitive information will be 
released to the public. 
 
Please read and answer “yes” or “no” to the following questions:  
CONSENT 
Has the research area been explained to you sufficiently, and do you understand why 
the research is taking place?  
 
Have you had the opportunity to ask questions and discuss the research?  
Do you understand that your participation in this research is entirely voluntary and 
can be stopped at any time?  
 
Do you give permission to be quoted (by use of a pseudonym) within the final 
publication of this research? 
 
Do you give permission to take part in tape-recorded interviews?   
 
If you answered yes to all of the above questions and wish to take part, please sign below to confirm 
that you fully consent to participation in this research. 
 
Participant: 
Signature: .......................................................................................... Date:…………………………………….. 
Full name (CAPITALS):……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Researcher: 
Signature: .......................................................................................... Date:…………………………………….. 
Full name (CAPITALS):……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
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Appendix D – Focus Group Session Plan 
Focus Group Session Plan 
Stage Purpose  Reason Method Risks / Considerations 
In
tr
od
uc
tio
ns
 
(5
 m
in
s)
 
House keeping N/A N/A Need to clarify 
researcher identity, 
purpose of study, and 
set rules.  
 
Important to clarify 
neutrality and 
confidentiality.  
 
Important to try and set 
a relaxed and informal 
atmosphere.  
C
om
m
un
ity
 C
oh
es
io
n 
 
(1
5 
m
in
s)
 
To understand 
how participants 
feel about the 
community in 
which they live.  
Vulnerability to 
extremism can be 
linked to poor 
community 
cohesion. It is 
important to 
ascertain how the 
participants feel 
about their 
communities, and 
whether they feel 
integrated into the 
UK.  
1. Are you happy with 
where you live?  
2. Do you feel that your 
community is well 
integrated in your area? 
3. Are there any 
community tensions in 
the area? 
 
Green/Red flags to indicate 
responses.  
 
Given the potential 
language barriers it is 
important to keep this 
fairly simple. Yes/No 
flags with green or red 
should help this. 
 
Also discourages non-
participation as each 
person would be 
responding to each 
question.   
P
ol
ic
e 
re
la
tio
ns
 
(1
5 
m
in
s)
 
How the group 
views the police 
in their area and 
what level of 
engagement they 
have.  
This research is 
ultimately looking 
at the role of 
neighbourhood 
policing in 
preventing 
extremism thus it 
is crucial to 
understand how 
they are perceived 
in vulnerable 
communities. 
Two groups or pairs 
(depending on the number), 
and ask groups to write down 
up with three positive things 
about the police in their area 
and 3 negative things. Then 
ask them to share their 
answers explaining what 
they mean, examples etc.  
 
Probing questions: 
- Would you feel 
comfortable in talking to 
the police about issues 
important to you?  
- Do you think the police 
treat you with respect? 
 
Before starting this 
question it may be useful 
to reiterate that none of 
answers will be shared 
with the police and they 
will remain entirely 
anonymous. 
  
Need to consider the 
groupings trying to 
match those who speak 
good English with those 
who don’t. 
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K
no
w
le
dg
e 
of
 P
re
ve
nt
 
(1
0 
m
in
s)
 
Establish what 
the participants 
know and feel 
about Prevent. 
Important to 
understand 
participant’s 
knowledge and prior 
involvement in 
Prevent as this will 
not only set up for 
later discussion but 
will also indicate 
whether Prevent is 
engaging with their 
communities from 
the community 
perspective.  
Ask participants to raise their 
hands if they have heard of 
Prevent police. If anyone 
puts hand up ask if they 
mind explaining to others 
what it is. For those who 
don’t, ask if they are aware in 
more general terms i.e. are 
they aware of police teams 
which are focused on 
community engagement or 
countering extremism.  
Understandably 
participants may not 
want to admit having any 
involvement with the 
police at all especially 
not Prevent police, 
therefore for this section 
important not to write 
any answers down on 
the flip board (although 
assistant will take notes 
as to the themes being 
discussed 
P
er
ce
pt
io
ns
 o
f e
xt
re
m
is
m
  
(1
0 
m
in
s)
 
Establish what 
the participants 
feel about 
extremism.  
A key element to 
the research is to 
engage with 
communities who 
are vulnerable to 
extremism. This 
will help to gage 
the level of 
vulnerability to 
radicalisation in 
this community. 
  
Write a number of 
statements (examples below) 
on the flip board and ask 
them to write down how they 
grade them on level of 
agreement. i.e. strongly 
agree / agree / disagree etc.  
 
Once this has been done 
tally the answers on the flip 
board and open of 
discussions as to why people 
feel that way about each.  
It is important not to 
mention the names of 
groups to avoid 
somebody inadvertently 
declaring their support 
for terrorism. 
 
This is perhaps the more 
controversial section of 
questioning so must be 
aware and ready to 
diffuse any conflict.  
P
ol
ic
e 
R
ol
e 
 
(1
0 
m
in
s)
 
What do 
participants think 
the police could 
do to prevent 
extremism within 
their communities 
and the UK in 
general? 
The aim of this is 
to be a concluding 
question which 
brings together 
elements of 
previous 
discussions and 
gets the 
participants view 
on what their 
community needs 
to see if this 
correlates with the 
police / local 
authority’s view 
Keep this as an open ended 
question, and jot down a 
mind-map on the flip board of 
answers. Encourage further 
discussion and try and 
informally gage level of 
support for each answer.  
 
Open ended questions 
need to be managed 
carefully to ensure all 
participants the 
opportunity to explain 
their opinions more 
broadly. Also may need 
to use the probing 
questions to either 
encourage conversation 
or keep it on track.  
C
lo
si
ng
 
Sum up and next 
steps. 
N/A - Thank everyone for their 
time and input.  
- Next steps and feedback. 
- Provide contact details and 
support information.  
Ensure opportunity for 
further, more private 
discussion. 
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Glossary 
Term Description 
Extremism Extremism can be described as the manifestation of a fanatical, religious, or 
political view point, which goes beyond typically accepted boundaries. For the 
purpose of this research it is often used to describe the threat of terrorism 
and its effect on the individual’s mind set or motivations.  
Neighbourhood 
Policing Teams (NPTs) 
Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs) are a community policing concept 
and style of policing used widely across the police forces of the UK. Typically 
an NPT involves small teams of police officers and Police Community 
Support Officers (usually 10-15 strong) who are dedicated to policing a 
certain community or area. 
Radicalisation Academics and practitioners generally define radicalisation as a process by 
which somebody comes to develop extremist beliefs 
Terrorism There are many definitions of terrorism; HM Government defines terrorism as 
“any act which causes harm, intending to influence the government, 
intimidate the public or to advance a political, religious or ideological cause.” 
The Oxford Dictionary defines terrorism as “The unlawful use of violence and 
intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims.” 
The Prevent Strategy The Prevent strategy is one strand of the CONTEST Strategy which is the UK 
Government’s counter terrorism strategy. The Prevent Strategy aims to stop 
people being drawn into extremism.  
Police Constable (PC) A Police Constable (PC) is a police officer of constable rank. The PC 
participants in this research are police officers who work on the 
Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs).  
Police Community 
Support Officer (PCSO) 
Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) work with police officers on 
Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs) and share some, but not all of their 
powers. 
Prevent Engagement 
Officers (PEOs) 
Prevent Engagement Officers (PEOs) are police officers typically of PC rank 
who are specially trained as Prevent Officers. They are embedded and work 
with NPTs, but are also tasked on Prevent matters by their senior within their 
local counter terrorism unit.  
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